Dozier v. Ragsdale
| Decision Date | 05 December 1932 |
| Docket Number | No. 4-2881.,4-2881. |
| Citation | 55 S.W.2d 779 |
| Parties | DOZIER v. RAGSDALE et al. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
J. V. Spencer and Marsh, McKay & Marlin, all of El Dorado, for appellant.
Coulter & Coulter, of El Dorado, for appellees.
A number of citizens of Union county, Ark., filed their petition to initiate a local or special statute for the purpose of fixing the compensations and expenses of certain officials of Union county, Ark., and fixing the number of their deputies, assistants, and clerks, and their salaries, and of fixing the manner in which such compensations and salaries shall be paid, and for the purpose of effecting economies in the expense of government in said county.
The initiative and referendum amendment to the Constitution (Const. Amend. No. 7) provides: "The initiative and referendum powers of the people are hereby further reserved to the legal voters of each municipality and county as to all local, special and municipal legislation of every character in and for their respective municipalities and counties, but no local legislation shall be enacted contrary to the Constitution or any general law of the State, and any general law shall have the effect of repealing any local legislation which is in conflict therewith."
The amendment further provides that in counties the number of signatures required upon any petition shall be computed upon the total vote cast for the circuit clerk. The time for filing the petition is then fixed by the amendment.
Act No. 356, page 1159, of the Acts of 1927, provides that the petition shall be filed with the county judge at least 60 days before the election, and that the county judge shall submit all such petitions to the county election commissioners, who shall place the matters petitioned for in the proper form on the tickets provided for the next general election of county officers, stating plainly and separately the matters initiated or referred with the words "for" and "against" each measure.
The act further provides that, when any measure initiated or referred shall receive a majority of the votes in the county cast upon the subject, it shall immediately become a law.
In 1910 the people of Arkansas adopted a constitutional amendment (No. 7) reserving the right and power to themselves to propose legislative measures, laws, and amendments to the Constitution, and to enact or reject the same at the polls independent of the General Assembly. That amendment undertook to provide for local legislation, but it read: "The people of each municipality, each county and of the State, reserve to themselves power to propose laws and amendments to the Constitution and to enact or reject the same at the polls as independent of the legislative assembly," etc.
No one doubted at the time, and no one doubts now, that the people, in adopting this amendment, thought they were providing for local legislation in counties, by initiating acts. But it will be observed that the reservation of power and authority to initiate and enact laws was in the same paragraph that the power was reserved to enact constitutional amendments, and this court held that that part of the amendment adopted in 1910 was meaningless.
The court said that the people of municipalities and counties, never having possessed the sovereign legislative power apart from the other people of the state, could not reserve the power to counties and municipalities to adopt constitutional amendments. The court further said that courts cannot supply legislative defects and omissions; that whenever a provision is left out of a statute, either by design or mistake of the Legislature, the courts have no power to supply it.
It was held by this court that the question for the interpreter is not what the Legislature meant, but what its language means. Hodges v. Dawdy, 104 Ark. 583, 149 S. W. 656, 662.
It will be remembered that the amendment construed by this court in the case of Hodges v. Dawdy, supra, was adopted in 1910. Thereafter the present amendment was adopted, and, in submitting the present amendment to be voted upon, the provision for the initiative and referendum amendment as to counties was in a separate paragraph, in which the amendment was not mentioned. It simply provided for local, special, and municipal legislation of every character, in and for their respective municipalities and counties. The fact that the people adopted this provision a second time, and having written it in such plain language that it cannot be misunderstood by any one, shows clearly that they intended to reserve to themselves the right to pass all local laws affecting the counties. In addition to this, in 1926, the people initiated and adopted an amendment to the Constitution (Amendment No. 14), which reads as follows:
It is therefore seen, not only that the people reserve to themselves the power to legislate as to the local affairs of the county, but they adopted an amendment expressly prohibiting the Legislature from passing any local or special law.
The appellant, however, contends that the measure adopted by the people of Union county is contrary to the general law of the state, and therefore violative of the constitutional amendment, which prohibits counties from enacting local legislation contrary to any general law of the state.
Appellant cites and relies on Act No. 216, page 691, of the Acts of 1931. That, however, is not a general law fixing the fees of the county officers of the state, but that law provides that the Legislature has determined and declared that the fees now being drawn by the different county officers, according to the provisions of general statutes of the state, and special and local acts, are based on proper classification, and that they shall continue to receive the salaries and fees under said local and special acts. Therefore the act itself provides that they are still receiving the fees and salaries under special acts, and not under general acts. We...
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Phillips v. Rothrock
...act, applicable to that county, was expressly affirmed and the source of that authority was pointed out in the case of Dozier v. Ragsdale, 186 Ark. 654, 55 S.W.2d 779, and need not be repeated. It will suffice to say that we reaffirmed that holding in the cases of Tindall v. Searan, 192 Ark......
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Tindall v. Searan
...cannot be delegated to the quorum court or any other body. Appellees say that it does not appear in the opinion in the case of Dozier v. Ragsdale, supra, the question of the constitutionality of the act was raised. We did say, however, in that case: "In 1910 the people of Arkansas adopted a......
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Clay County v. Ruff
...County to provide for their county officers and fix their compensation. These local salary acts have been held valid by this court. Dozier v. Ragsdale, supra; Smith v. Cole, 187 Ark. 471, 61 S.W.2d Reeves v. Smith, 190 Ark. 213, 78 S.W.2d 72. Our conclusion is that the initiated act of Clay......