Dewan ex rel. Situated v. M-I

• Decision Date: 22 February 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION H-15-1746
• Parties: MATTHEW DEWAN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. M-I, L.L.C. d/b/a M-I SWACO, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

MATTHEW DEWAN, Individuallyand on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. M-I, L.L.C. d/b/a M-I SWACO, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION H-15-1746

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION

February 22, 2016

OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court in the above referenced putative collective action,¹ seeking to recover unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201-219, are (1) Defendant M-I, L.L.C. d/b/a M-I Swaco's ("M-I's") motion for summary judgment (instrument #31) on the grounds that Dewan and Casey do not qualify as exempt employees under the administrative, outside sales, and/or combination exemptions from the FLSA overtime provision and (2) Plaintiff Matthew Dewan ("Dewan") and Opt-in Plaintiff William J. Casey's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings as to M-I's affirmative defenses relating to exemptions and good faith under the FLSA (#48).

Dewan's Original Complaint (#1 at p.7, ¶ 34) defines the FLSA class as follows:

All current and former drilling fluid specialists or any other employee who: (1) worked at any business located in the United States that was owned, operated, and/or acquired by Defendant during the class period; (2) claim they were misclassified as exempt from overtime compensation or was [sic] an hourly employee and now seek payment for overtime hours worked; and/or (3) were compensated on any basis where they were not properly paid at a rate of time and a half for hours worked in excess of forty (40).

The two motions deal with overlapping issues: (1) Whether M-I has adequately pleaded its affirmative defenses and whether Dewan and Casey qualify for the administrative, outside sales, and/or combination exemptions from the FLSA overtime provisions; (2) whether M-I has adequately pleaded an affirmative good faith defense for itself; and (3) whether Casey is properly a Plaintiff in this lawsuit.

Standards of Review

Summary Judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56

Summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) is appropriate when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the court determines that "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." A dispute of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to find in favor of the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Where the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant must offer evidence that undermines the nonmovant's claim or point out the absence of evidence supporting essential elements of the nonmovant's claim; the movant may, but does not have to, negate the elements of the nonmovant's case to prevail on summary judgment." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 431 (5^th Cir. 1998). "A complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

If the movant meets its burden and points out an absence of evidence to prove an essential element of the nonmovant's case on which the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the nonmovant must then present competent summary judgment evidence to support the essential elements of its claim and to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Board, 40 F.3d 698, 712 (5^th Cir. 1994). "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The nonmovant may not rely merely on allegations, denials in a pleading or unsubstantiated assertions that a fact issue exists, but must set forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact concerning every element of its cause(s) of action. Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc,, 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5^th Cir. 1998).

Conclusory allegations unsupported by evidence will not preclude summary judgment. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Board, 40 F.3d at 713; Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5^th Cir. 1996). "'[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment . . . .'" State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5^th Cir. 1990), quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.. 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). "Nor is the 'mere scintilla of evidence' sufficient; 'there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.'" Id., quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252. The Fifth Circuit requires the nonmovant to submit "'significant probative evidence.'" Id., quoting In re Municipal Bond Reporting Antitrust Litig., 672 F.2d 436, 440 (5^th Cir. 1978), and citing Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. Cajun Electric Power Co-Op., 799 F.2d 194, 197 (5^th Cir. 1986). "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Thomas v. Barton Lodge II, Ltd., 174 F.3d 636, 644 (5^th Cir. 1999), citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, and Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50.

Allegations in a plaintiff's complaint are not evidence. Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5^th Cir. 1996)("[P]leadings are not summary judgment evidence."); Johnston v. City of Houston, Tex., 14 F.3d 1056, 1060 (5^th Cir. 1995)(for the party opposing the motion for summary judgment, "only evidence--not argument, not facts in the complaint--will satisfy' the burden."), citing Solo Serve Corp. v. Westown Assoc., 929 F.2d 160, 164 (5^th Cir. 1991). The nonmovant must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial." Giles v. General Elec. Co., 245 F.3d 474, 493 (5^th Cir. 2001), citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.

The court must consider all evidence and draw all inferences from the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Board, 40 F.3d at 712-13. The Court may not make credibility determinations. Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 164 (5^th Cir. 2009), citing Turner v. Baylor Richardson Medical Center, 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5^th Cir. 2007).

Rule 12(c) Judgment on the Pleadings

Rule 12(c) provides, "After the pleadings are closed--but early enough not to delay trial--a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is "designed to dispose of cases where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts." Herbert Abstract Co. v. Touchstone Props., Ltd., 914 F.2d 74, 76 (5^th Cir. 1990), citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1367, at 509-10 (1990)("The federal courts have followed a fairly restrictive standard in ruling on motions for judgment on the pleadings. . . . The importance of the policy [in favor of ensuring to each litigant a full and fair hearing on the merits of his or her claim or defense] has made federal judges unwilling to grant a motion under Rule 12(c) unless the movant clearly establishes that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."). See also Great Plaints Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5^th Cir. 2002)("Pleadings should be construed liberally, and judgment on the pleadings is appropriate only if there are no disputed issues of fact and only questions of law remain."). The same standard used to review motions under Rule 12(b)(6) applies to motions under Rule 12(c). Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5^th Cir. 2008). The issue is whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support his claim, not whether he will ultimately prevail on the merits. Doe v. Hillsboro I.S.D., 81 F.3d 1395, 1401 (5^th Cir. 1996). The same standard of review also applies to affirmative defenses. Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 (5^th Cir. 1999).

If matters beyond the pleadings are introduced, the Rule 12(c) motion becomes one for summary judgment under Rule 56. "Hasty or imprudent use of this summary judgment procedure by the courts violates the policy in favor of ensuring to each litigant a full and fair hearing on the merits of his or her claim or defense. 5C Charles Alan Wright et al, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1368 (3d ed. data base updated Apr. 2015).

Rule 12(b)(6)

When a district court reviews a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), it must construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff and take all well-pleaded facts as true. Randall D. Wolcott, MD, PA v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5^th Cir. 2011), citing Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5^th Cir. 2009). The plaintiff's legal conclusions are not entitled to the same assumption. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)("The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions."), citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2007); Hinojosa v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 506 Fed. Appx. 280, 283 (5^th Cir. Jan. 7, 2012).

"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires...