Dewey v. Firefighters Pension and Retirement, 92,726.

• Decision Date: 08 May 2001
• Docket Number: No. 92,726.,92,726.
• Citation: 28 P.3d 539,2001 OK 40
• Parties: Thomas M. DEWEY and Thomas J. Riddle, for themselves and as class representatives of all other similarly situated retired firefighters, Appellees, v. STATE of Oklahoma, ex rel. OKLAHOMA FIREFIGHTERS PENSION AND RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Appellant.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

28 P.3d 539

2001 OK 40

Thomas M. DEWEY and Thomas J. Riddle, for themselves and as class representatives of all other similarly situated retired firefighters, Appellees, v. STATE of Oklahoma, ex rel. OKLAHOMA FIREFIGHTERS PENSION AND RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Appellant.

No. 92,726.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

May 8, 2001.

As Corrected May , 2001.

Rehearing Denied July 3, 2001.

James R. Moore and Patrick Hunt, James R. Moore and Associates, Oklahoma City, OK, for Appellees.

Marc Edwards and Dionna D. Deardorff, Phillips McFall McCaffrey McVay & Murrah, Oklahoma City, OK, for Appellant.

LAVENDER, J.

¶ 1 Resolution of today's cause requires the Court to assess in what capacity a district court acted when in a single case it both (1) reviewed an administrative agency's order entered in an individual proceeding and (2) entered judgment in favor of a certified class of litigants whose substantive claim included the same legal subject as that encompassed in the appealed agency-order. Oklahoma Firefighters Pension and Retirement Board's [appellant or Board] appeal challenges the district court's authority to enter an order¹ which embraces issues outside those posed by the submitted record of the agency's adjudication of Dewey's claim. Specifically, Board asserts that the district court was without authority (1) to determine an applicable statute of limitations' effect and (2) to enter an award of prejudgment interest.² Since the district court was sitting both as an appellate body (when it reviewed the Board's June 16, 1995 final order) and as a court of first instance (when it ruled on the class' application for declaratory relief), we conclude that the district court (1) was without authority as an appellate body to enter a judgment addressing issues outside the scope of the final order entered in the agency's adjudication of Dewey's claim but (2) was within the scope of its jurisdiction when it entered the February 12, 1999 order enforcing its earlier judgment in the class' favor. Hence, the order in issue is reversed in part and affirmed in part.

I FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 Dewey first became eligible for retirement as a firefighter on August 1, 1991. On February 4, 1994 Board received Dewey's claim — brought as a "war veteran" under the terms of 72 O.S.1991 § 67.13a — to have included in his accrued credited service (as a firefighter) his earlier military service, i.e., military service completed before he entered the firefighters retirement system.³ Accrued credited service is a determinant of retirement benefits. On June 16, 1995 Board denied Dewey the requested credit, ruling that the terms of 11 O.S.1991 § 49-138 only allow credit for military service completed after a firefighter's entry into the retirement system.

¶ 3 On July 7, 1995 Dewey [and Riddle], individually and as class representative for those firefighters who met the statutory-definition of "war veteran," brought both a suit and an appeal [under a single case number] from the Board's denial (of a military-service credit) to the district court. The class was certified on July 18, 1996 by an order approved by all parties. Judgment was entered on March 5, 1997 directing that firefighters — who were "war veterans" under the terms of 72 O.S.1991 § 67.13a and retired after its effective date (June 29, 1981) — were entitled to enhancement of their accrued credited service through consideration of their military service, regardless whether the pensioner's military service occurred before or after entry into the retirement system. The matter was remanded to the Board to perform the necessary recalculation of retirement benefits for Dewey and other affected class members. While an appeal was taken from the district court's March 5, 1997 decision by one class representative (Thomas J. Riddle) on grounds different from those asserted today,⁴ Board did not appeal from certification of the class or otherwise contest the judgment entered in the class' favor within thirty (30) days of it being filed. The March 5, 1997 judgment is now final and absolute.

¶ 4 Upon remand Board recalculated class members' retirement benefits. Eligible pensioners' retirement benefits were enhanced both retrospectively and prospectively from February 5, 1995⁵ through consideration of individually-appropriate, military-service credits. Board made no allowance for prejudgment interest in its computations. Both Dewey and class members took issue with the parameters within which Board made its retroactive recalculations, and by a October 31, 1997 motion sought enforcement of the district court's earlier judgment. The earlier judgment did not address: (1) what the applicable statute of limitation was; (2) from when it ran, i.e., the accrual date for eligible class members' claims; or (3) the class' entitlement to and calculation of prejudgment interest.

¶ 5 The trial court's February 12, 1999 postjudgment enforcement order directs that corrected benefits for Dewey and all eligible class members, plus prejudgment interest, be paid from February 4, 1991 [a date which is three years antecedent to the filing date of Dewey's administrative claim] until February 5, 1997 — the trial court's "ruling date."⁶Class and Board both agree that today's action is governed by the three-year statutory limitation period for actions upon a liability created by statute.⁷

¶ 6 Board appealed from the trial court's enforcement order on March 5, 1999. Class filed a counter-appeal on March 11, 1999, asserting that some class members (those in a deferred option plan) were — contrary to the enforcement order's terms — entitled to a higher rate of prejudgment interest. Class rests its argument upon the terms of 11 O.S.1991 § 49-106.1(E)(2).⁸

II THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7 In today's cause the Board questions the district court's jurisdiction; and Dewey and the class members raise issues of adjective law concerning application of the appropriate limitations period and entitlement to interest on their judgment. The primary focus of today's appeal is the district court's resolution of these issues through its postjudgment enforcement order and as such essentially presents questions of law which are reviewed de novo.⁹ An appellate court has plenary, independent and non-deferential authority to reexamine a trial court's legal rulings.¹⁰

¶ 8 To the extent that today's cause questions the district court's jurisdiction in entering its postjudgment order [in the context of an appeal brought from an administrative order entered in an "individual proceeding"] the provisions of the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act [OAPA], 75 O.S.1991 § 250 et seq., as amended, govern the Court's review.¹¹

III AS TO DEWEY'S INDIVIDUAL CLAIM, THE DISTRICT COURT WAS WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO ENTER ITS ENFORCEMENT ORDER WHICH ADDRESSED ISSUES OUTSIDE THE RECORD SUBMITTED OF THE INDIVIDUAL PROCEEDING

¶ 9 The Court begins its analysis by assessing the nature of the legal proceedings prosecuted by the parties before the district court. This is made difficult by the fact that the district court's March 5, 1997 judgment, which is final and now absolute, simultaneously addresses under a single case-number two different proceedings on the same subject [the availability of a military-service credit for firefighters who are war veterans and also possess vested interests in the firefighter-retirement system]. The parties' failure to comprehend the judgment's dual nature — i.e., as (1) a judgment which embodies an appellate opinion and (2) a decision on a class' application for declaratory relief — results in a failure to understand the full nature of the district court's March 5, 1999 postjudgment enforcement order.

¶ 10 Dewey, as an individual, brought a petition for review of Board's June 16, 1995 order entered in the individual proceeding on his administrative claim. His appeal from the agency's final order under the OAPA's provisions invokes the district court's appellate jurisdiction.¹² In response to his appeal the district court entered its March 5, 1997 judgment and the same is final and today beyond the reach of the Court's appellate jurisdiction. Neither Dewey nor the Board can now be heard for the first time to appeal the judgment, its terms and provisions.

¶ 11 Dewey's appeal to the district court from the Board's order denying his claim was necessarily brought under the terms of 75 O.S.Supp.1992 § 318(A)(1).¹³ The district court's March 5, 1997 judgment addressed the sole issue presented by the administrative hearing's record, i.e., Dewey's legal entitlement to a military-service credit. The district court remanded the cause to the agency for recalculation of Dewey's retirement benefits in a manner consistent with the reviewing court's legal conclusions. The March 5, 1997 judgment [qua appellate opinion] became final and absolute when no appeal from its provisions was prosecuted within thirty (30) days after it was filed.

¶ 12 There are no OAPA provisions which authorize the district court to re-open appellate proceedings for enforcement purposes once they become final. Further, the issues of (1) entitlement to prejudgment interest and (2) the proper limitations period are not part of the administrative record which was forwarded to the district court for review. Extant jurisprudence requires that when considering an appeal brought under the OAPA's provisions the district court must confine its review to the record made before the administrative tribunal.¹⁴ Hence, the district court was acting outside its authority when it attempted to enter its February 12, 1999 enforcement order as part of the appellate proceedings brought from the Board's June 16, 1995 adjudicative order. Insofar as the district court's February 12, 1999 order addresses Dewey's § 318(A)(1)¹⁵ individual appeal, the same is reversed.

IV THE DISTRICT COURT RETAINED JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE ITS MARCH 5, 1997 JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE CLASS' FAVOR

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