Rankins v. Commission On Professional Competence

• Decision Date: 30 April 1979
• Docket Number: S.F. 23769
• Citation: 593 P.2d 852,154 Cal.Rptr. 907,24 Cal.3d 167
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 593 P.2d 852, 19 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 925, 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 9234 Warren RANKINS, as Superintendent-Principal, etc. et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE OF the DUCOR UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Appellants; Thomas Edward BYARS, Real Party in Interest and Appellant.

Page 907

154 Cal.Rptr. 907

24 Cal.3d 167, 593 P.2d 852, 19 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 925,

19 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 9234

Warren RANKINS, as Superintendent-Principal, etc. et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE OF the DUCOR UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Appellants Thomas Edward BYARS, Real Party in Interest and Appellant.

S.F. 23769.

Supreme Court of California.

April 30, 1979.

Rehearing Denied May 30, 1979.

Chain, Younger, Jameson, Lemucchi, Busacca & Williams, Paul G. Busacca, Bakersfield, and Leonard Sacks, Encino, for real party in interest and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen. and William J. Power, Deputy Atty. Gen., for defendants and appellants.

Calvin E. Baldwin, County Counsel, and Thomas D. Bowman, Asst. County Counsel, Visalia, for plaintiffs and respondents.

NEWMAN, Justice.

We inquire in this case whether as a condition of employment a school district may require a teacher to forego adherence to bona fide religious tenets that require several absences a year for observance of a church's holy days. We have concluded that under the circumstances presented such a condition of employment violates article I, section 8, of the California Constitution, which provides: "A person may not be disqualified from entering or pursuing a business, profession, vocation, or employment because of sex, race, Creed, color, or national or ethnic origin." (Italics added.)

Thomas Byars was hired by Ducor Union School District in 1969 as an elementary classroom teacher under a contract requiring him "to render service . . . for such length of time during the school year as the Governing Board of the School District may direct." In 1971 he joined the Worldwide Church of God, which requires its members to refrain from all work on its weekly Sabbath (sundown Friday to sundown Saturday) and on certain holy days. To accommodate for those observances the district excused Byars from all Friday evening and Saturday activities and permitted him to be absent on two holy days in 1971- 1972 and again in 1972-1973. His requests for permission to be absent on other holy days, always submitted well in advance, were denied. Accordingly he was absent without permission for eight days in 1971-1972, five in 1972-1973, eight in 1973-1974, and ten in 1974-1975. Most of those days were consecutive. On each day of absence his class was taught by a substitute teacher for whom he had prepared a detailed lesson plan. The same substitute was employed for most absences in each school year.

Byars' religious sincerity and his competence as a teacher are unquestioned. The compensation of substitutes apparently was deducted from his salary (Ed.Code, former § 13467, now § 44977).

In March 1973 the district sent him a letter of reprimand, stating its disapproval of the unexcused absences and warning that their continuation would justify his dismissal. By the same letter, however, the district rehired him for 1973-1974 and made him a permanent instead of a probationary employee.

In May 1975 the district notified him of its intent to dismiss him for "(p) ersistent violation of or refusal to obey the school laws of the state or reasonable regulations prescribed for the government of the public schools" (Ed.Code, former § 13403, subd. (g), now § 44932, subd. (g)), basing its charges solely on the absences. At his request a hearing was held on July 24, 1975, before a commission on professional competence (Ed.Code, former § 13413, subd. (b), now § 44944, subd. (b); see Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist. v. Commission on Professional Competence (1977) 20 Cal.3d 309, 311 fn. 1, 142 Cal.Rptr. 439, 572 P.2d 53).

The district superintendent testified that a substitute cannot equal a good regular teacher because the substitute takes time to become acquainted with the pupils' abilities and discipline problems, and may not be able to execute the lesson plan properly or acquire enough information to provide continuity of instruction. There was no other evidence of detriment caused by Byars' absences. ¹ He introduced evidence that members of his church employed as teachers by five nearby school districts in Kern County were allowed to observe the holy days without hindrance or threat of discharge.

The commission found that none of his absences had a substantially detrimental effect on the educational program and that the district's denial of his requests for permission to be absent, together with its threats of discharge for such absences, interfered with his free exercise of religion. The commission concluded that this interference violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 4, of the California Constitution ² and, therefore, that he had not failed to obey a valid school law or regulation.

The district, its superintendent, and its board then brought the present mandate proceeding attacking the commission's order. (Ed.Code, former § 13414, now § 44945.) The trial court ruled that discharge of Byars was proper on the record before the commission. ³ The court found that his replacement by substitute teachers during his absences had a "substantial detrimental effect" that justified the district's discharging him notwithstanding the constitutional provisions cited by the commission. Accordingly the court ordered issuance of a writ of mandate; Byars appeals.

Would Byars' dismissal for absences required by his religious faith cause him to be "disqualified from . . . pursuing . . . (an) employment because of . . . creed" in violation of article I, section 8 of the California Constitution? The stated reason for dismissal was not his religion but his nonattendance at school in accordance with district rules. Section 8, however, forbids not only overt religious discrimination but also qualifications for employment that are discriminatory in effect. (See Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) 406 U.S. 205, 220, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15; Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971) 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158.) Though the district's rules are religiously neutral on their face, their effect was to exclude Byars from his employment because of his adherence to the precepts of his church. (See Sherbert v. Verner (1963) 374 U.S. 398, 403-404, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965.) Unless that adherence created "an inability to perform the tasks required by a particular occupation," reliance on it for dismissal amounted to disqualification because of religion. (See Sail'er Inn v. Kirby (1971) 5 Cal.3d 1, 9, 95 Cal.Rptr. 329, 333, 485 P.2d 529, 533.) ⁴

No published court opinion seems to have construed article I, section 8's prohibition of religious discrimination. Lines between (1) religiously proscribed tasks that the employment may lawfully require, and (2) tasks whose requirement by the employer would constitute unlawful religious discrimination have most frequently been drawn under the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 703(a)(1) of the act makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). ⁵ To implement that section the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission in 1967 issued guidelines declaring that the duty not to discriminate on religious grounds includes an obligation to make reasonable accommodation to employees' religious needs insofar as possible without undue hardship on the employer's business. (29 C.F.R. § 1605.1.) ⁶

The guidelines were incorporated into a 1972 amendment of the act (42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)), ⁷ and five years later the Supreme Court upheld them as a "defensible construction of the pre-1972 statute" (Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison (1977) 432 U.S. 63, 76, fn. 11, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 2272, 53 L.Ed.2d 113). Earlier decisions in three federal circuits approved the guidelines' requirement of reasonable accommodation without undue hardship as a proper application of the principle (declared in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra, 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158) that discrimination may be established by showing the disproportionate impact of an employment practice not justified by "business necessity." ⁸ (Yott v. North American Rockwell Corp. (9th Cir. 1974) 501 F.2d 398, 402-403; Riley v. Bendix Corp. (5th Cir. 1972) 464 F.2d 1113, 1115-1117; Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co. (6th Cir. 1975) 527 F.2d 515, 517 fn. 1; Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co. (6th Cir. 1972) 468 F.2d 346, 350; but see contrary Sixth Circuit cases: Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co. (1970) 429 F.2d 324, 329-330, affd. by equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689, 91 S.Ct. 2186, 29 L.Ed.2d 267; Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co. (1975) 521 F.2d 512, 519, hg. en banc den., 525 F.2d 986.)

Relying on those decisions the Alaska Supreme Court recently construed its state statute forbidding religious discrimination as implying a similar duty of reasonable accommodation. (Wondzell v. Alaska Wood Products, Inc. (1978) 583 P.2d 860, 864; cf. Olin v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n (1977) 67 Ill.2d 466, 474-475, 10 Ill.Dec. 501, 504-505, 367 N.E.2d 1267, 1270-1271 (leaving question open under Illinois statute).) We think that duty also is implied by California's constitutional prohibition of religious disqualification from employment (art. I, § 8). Californians adopted the prohibition in 1974, and it expresses the same deep concern for religious freedom that underlies the First Amendment (see, e. g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. 205, 220-221, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15). Just as that historic amendment protects religious practices from interference in the absence of a compelling state interest (People v. Woody (1964) 61 Cal.2d 716, 40 Cal.Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813), article I, section 8...