Dexter v. Dexter

• Citation: 186 N.E. 782,283 Mass. 327
• Parties: DEXTER v. DEXTER.
• Decision Date: 29 June 1933
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

283 Mass. 327

186 N.E. 782

DEXTER

v.DEXTER.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

June 29, 1933.

Report from Probate Court, Hampden County; R. L. Davenport, Judge.

Petition by Susan L. Dexter against Eleanor H. Dexter, guardian, to revoke decree of guardianship of William Clifford Dexter. On reservation and report.

Petition dismissed.

C. R. Clason, of Springfield, for respondent William Clifford dexter.

W. G. McKechnie, A. A. Aronstam, and M. J. Donovan, all of Springfield, for respondent Eleanor H. Dexter.

J. S. Kane, of Springfield, for petitioner.

RUGG, Chief Justice.

This case comes before us on reservation with statement of facts by a judge of probate, it being stipulated by all parties that the evidence need not be reported. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 215, § 13. Cook v. Howe, 280 Mass. 325, 182 N. E. 581.

This is a petition filed on October 30, 1931, by Susan L. Dexter praying that a decree entered on September 5, 1928, be declared null and void. That decree was entered upon a petition filed on September 4, 1928, by Eleanor H. Dexter alleging that she was ‘a relative of the respondent,’ William C. Dexter, that in her judgment he by excessive indulgence in various vices so spent, wasted and lessened his estate ‘as to expose himself or his family to want or suffering and * * * the city of Springfield to charge or expense for his or their support,’ and praying that ‘she or some other suitable person may be appointed guardian of the person and estate of said’ William C. Dexter. Eleanor H. Dexter was the wife of William C. Dexter and he assented to the allowance of the petition. No order of notice issued on that petition and the petitioner was appointed guardian of William C. Dexter on the ground that he was a spendthrift.William C. Dexter, now about forty years old, and his wife have no children; she is not related to him by consanguinity. His nearest ‘presumptive next of kin’ are the present petitioner and her two brothers, all of whom are related to him as first cousins. The present petitioner did not have knowledge of the entry of the decree of September 5, 1928, appointing the respondent guardian within twenty days thereafter, but did have such knowledge within about three months thereafter and before Christmas of 1928, and took no action to disturb that decree up to the time of filing the present petition. William C. Dexter has title to real estate, as tenant by the entirety with the respondent, and other assets including bank deposits and insurance policies. The petitioner, if she survives William C. Dexter, may have an interest in this property as one of his presumptive next of kin.

The main contention of the petitioner is that the decree of September 5, 1928, was unauthorized and void under the terms of the enabling statute. It was provided by G. L. c. 201, § 8 (see now G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 201, § 8) that ‘a relative of the alleged spendthrift’ may file a petition for the appointment of a guardian of his person and estate. It is argued that the wife is not a ‘relative’ of her husband and that therefore the present respondent had no standing to file the petition on which the decree of September 5, 1928, was founded.

Public officers alone were authorized to petition for the appointment of a guardian of a spendthrift prior to the enactment of St. 1897, c. 173, whereby ‘a relation or relations' also were so authorized. See O'Donnell v. Smith, 142 Mass. 505, 511, 8 N. E. 350. The substitution of ‘a relative’ for those words in G. L. c. 201, § 8, were a mere verbal change making no alteration in the substance of the statute. Main v. County of Plymouth, 223 Mass. 66, 69, 111 N. E. 694;Boston & Albany Railroad v. Boston, 275 Mass. 133, 138, 175 N. E. 740. There is no hard and fast definition of the word ‘relative.’ It is a word of general and comprehensive signification. According to definitions by lexicographers, it comprehends a person connected by consanguinity and also one connected by affinity.Esty v. Clark, 101 Mass. 36, 38,3 Am. Rep. 320;Lavery v. Egan, 143 Mass. 389, 392, 9 N. E. 747;Thompson v. Thornton, 197 Mass. 273, 276, 83 N. E. 880. The word as used in wills has been narrowed in its construction so as to be the equivalent of those who would take under the statute of distributions either as next of kin or by representation of next of kin unless a contrary intention appearn. Thompson v. Thornton, 197 Mass. 273, 276, 83 N. E. 880. Nevertheless, instances occur where the word is used in a somewhat colloquial sense, even in testamentary instruments, and is given meaning accordingly. Frye v. Saunders, 248 Mass. 285, 287, 142 N. E. 759. The word was interpreted in Esty v. Clark, 101 Mass. 36, 3 Am. Rep. 320, in the statute now G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 191, § 22, providing that a legacy ‘to a child or other relation of the testator,’ who dies before but leaves issue surviving the testator, shall go to such issue unless a different disposition is required by the will, as meaning kindred by blood and excluding the wife. That decision appears to be in harmony with the design of the statute because a testator would hardly intend a gift to go to stepchildren to the exclusion of those of his own blood without some definite expression of purpose to that end. See, also, Curley v. Lynch, 206 Mass. 289, 292, 92 N. E. 429;Worcester Trust Co. v. Turner, 210 Mass. 115, 120, 96 N. E. 132;Union Trust Co. v. Bingham, 273 Mass. 287, 173 N. E. 435;McInnes v. Spillane (Mass.) 185 N. E. 47.

The cardinal rule for the interpretation of a statute is to ascertain the intent of the legislative body enacting it from its several parts and all its words construed according to the common and approved usage of the language, unless words of technical and precise meaning are employed, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, its subject-matter, the pre-existing law, the mischief to be remedied, and the object to be accomplished, to the end that it be given effect in harmony with common sense and the general welfare. Duggan v. Bay State Street Railway, 230 Mass. 370, 374, 119 N. E. 757, L. R. A. 1918E, 680;Armburg v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 276 Mass. 418, 426, 177 N. E. 665, 80 A. L. R. 1408.

The purpose of the enactment of St. 1897, c. 173, manifestly was to enlarge the class of persons who might petitionfor the appointment of a guardian of a spendthrift. By using the words ‘relation or relations' manifestly a broad field of persons presumably having genuine interest in such a person was...