DeYarman v. State, 2--56100
| Decision Date | 19 February 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 2--56100,2--56100 |
| Citation | 226 N.W.2d 26 |
| Parties | Randy K. DeYARMAN, a minor, by his next friend, Ronald K. DeYarman, et al., Appellants, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Michael L. Huston, Des Moines, for appellants.
Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., and John E. Beamer, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Heard before MOORE, C.J., and MASON, LeGRAND, REES and REYNOLDSON, JJ.
This case involves five claims for damages arising out of an automobile accident. Plaintiffs seek recovery on the ground the State was negligent in the construction and maintenance of the shoulders abutting the highway where the accident occurred. Plaintiffs appeal from an adverse judgment, holding the State free from liability. We affirm the trial court.
On July 29, 1967, an automobile driven by plaintiff Ronald K. DeYarman and one driven by William C. Marlin, proceeding in opposite directions on Highway 218, collided almost head-on. Just prior to the collision, Marlin's right wheels (or one of them) had dropped off the pavement onto the shoulder of the road. As he came back onto the pavement, he crossed the center line into the path of the DeYarman car. DeYarman's efforts to avoid the Marlin car were unsuccessful, and the two vehicles met on DeYarman's side of the road with resulting injuries to all occupants of the DeYarman car.
Plaintiffs claim the negligent condition of the shoulder caused Marlin to lose control of his car, thus causing the accident for which they say the State must bear responsibility. The trial court found the State was negligent; but it also found such negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident. This is the finding which plaintiffs dispute. It is, indeed, the issue upon which this case turns.
By agreement trial was limited to a determination of liability, with the question of damages reserved for later proof in the event that became necessary. Although there were 17 witnesses, numerous exhibits, and 500 pages of transcript, the issues presented are few in number and limited in scope. Plaintiffs claim (1) the trial court applied an erroneous rule of law in ruling on proximate cause and (2) there was no substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings.
The Iowa Tort Claims Act (Chapter 25A, The Code) provides that claims against the State are triable to the court without a jury. See § 25A.4, The Code. Under such circumstances, the trial court's findings of fact are binding on us if supported by substantial evidence. Rule 344(f) 1, Rules of Civil Procedure; Farmers Insurance Group v. Merryweather, 214 N.W.2d 184, 186 (Iowa 1974).
Several other applicable rules should be stated. Our review is not de novo, but only on errors assigned. We view the evidence in its light most favorable to the judgment, and we construe the findings of the trial court liberally to uphold, rather than defeat, the result reached. Long v. Glidden Mutual Insurance Association, 215 N.W.2d 271, 272 (Iowa 1974); Farmers Insurance Group v. Merryweather, supra, 214 N.W.2d at 186; Frantz v. Knights of Columbus, 205 N.W.2d 705, 708 (Iowa 1973); Northrup v. Foster, 204 N.W.2d 889, 891 (Iowa 1973); Reichle v. Zeman, 204 N.W.2d 636, 637 (Iowa 1973).
I. Plaintiffs' first complaint urges us to reverse this judgment because the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in ruling the State's negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident. They argue the trial court erroneously held there could be only One proximate cause; and that Marlin's negligence was impliedly found to have proximately caused the accident, leading to the incorrect conclusion the State's negligence could not therefore have been the legal cause of the accident. In connection with this argument, plaintiffs claim the trial court also wrongly found Marlin's negligence was a superseding cause which relieved the State of liability. We believe plaintiffs completely misconstrue the trial court's findings.
It is apparent the court was quite aware of the rule there may be more than one proximate cause and that concurring negligence, if each meets the proximate cause test, may render several tort-feasors jointly and severally liable. See Andrews v. Struble, 178 N.W.2d 391, 398 (Iowa 1970); Adams v. Deur, 173 N.W.2d 100, 111 (Iowa 1969); Osterfoss v. Illinois Central Railroad, 215 N.W.2d 233, 238 (Iowa 1974). The trial court pointedly referred to this rule during the course of the trial, and its findings of fact and conclusions of law are couched in language clearly demonstrating the correct rule was used in fixing proximate cause.
Plaintiffs devote much of their written brief to persuade us the trial court decided the case on the theory Marlin's negligence was a superseding cause which relieved the State of liability. That was not the trial court's rationale at all, and the record reflects nothing to support such an argument. There was simply a finding that under the evidence the State's negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident.
We reject plaintiffs' argument the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard in reaching its proximate cause conclusion.
II. We next consider plaintiffs' claim there was no substantial evidence to support the findings made.
Ordinarily negligence and proximate cause are matters to be determined by the trier of fact and only in exceptional cases may they be settled as questions of law. Rule 344(f) 10, R.C.P., Ruan Transportation Corp. v. Jacobs, 216 N.W.2d 182, 185 (Iowa 1974); Osterfoss v. Illinois Central Railroad, supra, 215 N.W.2d at 238.
Even though negligence is established, it does not necessarily follow that proximate cause exists. This is a question to be separately determined. Kastler v. Iowa Methodist Hospital, 193 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Iowa 1971); Robeson v. Dilts, 170 N.W.2d 408, 412 (Iowa 1969).
Three witnesses gave eyewitness testimony, and their evidence is conflicting. The versions given by Mr. DeYarman and Mr. Marlin would unquestionably have supported a finding against the State on the issue of proximate cause; but there was ample evidence to dispute them from Yvonne Lawrence, the only truly disinterested witness. In substance she testified as follows: She was four or five car lengths behind the Marlin car as it proceeded north on Highway 218. The...
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Lewis v. State
...some causal connection between it and plaintiffs' injuries. Frederick v. Goff, 251 Iowa 290, 297, 100 N.W.2d 624, 628; DeYarman v. State, 226 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Iowa 1975), and authorities In Restatement, Second, Torts, section 430, it is stated: "Necessity of Adequate Causal Relation "In order......
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...this question must be separately determined. Northwestern Nat. Ins. v. Raid Quarries Corp., Iowa, 249 N.W.2d 640, 643; DeYarman v. State, Iowa, 226 N.W.2d 26, 28. Proof of the necessary causal connection may be by either direct or circumstantial evidence but in event the latter is used, it ......
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Moody v. Bogue
...which evidence is entitled to belief and the appellate court will not weigh or pass on the credibility of witnesses. DeYarman v. State, 226 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 1975); North Western National Insurance Co. v. Raid Quarries Corp., 249 N.W.2d 640 (Iowa 1977). Further, we must consider the evidence ......
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