Ruan Transport Corp. v. Jacobs, 56312

Decision Date27 March 1974
Docket NumberNo. 56312,56312
PartiesRUAN TRANSPORT CORPORATION, a corporation, Appellee, v. Donald Eugene JACOBS, Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Linnan & Lynch, Algona, for appellant.

Joseph J. Straub, Algona, for appellee.

Submitted to MOORE, C.J., and MASON, LeGRAND, UHLENHOPP and REYNOLDSON, JJ.

MASON, Justice.

This is an action at law for property damage to a tractor truck unit owned by plaintiff, Ruan Transport Corporation, alleged to have been sustained as a result of a collision with a 1965 Mercury Comet automobile owned and being driven by defendant, Donald Eugene Jacobs. Plaintiff's theory of recovery was based on defendant's alleged negligence in one or more of eight specifications as a proximate cause of the collision. Defendant asserted negligence of the driver of plaintiff's truck as a complete defense.

Defendant's motion for directed verdict made at the close of plaintiff's evidence and renewed at the close of all evidence was overruled and the matter submitted to a jury which returned a plaintiff's verdict of $2145.15. Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and his motion in the alternative for new trial were overruled and he appeals.

Defendant presents three issues for review which involve one question, whether the speed of plaintiff's driver under all the conditions and circumstances shown constituted violation of the assured clear distance ahead rule and therefore established contributory negligence as a matter of law.

Section 321.285, The Code, 1973, in pertinent part provides:

'Speed restrictions. Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed not greater than nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard to the traffic, surface and width of the highway and of any other conditions then existing, and no person shall drive any vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than will permit him to bring it to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead, such driver having the right to assume, however, that all persons using said highway will observe the law.'

The facts giving rise to the collision occurred February 11, 1969. James Popinga, employed as a truck driver for plaintiff corporation, picked up a load of cement in Mason City, Iowa, to be delivered to a company in Elmore, Minnesota. The load was placed on a flat bed trailer covered with a canvas rubberized tarp tied down on the sides and ends. Total weight of the tractor cab, trailer and cargo was approximately 72,500 pounds.

Although there was only light snow and blowing snow in Mason City, as Popinga headed west on highway 18 the weather became worse and the snow and blowing snow greatly reduced visibility. As a precaution he drove with his headlights on. At Garner Popinga stopped and called his employer to see if he should bring the truck back because of the poor visibility. He was told that other drivers were still running and to try and go ahead but that he should use his own judgment. As it seemed conditions had lessened somewhat Popinga decided to continue on.

From highway 18 he turned north on highway 69, then west on highway 9 and finally north again on highway 169. Popinga maintained a steady speed of about 30--35 miles per hour rather than the normal speed of 50--55 miles per hour because of the poor conditions. Visibility at times was as much as a quarter of a mile, but at other times only 10--20 feet. As he approached the scene of the accident, about 3 miles south of his destination, visibility was very bad. Popinga testified that just before the collision he could see only 10 feet ahead.

Highway 169 intersects with a black top road about 3 miles south of Elmore. Defendant, a seventy-year-old retired farmer, arrived at the intersection a few minutes before the accident. He stopped at the stop sign on the west side of the intersection and looked both north and south on highway 169 several times. Two cars with their headlights on passed through the intersection going north; Jacobs estimated their speed at about 20--25 miles per hour. Visibility at this time was very poor because the snow was blowing quite hard. It was so bad defendant hesitated at the intersection for about five minutes. During this time he finally opened his car door, stood up out of the car, and again looked both ways on highway 169; apparently satisfied he got back in the car and made a left turn onto highway 169 heading north.

Although the evidence is conflicting, Popinga entered the intersection at almost the same time as Jacobs began to make his turn. He claims that the front end of Jacobs' car was in the northbound lane but the rear in the southbound lane and that it was still in the act of turning and had not yet straightened out. Jacobs contends that he had come around and travelled about 125 feet north at the time of impact.

Popinga testified visibility at this time was only about 10 feet and he saw nothing until he came into the intersection; his speed was still 30--35 miles per hour. Upon seeing the car he sounded his horn and swerved left into the southbound lane. He succeeded in missing the car with the truck cab but the front tandems of the trailer came in contact with the rear of the car. After swerving to the left Popinga hit a patch of ice and lost steering control; the front end went into the road curb and the trailer jackknifed.

Upon arrival at the scene highway patrolman Cogdall found the trailer broken away from the cab in the southbound lane facing north. The cab was in the southbound lane facing south at the north end of the intersection. Bags of cement were scattered about the highway. The car was facing north on the east shoulder of the highway, about 50--100 feet north of the intersection but it had been moved. Cogdall testified in his opinion the point of impact was at the north edge of the intersection.

Plaintiff's testimony showed that given its weight and speed it would take about 800 feet to stop the truck.

I. In this action our review is limited to consideration of errors properly assigned. Rule 334, Rules of Civil Procedure.

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6 cases
  • Ehlinger v. State
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • January 21, 1976
    ...trier of fact and only in exceptional cases may they be settled as questions of law. Rule 344(f)(10), R.C.P.; Ruan Transport Corporation v. Jacobs, 216 N.W.2d 182, 185 (Iowa 1974). These rules, impartially applied in tort claims act appeals, have supported judgment for the State, DeYarman v......
  • Rubel v. Hoffman, 2--56204
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • May 21, 1975
    ...the trier of fact and only in exceptional cases may they be settled as questions of law. Rule 344(f)10, R.C.P.; Ruan Transport Corp. v. Jacobs, 216 N.W.2d 182, 185 (Iowa 1974); Osterfoss v. Illinois Central Railroad, supra, 215 N.W.2d (233) at 'Even though negligence is established, it does......
  • Nolte v. Case
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • September 18, 1974
    ...snow packed highways. See Coppola v. Jameson, 200 N.W.2d 877, 879--880 (Iowa 1972) and authorities cited.' Ruan Transport Corporation v. Jacobs, 216 N.W.2d 182, 185 (Iowa 1974). Most often the discernible object involved is another car or other vehicle. See Anderson v. Kist, 229 Iowa 462, 2......
  • DeYarman v. State, 2--56100
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • February 19, 1975
    ...the trier of fact and only in exceptional cases may they be settled as questions of law. Rule 344(f) 10, R.C.P., Ruan Transportation Corp. v. Jacobs, 216 N.W.2d 182, 185 (Iowa 1974); Osterfoss v. Illinois Central Railroad, supra, 215 N.W.2d at Even though negligence is established, it does ......
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