Deziel v. Difco Laboratories, Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 June 1974
• Docket Number: Nos. 1--3,s. 1--3
• Citation: 232 N.W.2d 146,394 Mich. 466
• Parties: Mary DEZIEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DIFCO LABORATORIES, INC., and Michigan Mutual Liability Company, Defendants-Appellees. Yusuf BAHU, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. Harold K. MacKENZIE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, FISHER BODY DIVISION, Defendant-Appellee. ,
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 146

232 N.W.2d 146

Mary DEZIEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DIFCO LABORATORIES, INC., and Michigan Mutual Liability

Company, Defendants-Appellees.

Yusuf BAHU, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

Harold K. MacKENZIE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, FISHER BODY DIVISION,

Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 1--3, June Term, 1974.

394 Mich. 466, 232 N.W.2d 146

Supreme Court of Michigan,

Aug. 19, 1975.

Jerome W. Kelman, for Kelman, Loria, Downing & Schneider, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant in 54825.

Kelman, Loria, Downing & Schneider by Donald W. Loria and Rodger G. Will, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant in 54879.

Levine & Benjamin, P.C. by Alvin L. Levine, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant in 55072.

LeVasseur, Werner, Mitseff & Brown by Grahame G. Capp, Detroit, for defendants-appellees in 54825.

I. Gross, Lacey & Jones, Detroit, for defendant-appellee in 54879.

Plunkett, Cooney, Rutt, Watters, Stanczyk & Pedersen by Edward K. Pedersen, Jr., Leonard E. Nagi, Detroit, for defendant-appellee in 55072; Ross L. Malone, Gen. Counsel, General Motors Corp., Detroit, of counsel.

Robert D. Thompson, Southfield, for Michigan Self-Insurers Assn.

Before the Entire Bench except SWAINSON and LINDEMER, JJ.

T. G. KAVANAGH, Chief Justice.

We granted leave in these cases and directed that they be argued and submitted consecutively because they all concern aspects of the same problem which we perceive to be of importance in the workmen's compensation law--the compensability of psychiatric injuries.

The facts in each case differ.

DEZIEL

Mary Deziel, 39 at the time of suit, began working for Difco in 1968 handling test tubes, mixtures and various chemicals. On January 23, 1969 a test tube she was filling broke causing glass to get into her eye. She was treated the next day and returned to work. On April 24, 1969 a test tube filled with iodine slipped from her hand and hit the table, splattering iodine around her eyes. She has not returned to work since. She made claim for compensation asserting she cannot work because of pain in the back of her eyes, anxiety, headaches, tiredness, and occasional dizziness, nausea and tightness in the chest. No physical cause for these symptoms had been found.

In her testimony before the referee Deziel denied being treated for headaches and nervousness prior to working for Difco.

However, prior to her employment with Difco, Deziel lived and worked in Ontario where she was treated by Dr. Brewer, who was deposed by Difco after the referee's decision. Brewer testified that he had treated Deziel for various ailments including headaches, anxiety, and tiredness but did not recall whether she had complained of eye problems.

The referee accepted and adopted the disease theory of Difco's psychiatrist, Dr. Forrer, namely that Deziel has always suffered from an obsessive-compulsive character which attached to the eye injury and developed into a psychosis, called a schizophrenic reaction. Coupled with that disease theory, the referee found that the iodine splashing 'aggravated the pre-existing latent mental disorder' culminating into a total occupational disablement. He awarded compensation.

The Appeal Board in a unanimous opinion reversed the referee, holding that Deziel had not met the burden of proof to show her ailments were associated with her work, because with the exception of her eye ailments she had suffered the same symptoms since 1962.

BAHU

Bahu, 35 at the time of suit, was hired by Chrysler in 1967. In 1968 he worked at a stamping machine lifting and moving 1500 seven-pound parts a day from an overhead conveyor to large tubs. From September 19, 1968 through October 7, 1968 he was off work with back pains and was voluntarily paid workmen's compensation benefits.

Bahu returned to work and continued to complain of pain in his back, neck, and arms and of an inability to move one of his arms. He asked for lighter work but was refused. He quit on January 4, 1969. From January 29, 1969 through part of 1970 he worked at other jobs, but quit because of pain in his back, neck and arm.

At the hearing before the referee on his claim for compensation, two psychiatrists testified. Plaintiff's psychiatrist, Dr. Dorsey, said that Bahu's physical pain was caused by pre-existing personality factors plus the precipitating events of a stressful job situation at Chrysler.

Defendant's psychiatrist, Dr. Forrer, testified that Bahu was in pain. Forrer said that the pain was not caused by or aggravated by his work at Chrysler, but rather that Bahu's personality makeup was fragile when he came to Chrysler and he subconsciously attached his life's troubles to the event of the work-related injury. In the words of Dr. Forrer the work injury was 'a covenient hook on which he can attach causation for troubles of all kinds'.

The referee, without stating any reasons, found that Bahu received a compensable personal injury, and awarded compensation from January 5, 1969 until further order.

The Appeal Board in a 4 to 3 opinion was not persuaded that Bahu's disability was causally related to his work for Chrysler. The dissenting members would have awarded compensation, finding that the requirement of job relationship was satisfied because the job provided the hook on which Bahu could hang his troubles.

MacKENZIE

MacKenzie, 65 at the time of suit, began working for General Motors in 1924 at the age of 15. In 1965 he took an early retirement at age 56. For about five years prior to his retirement he worked on the day shift in a General Motors Fisher Body salvage department. His job was to count, keep track of, and ship back to vendors red-tagged defective parts. During his last two or three years with General Motors he became irritable and nervous because the afternoon shift would take defective parts from his department and install them on cars in the assembly line. This caused him to worry about the safety of new cars and required him to recount the remaining parts and account to his supervisors for the missing parts. In addition, the poor work habits of his co-worker required MacKenzie to work harder, which added to his anxiety.

He made claim for compensation. At the hearing before the referee, MacKenzie's psychiatrist, Dr. Dreyer, testified that MacKenzie suffered from a long-standing personality defect of compulsive perfectionism that centered on his job, and that eventually the job pressures disabled him. This was subjective analysis based on MacKenzie's view of his job.

General Motors' psychiatrist, Dr. Fink, testified that it was MacKenzie's perfectionistic need in conflict with the impairments of aging that produced his anxiety and that although MacKenzie perceived the stresses of the job as causing his anxiety those stresses were usual occurrences and did not cause his emotional problems. This was an objective analysis based on the normal worker's view of MacKenzie's job.

The referee awarded compensation finding that, although the stresses of the job were not great enough to cause ill effects in an average person, the stress did cause MacKenzie to become disabled.

The Appeal Board in its 5 to 2 majority opinion reversed the referee and rejected the subjective analysis in favor of an objective analysis and ruled that an actual mental injury caused by a claimant's perception of his work environment is not compensable when that environment is not injurious to the average worker.

Two members of the Board dissented and would have awarded compensation by applying the subjective analysis and finding that the on-the-job stress aggravated MacKenzie's pre-existing personality disorder.

The Court of Appeals majority did not speak to whether a subjective or objective test should be used. It affirmed, holding only that there was evidence to support the Board's findings of fact.

Judge Bronson dissented, stating that Carter v. General Motors Corporation, 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960), requires that a subjective analysis must be employed in deciding the issue of causation.

We are not satisfied that the Appeal Board has properly construed the law as it applies to disabilities of the character involved in these cases and accordingly must set aside its decisions.

In the first place we consider it in order to discuss a claim that is asserted in each of these cases, Viz., that the ruling by the Appeal Board is a finding of fact which is made binding upon us if supported by any evidence by Const.1963, art. 6, § 28.

What is always at issue in these cases is a 'jural relation'--a right to compensation in the claimant, and a liability for it in the defendant. As pointed out in 1 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed.), § 1, p. 2, 'The material on which this claim of the plaintiff rests, if successful, is composite.'

This means simply that in determining any Jural relationship, the facts upon which such relationship is to be predicated are 'ordinary facts' and the Jural relationship itself (which in a very real sense is also a fact) is deemed a 'holding', 'ruling', or 'conclusion' of law.

It is to the former, the facts upon which the Jural relationship is based--' ordinary facts'--that the constitution addresses itself, and not the latter--which are called legal principles. See, generally, Wigmore Supra, '(a) Law and Fact, distinguished.'

What facts are to be determined by the fact finder are controlled by principles of law. These principles are set forth in statutes as interpreted by the Court.

The Workmen's Compensation Act, M.C.L.A. § 418.301; M.S.A. § 17.237(301), requires that injuries to be compensable must arise 'out of and in the course of' employment. In cases such as these which are asserted to involve pre-existing conditions the question of whether a disability arose out of the employment is resolved by the fact finder only upon inquiry regarding the work connection. The legal principle to be applied is that set forth by Professor Larson in § 12.20 of his...