Dhinsa v. Krueger, 12–cv–4176 (ERK)
Citation | 238 F.Supp.3d 421 |
Decision Date | 02 March 2017 |
Docket Number | 12–cv–4176 (ERK) |
Parties | Gurmeet Singh DHINSA, Petitioner, v. J.E. KRUEGER, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Marc A. Fernich, Lead Attorney, Robert Caliendo, Law Offices of Marc Fernich, New York, NY, for Gurmeet Singh Dhinsa, Petitioner.
Peter Alfred Norling, Lead Attorney, United States Attorneys Office, Brooklyn, NY; Mark Morrison, U.S. Attorney's Office–Prisoner, Harrisburg, PA; Timothy Judge, U.S. Attorney's Office–Prisoner Litigation Unit, Scranton, PA, for J.E. Krueger, as Warden of FCI Schuylkill, Respondent.
Petitioner, Gurmeet Singh Dhinsa, was convicted of numerous offenses following a jury trial that involved approximately 100 witnesses and lasted nearly four months. United States v. Dhinsa , 243 F.3d 635, 642 (2d Cir.), cert. denied , 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001). The evidence presented at trial, as described by the Second Circuit on direct appeal, showed that "Dhinsa was the self-professed leader of the ‘Singh Enterprise,’ a vast racketeering organization built around a chain of fifty-one gasoline stations that Dhinsa owned and operated throughout the New York City metropolitan area under the name ‘Citygas.’ " Id. at 643. Dhinsa's enterprise "generated tens of millions of dollars, which were used, inter alia , to bribe public officials, purchase weapons and carry out crimes of violence aimed at protecting the enterprise's operations and its profits." Id. The jury found Dhinsa guilty on 21 of 29 counts charged in the superseding indictment, including four counts for which the jury could have imposed the death penalty, although it chose not to do so. See id. at 642.
Dhinsa was sentenced to eight life terms for two counts of racketeering, two counts of murder in aid of racketeering, two counts of obstruction of justice murder, one count of conspiracy to commit kidnapping in aid of racketeering, and one count of kidnapping in aid of racketeering. Judgment at 1, United States v. Dhinsa , No. 97–cr–672–ERK (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1999), ECF No. 440. Several other terms of imprisonment were imposed for various firearm, conspiracy, and fraud offenses, including four 120–month terms to run consecutive with each other but concurrent with the life terms; eight 60–month terms to run consecutive with each other but concurrent with the life terms; and one 60–month term to run consecutive with all other terms. Id. The Second Circuit ultimately vacated two of the counts for which Dhinsa had been sentenced to life terms and one of the counts for which he had been sentenced to a 60–month term to run concurrent with the life terms. See Dhinsa , 243 F.3d at 677–78. This left Dhinsa with his current sentence: six life terms, four 120–month terms, and eight 60–month terms. Two of the six life terms rest on obstruction of justice murder charges, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C) (counts 5 and 9). Dhinsa filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging these two counts.
The two obstruction of justice murder convictions at issue here are predicated on the murders of Manmohan Singh and Satinderjit Singh, two Citygas employees. Dhinsa , 243 F.3d at 660. The evidence presented at trial regarding these murders is detailed in the Second Circuit decision on direct appeal. Numerous witnesses testified that throughout 1997, Manmohan1 was actively searching for his brother, Kulwant, who had disappeared from a Citygas station in 1995. Id. at 643, 660. Manmohan suspected Dhinsa of kidnapping Kulwant or otherwise contributing to Kulwant's disappearance. See id. at 660. According to trial testimony from Marvin Dodson and Evans Alonzo Powell (two of Dhinsa's co-conspirators), Dhinsa "instructed Dodson to kill Manmohan because [Manmohan] was cooperating with the police in a murder investigation involving [Dhinsa's] brother." Id. Specifically, "Dhinsa told Dodson to check with Gulzar [another member of Dhinsa's criminal enterprise] to confirm [Manmohan's] identity and directed Dodson to go to a nearby Citygas station to pick up the gun to be used for the murder [of Manmohan]." Id. at 660–61. Next, "at Dhinsa's suggestion that he find someone to assist him in committing the murder, Dodson contacted Powell, a member of the trio of hitmen employed by Dhinsa." Id. at 661. The Second Circuit described the evidence against Dhinsa as "direct and overwhelming," id. at 660, on this issue of Manmohan's obstruction of justice murder:
Powell's testimony and cellular telephone and pager records corroborate Dodson's version of the events surrounding Manmohan's murder. The telephone records establish that Dodson made numerous attempts to contact Dhinsa and Gulzar during the period March 14 through March 16, 1997, the day Manmohan was murdered. These records also indicate that Dodson called Dhinsa and Gulzar within hours after Manmohan was murdered, presumably to inform them of his success. The government also presented evidence that the vehicle driven by Dodson during the murder was registered to a company owned by Dhinsa, and that Dhinsa arranged to have the truck repainted and re-registered following Manmohan's murder.
The evidence supporting Satinderjit's obstruction of justice murder was equally overwhelming:
Id. The Second Circuit continued: "With respect to Satinderjit, the evidence presented at trial established that Satinderjit was in fact cooperating with the [local] police at the time Dhinsa ordered Dodson to kill him, providing police with information regarding Manmohan's murder, Kulwant's disappearance and the Citygas pump-rigging scheme." Id. at 657. The evidence at trial demonstrated that federal officers began an extensive investigation of Dhinsa in July 1997, just one month following Satinderjit's June 1997 murder and four months following Manmohan's March 1997 murder. Id. at 644–45, 647. Indeed, as relevant to this petition, the Second Circuit specifically held that "[t]he record amply demonstrates that Dhinsa murdered Manmohan and Satinderjit to ‘depriv[e] the government of ... potential witness[es].’ " Id. at 657 (citations omitted).
On September 16, 2002, Dhinsa filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Central District of California, where he was incarcerated, in which he argued that he had received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel (and not that he was actually innocent). Resp't's Mem. Opp'n Habeas Pet., Gov't App'x at 66, 69, ECF No. 25. The petition was dismissed on the ground that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the validity of a judgment of conviction had to be filed in the judicial district in which he was convicted. See id. at 74. Dhinsa then filed a motion to vacate sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the Eastern District of New York. Id. at 51. Dhinsa had filed his petition in California at the eleventh hour, and the statute of limitations was not tolled during that proceeding in California. See Dhinsa v. Herrera , 173 Fed.Appx. 630, 630–31 (9th Cir. 2006). By the time Dhinsa filed his motion pursuant to § 2255, it was untimely and thus dismissed. Id. at 630. The Second Circuit denied a motion for a certificate of appealability and dismissed Dhinsa's ensuing appeal, Resp't's Mem. Opp'n Habeas Pet., Gov't App'x at 107, ECF No. 25, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Dhinsa v. Herrera , 543 U.S. 1188, 125 S.Ct. 1429, 161 L.Ed.2d 191 (2005).
On June 29, 2004, Dhinsa filed a motion under FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6) in the Central District of California, arguing that his original § 2241 petition should have been transferred to the Eastern District of New York rather than dismissed. Motion for Relief from Judgment, Dhinsa v. Herrera , No. 02–cv–7211–VAP–SGL (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2004), ECF No. 6; Dhinsa , 173 Fed.Appx. at 631. This motion was rejected, as was the appeal that followed. Dhinsa , 173 Fed.Appx. at 631. On May 16, 2012, Dhinsa filed another petition pursuant to § 2241, this time in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Dhinsa v. Hufford , No. 3:12–CV–912, 2012 WL 3579652, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2012). The petition was based on Fowler v. United States , 563 U.S. 668, 131 S.Ct. 2045, 179 L.Ed.2d 1099 (2011), which interpreted the federal jurisdictional element of the federal...
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...concurrent life sentences.On March 2, 2017, the District Court issued an order denying Dhinsa’s petition. Dhinsa v. Krueger (" Habeas Order "), 238 F.Supp.3d 421 (E.D.N.Y. 2017). The District Court concluded, first, that the petition should be dismissed under the concurrent sentence doctrin......
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United States v. Dhinsa
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