Diane D., Matter of

• Decision Date: 15 June 1994
• Parties: In the Matter of the Contempt or Sanctioning of DIANE D., A Juror.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 607

615 N.Y.S.2d 607

161 Misc.2d 861

In the Matter of the Contempt or Sanctioning of DIANE D., A Juror.

Supreme Court, New York County, Part 93.

June 15, 1994.

Dana Hanna, New York City, for Diane D.

EDWARD J. McLAUGHLIN, Justice:

May a court, absent legislative or plenary rule-making authority, fine an impaneled juror who abandons a trial in the midst of the proceedings? The court finds that its inherent judicial authority empowers it to do so.

THE FACTS

On March 31, 1994, the court and the attorneys for the parties conducted the voir dire in People v. Boyd, Indictment Number 6666/93. The indictment charged serious offenses; Boyd was accused of two A-1 felonies: attempting to murder two police officers. During the voir dire, Ms. Diane D., a prospective juror, responded "No" to the court's question whether there was "[a]ny reason at all why you shouldn't serve." Ultimately, Ms. D. was selected as alternate juror number one pursuant to CPL 270.30 & 270.35.

Ms. D. failed in her duties as a sworn juror. On April 4, 1994, after the jury was empaneled and the trial began, the court adjourned the proceedings to April 6, at 1:15 p.m. Two attorneys, four witnesses, twelve seated jurors, and one alternate juror arrived on time. Only Ms. D. did not. At 1:50 p.m., the court staff telephoned Ms. D. at her home. A relative who did not know Ms. D.'s whereabouts explained that Ms. D. did not return home the night before. After both sides consented to Ms. D.'s removal, the court resumed the proceedings at 2:01 p.m.

Ms. D. next appeared in court on April 29, 1994, in response to a court letter that directed her to do so. On that date the court appointed counsel for Ms. D., who is unemployed. Ms. D.'s attorney informed the court why Ms. D. neglected to fulfill her duties. According to her counsel, Ms. D., distraught because her father died a few months earlier, consumed so much liquor the evening before she was to return to court that she slept past the 1:15 p.m. adjournment. Ms. D.'s embarrassment, her lawyer explained, prevented her from either calling the court or returning to court once she became sober. ¹

THE LAW

This court may hold Ms. D. in contempt. As the Court of Appeals noted some time ago, "alternate jurors ... must attend at all times upon the trial ... and for a failure so to do are liable to be punished for contempt" (People v. Mitchell, 266 N.Y. 15, 17, 193 N.E. 445 [1934]. Nonetheless, this court is searching for a sanction less severe than contempt. ² Neither statute nor court rules provide for any explicit remedy other than a contempt finding. Lack of legislative or plenary authority, however, is not dispositive on whether a juror may be fined; the court finds that its ability to sanction a derelict juror to something less severe than contempt is derived from the court's inherent powers.

Inherent power provides a viable reason to engage in remedial action unless the subject matter is so broad, problematic, and systemic that it requires a plenary rule (see, Matter of A.G. Ship Maintenance Corp. v. Lezak, 69 N.Y.2d 1, 6, 511 N.Y.S.2d 216, 503 N.E.2d 681 [1986] [per curiam] [finding that plenary rules are required for "frivolous litigation [, which] is [a] serious problem affecting the proper administration of justice"]. Essentially, a court may react before a relatively isolated incident becomes so pervasive as to require legislative or plenary action. Thus, when it comes to supervising errant jurors, a court is not required to choose between contempt and doing nothing.

Legislative authority, amplified by court rules, contemplates penalties only against those jurors who fail to respond to a summons for jury duty. Pursuant to the Judiciary Law, the Commissioner of Jurors may bring a proceeding against anyone who fails either to respond to a juror questionnaire or initially to appear in the jury assembly room (see, Judiciary Law § 527). These acts of noncompliance are covered pursuant to the Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts, under the Uniform Rules for the Jury System (see, 22 NYCRR § 128.12).

Once jurors are empaneled, however, for most purposes they are no longer subject to the limited jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Jurors; rather, these jurors are subject to the court's control. Empaneled jurors are obligated to follow the court's instructions as to scheduling. If they fail to comply with their responsibilities, the Legislature provides a trial court with only two remedies: civil contempt or criminal contempt (see, McCormick v. Axelrod, 59 N.Y.2d 574, 582-83, 466 N.Y.S.2d 279, 453 N.E.2d 508 [1983] [per curiam] [explaining difference between civil and criminal contempt generally]; People ex rel. Munsell v. Court of Oyer & Terminer, 101 N.Y. 245, 4 N.E. 259 passim [1886] [explaining difference between civil and criminal contempt in context of jurors]. A court may institute civil contempt proceedings against duly selected jurors who violate their duty to perform a judicial service (see, Judiciary Law § 753[A][1]. A more severe penalty, criminal contempt, is available when the juror wilfully disobeys a court's lawful mandate (see, Judiciary Law § 750[A][3].

Although the Legislature has provided the courts with contempt remedies only, this court finds that its ability to sanction Ms. D. is derived from the court's inherent powers and does not depend on legislative authorization (see, Riglander v. Star Co., 98 App.Div. 101, 104, 90 N.Y.S. 772 [1st Dep't 1904],aff'd, 181 N.Y. 531, 73 N.E. 1131 [1905] [mem.]; Hanna v. Mitchell, 202 App.Div. 504, 513, 196 N.Y.S. 43 [1st Dep't 1922] [concluding that New York Constitution expressly confers inherent judicial power on Supreme Court and that this power is "in no sense a delegation of legislative power by the Legislature"]; Tubular Products, Inc. v. Jacobson 33 Misc.2d 807, 809, 508 N.Y.S.2d 364 [Sup.Ct., Westchester County] [noting that sanctions are permitted even when legislative authority "fails to provide for them"], aff'd in relevant part,138 A.D.2d 371, 372, 525 N.Y.S.2d 655 [2d Dep't 1986] [holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanction].

That the court possesses the inherent power to control its business is indisputable--and has been recognized in New York for almost a century (see, id.; Plachte v. Bancroft Inc., 3 A.D.2d 437, 438, 161 N.Y.S.2d 892 [1st Dep't 1957]. The issue, therefore, is whether sanctioning an offending juror falls under this inherent power, and the answer is that it does, because a court must have the independence and wherewithal to solve problems with its jury even absent specific authority to tell the court what it may or may not do. A court's inherent jurisdiction encompasses anything reasonably necessary to control its order of business (see, Riglander v. Star Co., 98 App.Div. at 104, 90 N.Y.S. 772). Indeed, the court's inherent powers have been described as "all powers reasonably required to enable a court to perform efficiently its judicial function, to protect its dignity, independence and integrity, and to make its lawful actions effective" (Matter of People v. Little, 89 Misc.2d 742, 745, 392 N.Y.S.2d 831 [County Ct., Yates County, 1977].

Trial courts have occasionally invoked their inherent powers to impose sanctions when court proceedings are delayed. For example, in People v. I.L., 143 Misc.2d 1061, 1065-66, 542 N.Y.S.2d 125 [Sup. Ct., Bronx County, 1989], on a motion to reargue the court's decision in People v. Lacen, 140 Misc.2d 64, 65, 531 N.Y.S.2d 75 [Sup. Ct., Bronx County, 1988], the court used its inherent powers to impose sanctions on the district attorney's office for its inexcusable failure to proceed. Similarly, in McLoughlin v. Henke, 130 Misc.2d 1091, 1092, 499 N.Y.S.2d 332 [Sup.Ct.Queens County, 1986], the court held that it has the inherent power to impose sanctions on an attorney whose conduct wasted the court's time. A court may also use its inherent powers to punish those who impede justice (see, e.g., Gottlieb v. Edelstein, 84 Misc.2d 1053, 1054, 375 N.Y.S.2d 532 [Sup.Ct., Queens County, 1975]; Campbell v. Regency Towers, 76 Misc.2d 33, 35, 349 N.Y.S.2d 928 [Sup.Ct., New York County, 1973]; cf., People v. Vonwerne, 155 Misc.2d 311, 314-15, 588 N.Y.S.2d 533 [Crim.Ct., N.Y. County, 1992] [declining to sanction for frivolous criminal litigation, which is not explicitly covered in 22 NYCRR 130-1 or 130-2, because of "absence of explicit authority to impose sanctions" and because frivolous criminal litigation was commenced by a pro se defendant] [emphasis in original].

The most practical way for a trial court to control wayward jurors, and thereby to promote efficient proceedings, is through its inherent powers, not by plenary rule; neither plenary rules nor legislative action can anticipate every event that poses challenges to the courts and their ability to conduct their business. Moreover, although a plenary rule may be the preferred solution to sanction attorneys who instigate frivolous actions (see, A.G. Ship Maintenance, 69 N.Y.2d at 6, 511 N.Y.S.2d 216, 503 N.E.2d 681), or to sanction jurors who fail even to appear (see, 22 NYCRR § 128.12), plenary rules are too cumbersome for jurors who disobey a court's order.

In A.G. Ship Maintenance, the Court of Appeals found that frivolous litigation is a serious problem that pervades both trial and appellate courts alike (see, 69 N.Y.2d at 4, 6, 511 N.Y.S.2d 216, 503 N.E.2d 681). Although the A.G. Ship court found that proceeding by plenary rule is the best way to curb widespread frivolous...