Diaz Gonzalez v. Colon Gonzalez

• Decision Date: 28 May 1976
• Docket Number: No. 75-1270,75-1270
• Citation: 536 F.2d 453
• Parties: Elisa DIAZ GONZALEZ et al., Defendants-Appellants, v. Alfredo COLON GONZALEZ, Plaintiff-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 453

536 F.2d 453

Elisa DIAZ GONZALEZ et al., Defendants-Appellants, v. Alfredo COLON GONZALEZ, Plaintiff-Appellee.

No. 75-1270.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Argued Feb. 5, 1976.

Decided May 28, 1976.

Michael J. Henke, Washington, D. C., with whom Miriam Naveira de Rodon, Sol. Gen., Com. of Puerto Rico, Candita Orlandi, Asst. Sol. Gen., Com. of Puerto Rico, San Juan, P. R., Lynn R. Coleman, and Vinson, Elkins, Searls, Connally & Smith, Washington, D. C., were on briefs for defendants-appellants.

Hector M. Laffitte, Hato Rey, P. R., with whom Laffitte & Dominquez, Hato Rey, P. R., was on brief, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before MATTHES, ^* McENTEE and CAMPBELL, Circuit Judges.

McENTEE, Circuit Judge.

This is a difficult and complex case, which calls for the interpretation of certain Puerto Rican statutes and possibly for an "equitable" extension of their literal meaning. Although the factual background against which the legal questions must be resolved is exceedingly complicated, ¹ an abridged summary will suffice here in the light of our ultimate disposition. Basically the district court was faced with an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which the plaintiff alleged a deprivation of civil rights by the defendants' wrongful termination of his employment in the Commonwealth's Department of Social Services. ² Plaintiff sought both equitable relief and damages and succeeded in obtaining both as well as $6,000 in attorneys' fees. Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 385 F.Supp. 1226 (D.P.R.1974). ³

The court held that plaintiff's right to procedural due process was violated by defendants, and accordingly it sustained his § 1983 claim. ⁴ The factual predicate of the court's due process ruling was essentially the following:

"(P)laintiff was summarily and without prior notice or hearing, transferred from a competitive position to a non-competitive one. This action was immediately followed by termination in his employment without any reason therefor," 385 F.Supp. at 1238 (footnotes omitted). ⁵

Although this terse statement by the court might lead one to infer that defendant's action in "transferring" plaintiff from a competitive to a non-competitive position was utterly arbitrary, such was not the case nor did the district court ever directly so find.

Without deciding at this point whether defendants' actions were correct or not, we note that defendants have maintained at all times that their actions were taken in compliance with applicable Puerto Rican law; indeed, at one point the district court appears to have conceded as much:

"The evidence before this Court establishes that both defendants had direct participation in altering plaintiff's status as a career government employee . . . (and that both) acted pursuant to the provisions of the Personnel Act of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Title 3, Laws of Puerto Rico Annotated, Section 641 et seq." 385 F.Supp. at 1235. ⁶

The basic theory by which defendants have sought to explain their actions since the beginning is the following: the action of the Commonwealth's Director of Personnel on October 27, 1971 in classifying plaintiff's position (which had formerly been part of the non-competitive service) as part of the competitive service was not authorized by § 648(d) of Title 3, Laws of Puerto Rico Annotated the statute under which the Director purported to act. Therefore, defendants assert, when they notified plaintiff in the Spring of 1973 that they considered him to be in the non-competitive service, they were in no sense transferring him from the competitive to the non-competitive service but simply recognizing that the October 1971 classification of plaintiff's position as part of the competitive service was illegal. ⁷

For the force of this argument to be appreciated, it is necessary to recount in chronological order the principal events leading up to the present controversy:

(1) Prior to September 16, 1970, plaintiff was a regular employee of the Commonwealth's Department of Labor (since September 8, 1944) and was in the competitive service.

(2) On September 16, 1970, at the request of the then Secretary of Social Services, Efrain Santiago, Plaintiff, having agreed to accept appointment as "Executive Director IV" in the Department of Social Services was transferred to that department. Upon his arrival at the Department of Social Services, plaintiff signed official form "OP-15." That form stated that his position as "Executive Director IV" was in the non-competitive service. ⁸

(3) On October 27, 1971, the Director of Personnel citing § 648(d) as his authorization included the position of "Executive Director IV" in the competitive service. (He had been requested to do so by Mr. Efrain Santiago on October 8, 1971, plaintiff having discussed the form OP-15 matter with Mr. Santiago at some time subsequent to September 16, 1970.)

(4) In January, 1973 defendant Elisa Diaz Gonzalez became Secretary of Social Services and defendant Milagros Guzman became Director of Personnel. They are members of a political party different from plaintiff's and their party had won the Puerto Rican elections in 1972.

(5) On March 30, 1973 defendant Elisa Diaz Gonzalez requested of defendant Milagros Guzman an opinion as to the legality of the employment status of plaintiff (among others). Defendant Milagros Guzman replied on April 13, 1973 that plaintiff had improperly been granted competitive status on October 27, 1971 and therefore was still in the non-competitive service. Mrs. Guzman cited § 648(d), as she interpreted it, as the basis for her ruling. ⁹

It is obvious that the meaning of § 648(d), ¹⁰ is central to a resolution of this dispute, and it is equally obvious that the parties differ as to its meaning. If defendants are right in their contention that under § 648(d) plaintiff was at all relevant times in the non-competitive service, then no wrongful act occurred when "(p)laintiff was not afforded an opportunity to be heard on the abrupt change of status in his civil service career from competitive to non-competitive service, nor on his termination of employment after twenty-nine years of service," 385 F.Supp. at 1233. ¹¹ If, on the other hand, defendants' understanding of § 648(d) was inaccurate, the issue of their liability under § 1983 would have to be directly confronted. ¹²

Our own reading of § 648(d) does not convince us that under it the controverted action of the Director of Personnel on October 27, 1971 was clearly illegal or clearly legal. The statute is ambiguous in this respect, ¹³ and we cannot say that the contentions of either side in this dispute are patently unreasonable. We do not think, however, that it is for a federal court to cut this particular gordian knot. We believe that the district court should have abstained and allowed the Commonwealth courts to rule on the issue. ¹⁴

Abstention is "an equitable doctrine premised on the 'avoidance of needless friction with state policies.' " Druker v. Sullivan, 458 F.2d 1272, 1274 (1st Cir. 1972), quoting Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941). See also Catrone v. Massachusetts State Racing Commission, 535 F.2d 669 (1st Cir. 1976). Precisely because it is an equitable principle requiring careful balancing of competing considerations, see Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., supra at 500, 61 S.Ct. 643, at 645, the doctrine of abstention cannot readily be reduced to a simple formula. "There have been as many and as variegated applications of this supple principle as the situations that have brought it into play." Id. Nevertheless, some of the considerations which must be weighed can be itemized:

"Reflected among the concerns which have traditionally counseled a federal court to stay its hand are the desirability of avoiding unseemly conflict between two sovereigns, the unnecessary impairment of state functions, and the premature determination of constitutional questions." Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219, 224, 79 S.Ct. 1034, 1037, 3 L.Ed.2d 1186 (1959).

See also Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483, 44 U.S.L.W. 4372 (1976); Carey v. Bert Randolph Sugar and Wrestling Revue, Inc., --- U.S. ----, 96 S.Ct. 1208, 47 L.Ed.2d 587, 44 U.S.L.W. 4416 (U.S. March 24, 1976). The

considerations set forth in Martin v. Creasy all seemed to counsel abstention in the factual and legal context of this case. ¹⁵ Since resolution by the Commonwealth courts of the statutory ambiguity outlined above might well moot the constitutional issue (viz. the alleged denial of procedural due process), this is a proper case for abstention. ¹⁶ See Catrone v. Massachusetts State Racing Commission, supra. "Among the cases that call most insistently for abstention are those in which the federal constitutional challenge turns on a state statute, the meaning of which is unclear under state law." Harris County Commissioners Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 84, 95 S.Ct. 870, 875, 43 L.Ed.2d 32 (1975). See Reed v. Board of Election Commissioners, 459 F.2d 121, 124 (1st Cir. 1972); Palmigiano v. Affleck, 327 F.Supp. 1280, 1283-84 (D.R.I.1971) (three-judge court). Cf. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 604, 92 S.Ct. 2513, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972) (Burger, C. J., concurring).

While we realize that our directing abstention in this case will require vacation of both the district court's own judgment and its assessment of attorneys' fees and the judgment which the court entered on the jury verdict, we believe that our system of federalism requires no less, see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). As the Supreme Court has very recently stated: "Where . . . the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts must be constantly mindful of the 'special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable power and State administration of its own law.' " Rizzo...