Catrone v. Massachusetts State Racing Commission

• Decision Date: 18 May 1976
• Docket Number: No. 75-1477,75-1477
• Citation: 535 F.2d 669
• Parties: Patrick CATRONE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MASSACHUSETTS STATE RACING COMMISSION et al., Defendants-Appellees, Ogden Suffolk Downs, Inc., Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 669

535 F.2d 669

Patrick CATRONE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MASSACHUSETTS STATE RACING COMMISSION et al., Defendants-Appellees Ogden Suffolk Downs, Inc., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 75-1477.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Argued April 5, 1976.

Decided May 18, 1976.

Roger P. Stokey, Boston, Mass., with whom Francis C. Lynch and Goodwin, Proctor & Hoar, Boston, Mass., were on brief for Ogden Suffolk Downs, Inc., appellant.

Herbert D. Lewis, Boston, Mass., with whom Lewis & Lewis and Howard J. Alperin, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for appellee.

Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, McENTEE and CAMPBELL, Circuit Judges.

LEVIN H. CAMPBELL, Circuit Judge.

Patrick Catrone, a trainer of race horses, brought this civil rights action ¹ after he was ejected by appellant, Ogden Suffolk Downs, Inc. from its race track. The district court entered an order permanently enjoining appellant from depriving Catrone of access to Suffolk Downs on the basis of the charges that had been brought against him. 404 F.Supp. 765 (D.Mass.1975). This appeal followed.

Appellant's Director of Security, Frisoli, ejected Catrone from Suffolk Downs on February 3, 1975, following an argument between Catrone and a security guard. Frisoli's decision was sustained by management and by the three track stewards who, after hearing, ordered that Catrone be suspended indefinitely. Catrone then appealed the stewards' ruling to the Massachusetts State Racing Commission which, after a further hearing, ordered that Catrone be fined $50 and "reinstated to good standing as of this date". Catrone paid the fine, but appellant then and now has refused to readmit him.

In late March of 1975 the State Racing Commission again had occasion to consider Catrone. This time the question was whether to suspend his trainer's license because he had been indicted for a federal crime. The Commission voted to suspend the license but in July, 1975, ordered him restored "to good standing" after he was found not guilty by a federal jury.

Catrone originally brought this action against the State Racing Commission, protesting suspension of his license because of the criminal indictment. But by the time of the court's hearing that resulted in the present injunction, the Commission had not only reversed the stewards' ejection order but had restored Catrone's license. The case therefore continued only against appellant, which had been added as a defendant.

After hearing, which included the testimony of Catrone, Frisoli and others, the district court ruled that notwithstanding appellant's status as a private corporation, its exclusion of Catrone from Suffolk Downs was "state action" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It rested this conclusion on an examination of Massachusetts' comprehensive legislative scheme for regulating the licensing and operation of race tracks. 404 F.Supp. 767-68. The court further held that excluding Catrone was under the circumstances so "arbitrary and capricious" as to deny him both equal protection and due process of law. Going beyond the preliminary relief that was originally the subject of the hearing, the court permanently enjoined appellant from barring Catrone. ²

As indicated below, we believe that Catrone's showing entitled him to interim injunctive relief. But we think the district court should have abstained from adjudicating the merits of his constitutional claims until his rights under state law could be submitted to the state courts. The rules of horse racing adopted by the Massachusetts State Racing Commission, and the governing state statute, Mass. G.L. c. 128A, indicate the presence of a substantial unresolved state law question which, if decided, might render moot, or present in a different posture, the federal constitutional issues. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, --- U.S. ---, ---, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1244, 47 L.Ed.2d 483, 495-496, 44 U.S.L.W. 4372, 4376 (1976), quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89, 79 S.Ct. 1060, 1062-63, 3 L.Ed.2d 1163, 1166-67 (1959). The unresolved state question is whether the State Racing Commission's ruling reversing the stewards' exclusionary order requires appellant to admit Catrone. On the one hand, § 10A of Mass. G.L. c. 128A purports to allow persons licensed to conduct a horse racing meeting the right to bar anyone. On the other, § 9A gives the Commission power over the licensing of trainers; and the Commission's regulations furnish a comprehensive scheme under which race track stewards exercise independent power, reviewable by the Commission, with respect to the licensing and exclusion of trainers. See 404 F.Supp. at 767-68. Arguably, the power of the stewards and the Commission to discipline and bar trainers is exclusive, and § 10A applies only to the barring of others. Especially as expulsion from Suffolk Downs means exclusion not only from the one thoroughbred track in Massachusetts but, quite possibly, from other race tracks around the country, id. at 767, the Massachusetts courts may find that state law gives to the State Racing Commission, under the procedures set forth in its rules, the final say over Catrone's right to train at Suffolk Downs.

As Catrone may thus be entitled by state law to be readmitted to the track, we do not think that a federal court should first decide unsettled constitutional claims involving application of the abstruse "state action" concept. Where cases can be decided without reference to federal constitutional questions, that is the preferred course, Siler v. Louisville & N. R. R., 213 U.S. 175, 193, 29 S.Ct. 451, 455, 53 L.Ed. 753, 758 (1909); see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 483, 80 L.Ed. 688, 711 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). This is especially so where the constitutional claims have at their root an alleged denial of due process, but the nature of the process that the state affords is unclear. And where, as here, resolution of the ambiguity in state law requires construction of state administrative as well as legislative policy, we think the proper course is for the federal court to abstain, while retaining jurisdiction, Carey v. Bert Randolph Sugar and Wrestling Revue, Inc., --- U.S. ---, 96 S.Ct. 1208, 47 L.Ed.2d 587, 44 U.S.L.W. 4416 (1976); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941).

Appellant argues that Catrone's voluntary dismissal of three prior state court actions constituted a previous state adjudication under Rule 41(a)(1) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure which should also bar his federal claims. Each action, however, arose at a different stage in Catrone's ongoing struggle and is claimed to have...