Diaz-Oropeza v. Riverside Red X, Inc.

Decision Date28 June 2011
Docket NumberCase No. 11-2012-JTM
PartiesNICK DIAZ-OROPEZA, Plaintiff, v. RIVERSIDE RED X, INC., ET. AL., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Kansas
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Presently before the court is a Motion to Dismiss for Want of Personal Jurisdiction or, in the Alternative, Motion to Transfer Venue to United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri (Dkt. No. 5) filed by defendants Richard Anderson, Stephen Mendoza, and Platte County, together with defendants Riverside Red X, Inc. and Guy Zeke Young's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for Failure to Establish Personal Jurisdiction Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) (Dkt. No. 18), and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 24).1 For the following reasons the court grants defendants' motions to dismiss.

I. Factual Background

Riverside Red X, Inc. is a Missouri corporation operating a liquor and grocery store at 2401 Northwest Platte Road in Riverside, Missouri. At all relevant times, Guy Zeke Young was the president, registered agent, and sole owner of Riverside Red X. On January 13, 2010, around 3:00 p.m. plaintiff, Nick Diaz-Oropeza, a citizen of Kansas, parked his 1995 Lincoln Town Car in a handicapped parking stall in front of Riverside Red X's store. Loss prevention officer for Riverside Red X, Stephen Lawrence,2 saw plaintiff pull into the handicapped stall. Plaintiff began walking toward the store when Lawrence approached him and asked if he had a valid handicapped license for the vehicle. Lawrence informed him that if he did not he needed to move the vehicle or be fined. Without moving his vehicle, plaintiff entered the store and began shopping. Soon thereafter, security officer Stephen Mendoza and Lawrence approached plaintiff and questioned him about parking in a handicapped stall. According to plaintiff, they stopped, detained, interrogated, and intimidated him on false charges of parking illegally in a handicapped stall. After learning plaintiff had a valid handicapped license, they walked away.

As a result of that incident, plaintiff filed the present lawsuit alleging various constitutional violations and an Americans with Disabilities violation against Riverside Red X, Guy Zeke Young, and "John Doe." Plaintiff also filed suit against Platte County Sheriff Richard Anderson, Deputy Stephen Mendoza, and Platte County alleging Anderson and the county failed properly to train, supervise, and control Mendoza's actions.

II. Analysis

Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, this court construes his arguments liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Price v. Philpot, 420 F.3d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir. 2005). "[The] court, however, will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a Plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a Plaintiff's behalf." Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997). "The broad reading of the Plaintiff's complaint does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).

A. Legal Standard:12(b)(2)

"The standard that governs a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is well established: The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over the defendant." Edison Trust Number One v. Patillo, No. 10-1159, 2010 WL 5093831, at *1 (D. Kan. Dec. 8, 2010) (quotations omitted). The extent of the burden depends on the stage at which the court considers the jurisdictional issue. Id. When personal jurisdiction "is decided at a preliminary stage by reference to only the complaint and affidavits, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction." Id. "The plaintiff may carry this burden 'by demonstrating, via affidavit or other written materials, facts that if true would support jurisdiction over the defendant.'" Id. (quoting TH Agric. & Nutrition, L.L.C. v. Ace European Grp. Ltd., 488 F.3d 1282, 1286 (10th Cir. 2007)). If plaintiff meets that burden, the defendant must "present a compelling case demonstrating 'that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.'" Thermal Components Co. v. Griffith, 98 F. Supp.2d 1224, 1227 (D. Kan. 2000) (citing OMI Holdings, Inc.v. Royal Ins. Co. of Can., 149 F.3d 1086, 1091 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985))). All factual disputes are resolved in Plaintiff's favor. Rusakiewicz v. Lowe, 556 F.3d 1095, 1100 (10th Cir. 2009). "The allegations in the complaint must be taken as true to the extent they are uncontroverted by the defendant's affidavits. If the parties present conflicting affidavits, all factual disputes must be resolved in the Plaintiff's favor, and 'the Plaintiff's prima facie showing is sufficient notwithstanding the contrary presentation by the moving party.'" Wenz v. Memery Crystal, 55 F.3d 1503, 1505 (10th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).

In a diversity action, "personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is determined by the law of the forum state." Caldwell-Baker Co. v. S. Ill. Railcar Co., 225 F. Supp.2d 1243, 1259 (D. Kan. 2002). "The proper inquiry is, therefore, whether the exercise of jurisdiction is sanctioned by the long-arm statute of the forum state and comports with due process requirements of the Constitution." Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Corp. v. Kootenai Elec. Coop., 17 F.3d 1302, 1304-05 (10th Cir. 1994). "Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not, by itself, confer nationwide service of process or jurisdiction upon federal district courts to adjudicate claims, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) refers us to the" [Kansas] long-arm statute.3 The Kansas long-arm statute extends the personal jurisdiction analysis to the extent of the United States Constitution; thus, this court may proceed to the due process analysis. Id. at 1305.4

The due process analysis consists of two steps: (1) whether defendants have such minimum contacts with the forum state that they should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there; and (2) if the defendants have minimum contacts with the forum state, whether exercising personal jurisdiction over them would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. OMI Holdings, Inc., 149 F.3d at 1091; AST Sports Sci., Inc. v. CLF Distribution Ltd., 514 F.3d 1054, 1061 (10th Cir. 2008).

1. Minimum Contacts: Specific Jurisdiction

The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant comports with due process "so long as there exists 'minimum contacts' between the defendant and the forum State." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). The minimum contacts necessary for specific personal jurisdiction are established when "the defendant has 'purposefully directed' its activities toward the forum jurisdiction and where the underlying action is based upon activities that arise out of or relate to the defendant's contacts with the forum." In re Application to Enforce Admin. Subpoenas Duces Tecum of S.E.C. v. Knowles, 87 F.3d 413, 418 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472). "Purposeful availment requires actions by the Defendant which create a substantial connection with the forum state." Emp'rs Mut. Cas. Co. v. Bartile Roofs, Inc., 618 F.3d 1153, 1160 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted). The purposeful availment requirement is to "ensure[] that adefendant will not be subject to the laws of a jurisdiction 'solely as the result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, or of the unilateral activity of another party or third person.'" AST Sports Sci., 514 F.3d at 1058 (quoting Benally v. Amon Carter Museum of W. Art., 858 F.2d 618, 625 (10th Cir. 1988)). "Purposeful availment analysis turns upon whether the defendant's contacts are attributable to his own actions or solely to the actions of the plaintiff . . . [and generally] requires . . . affirmative conduct by the defendant which allows or promotes the transaction of business within the forum state." Rambo v. Am. S. Ins., Co., 839 F.2d 1415, 1420 (10th Cir. 1988) (quotations omitted).

The events in this case, as alleged by plaintiff, occurred exclusively at the Riverside Red X store in Platte County, Missouri. Plaintiff does not allege that any defendants had contacts with Kansas in relation to the specific incident alleged in his Complaint. Simply put, none of the defendants purposefully directed any activities toward Kansas; the underlying action is based entirely on events occurring in Missouri. See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472. Thus, specific jurisdiction is not present, and this court must analyze whether Kansas may exercise general jurisdiction over defendants.

2. Minimum Contacts: General Jurisdiction

A court may also exercise general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, based on the defendant's "continuous and systematic" general business contacts with the forum state when those contacts are unrelated to the claims in the case. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984); see also Intercon, Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Internet Solutions, Inc., 205 F.3d 1244, 1247 (10th Cir. 2000) ("When a plaintiff's cause of action does not arise directly from a defendant's forum-related activities, the court may nonetheless maintain general personaljurisdiction over the defendant based on the defendant's business contacts with the forum state."). There is no specific rule for what constitutes continuous and systematic contacts. There are, however, certain factors courts analyze when performing the general jurisdiction analysis, such as: "(1) whether the corporation solicits business in the state through a local office or agents; (2) whether the corporation sends agents into the state on a regular basis to solicit business; (3) the extent to...

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