DiCentes v. Michaud

• Decision Date: 07 October 1998
• Citation: 719 A.2d 509,1998 ME 227
• Parties: Geraldine DiCENTES v. Danny R.P. MICHAUD et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

719 A.2d 509

1998 ME 227

Geraldine DiCENTES v. Danny R.P. MICHAUD et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued May 5, 1998.

Decided October 7, 1998.

Jeffrey Neil Young (orally), N. Kate Werner, McTeague, Higbee, MacAdam, Case, Watson & Cohen, Topsham, for plaintiff.

Kevin M. Cuddy (orally), Cuddy & Lanham, Bangor, for defendant. Before WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, and SAUFLEY, JJ., and ROBERTS, A.R.J.¹

SAUFLEY, Justice.

[¶ 1] Geraldine DiCentes taught science at Schenck High School under a probationary contract during the 1990-91 school year. When her contract was not renewed for the following year, she filed suit against several members of the school system. DiCentes now appeals from the resulting judgment of the Superior Court (Penobscot County, Kravchuk, J.) finding, inter alia, that the Superintendent of Schools and the East Millinocket School Committee did not violate the Whistleblowers' Protection Act, 26 M.R.S.A. §§ 831-840 (1988). Schenck High School's principal cross-appeals from the portion of the court's judgment finding him responsible for a violation of section 833(1)(B) of the Act. We modify the judgment and affirm.

I. Background

[¶ 2] DiCentes was hired by the East Millinocket School Committee to work at Schenck High School during the 1989-90 school year, both as a teaching assistant for a single student and as a teacher for a geometry class. She then accepted a one-year probationary contract to work as a science teacher at the high school for the 1990-91 school year. During both of those school years, Ralph Ryder was the Superintendent of the School Department, and Danny R.P. Michaud was the principal of Schenck High School.

[¶ 3] There had been friction between DiCentes and Michaud during the 1989-90 school year, and more friction arose between the two during the first half of the 1990-91 school year. Among the sources of friction was DiCentes's concern about the adequacy of the ventilation in the chemistry lab and the adjacent chemical storage room. She voiced those concerns to both Ryder and Michaud, and, contrary to Michaud's instructions, to officials with the Departments of Education and Labor.

[¶ 4] In December 1990, Ryder separately concluded, due to budgetary concerns, that a reduction-in-force was necessary for the entire East Millinocket School Department. The School Department's principals, including Michaud, were asked to prepare reduction-in-force proposals for their respective schools. After considering the proposals, Ryder recommended to the School Committee that three positions be eliminated at the high school: one in industrial arts, one in music, and one in the science department. Pursuant to the School Department's "last-in, first-out" policy, Ryder determined that this proposal would result in the elimination of the science position held by DiCentes. The School Committee ultimately voted to approve the reduction-in-force, thereby eliminating the teaching position DiCentes had held.²

[¶ 5] DiCentes filed a complaint with the Maine Human Rights Commission,³ and later exercised her right to sue in Superior Court, filing a twenty-eight count complaint related to her not having been hired as a teacher by the East Millinocket School Committee for the 1991-92 school year.⁴ Although the trial court concluded that DiCentes was not entitled to a jury trial on her Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA) claims, it empaneled a jury to hear DiCentes's legal claims and to sit in an advisory capacity on her WPA claims. After eight days of trial, the case was submitted to the jury with special interrogatories concerning the WPA claims. When the jury deadlocked on whether Michaud and Ryder were liable pursuant to the WPA, the court dismissed the jury and ruled on those claims, finding that Ryder and the East Millinocket School Committee had not violated the Act, and that Michaud had violated the Act. The court imposed a $1500 civil penalty upon Michaud personally pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 4613(2)(B)(7) (Supp. 1997).⁵ This appeal followed.

[¶ 6] On appeal, DiCentes argues that the court erred in concluding that she was not entitled to a jury trial on her WPA claims; erred in finding that Ryder was not liable for a violation of section 833(1)(B) of that Act, either as a result of his recommendation not to renew her contract or as a result of his refusal to provide her with a letter of recommendation for prospective employers; erred in concluding that the East Millinocket School Committee was not liable in respondeat superior for Michaud's violation of section 833(1)(B); and erred in finding that she was not entitled to damages representing her lost wages. Michaud cross-appeals, arguing that the court erred in finding that he was liable for a violation of section 833(1)(B).

II. Right to Jury Trial

[¶ 7] The right to jury trial in civil matters is found in article 1, section 20 of the Maine Constitution, which provides in pertinent part that "[i]n all civil suits, ... the parties shall have a right to a trial by jury, except in cases where it has heretofore been otherwise practiced." Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 38, this right "shall be preserved to the parties inviolate." We have construed article 1, section 20 to provide "`a broad constitutional guarantee of a right to a jury in all civil cases' except where `by the common law and Massachusetts statutory law that existed prior to the adoption of the Maine Constitution in 1820 such cases were decided without a jury.'" Kennebec Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Kueter, 1997 ME 123, ¶ 3, 695 A.2d 1201, 1202 (quoting City of Portland v. DePaolo, 531 A.2d 669, 670 (Me.1987)). Because matters in equity were never triable of right to a jury, the right to a jury trial does not exist for claims sounding in equity. See DesMarais v. Desjardins, 664 A.2d 840, 844 (Me. 1995)

.

[¶ 8] Whether a claim is legal or equitable depends upon the basic nature of the claim, including the remedy sought, as evidenced by the source of the claim or the nature of the pleadings. See id. We have previously addressed this issue with respect to claims under the Maine Human Rights Act, 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 4551-4651 (1989 & Supp. 1997) (MHRA), and have concluded that such claims are, by law, equitable in nature and thus do not give rise to a right to a jury trial. See Rozanski v. A-P-A Transport, Inc., 512 A.2d 335, 342 n. 1 (Me.1986)

; Maine Human Rights Comm'n v. City of Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253, 1261 (Me.1979).

[¶ 9] DiCentes, however, asks us to reexamine our holding in light of Abbott v. Bragdon, 882 F.Supp. 181 (D.Me.1995), in which the United States District Court for the District of Maine held that MHRA claims do give rise to a right to jury trial, at least to the extent that a litigant seeks relief in the form of a civil penalty. See id. at 182.⁶ We are not convinced that our prior decisions should be set aside.⁷

[¶ 10] An employee who suffers an adverse employment action as a result of unlawful discrimination, who may otherwise be without a cause of action against her employer at common law or in contract, may receive meaningful redress through the provisions of the MHRA. See generally Maine Human Rights Comm'n v. Local 1361, United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 383 A.2d 369, 373-75 (Me.1978)

(discussing Legislature's intention that the MHRA should have broad coverage in the area of fair employment practices). The MHRA, like its federal counterpart, was intended to accomplish "the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of . . . impermissible classification[s]." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). Toward that end, the Legislature provided the court with broad powers in equity to fashion appropriate remedies. Although the Act authorizes both legal and equitable relief, see 5 M.R.S.A. § 4613(2)(B), it explicitly provides the court with broad equitable authority to hear claims, determine liability, and award relief. See Maine Human Rights Comm'n,

408 A.2d at 1261 n. 11. Accordingly, here, where the cause of action itself sounds in equity, the nature of the relief sought is not dispositive on the question of availability of jury trial. The court committed no error in concluding that DiCentes was not entitled to a jury trial on her WPA claims.

III. Respondent Superior

[¶ 11] DiCentes argues that the East Millinocket School Committee is liable in respondeat superior for WPA violations committed by its agents, Ryder and Michaud. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, liability for tortious acts of a servant may be imputed to the master,⁸ see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 69, 70, at 499, 501 (5th ed.1984), and the acts of an agent may be imputed to the principal. See Bonk v. McPherson, 605 A.2d 74, 78 (Me.1992)

. The concept of respondeat superior has caused much debate in the courts in the context of employment discrimination claims.⁹

[¶ 12] Here, however, the answer is found in the explicit language of the WPA and the uncontested facts before the court. Section 833(1) of the WPA provides that "[n]o employer may discharge, threaten or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location or privileges of employment." 26 M.R.S.A. § 833(1) (1988) (emphasis added). The WPA defines the term "employer" in the following manner:

"Employer" means a person who has one or more employees. Employer includes an agent of an employer and the State, or a political subdivision of the State.

26 M.R.S.A. § 832(2) (1988) (emphasis added). Pursuant to the plain language of these two sections, the discriminatory conduct of an "employer" encompasses not only the conduct of the employing entity, but also that of its agents.

[¶ 13] The question therefore is not whether the School Committee, as DiCentes's employer, can be held responsible for the...