Dickerson v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co.

• Citation: 697 S.W.2d 210
• Decision Date: 28 June 1985
• Docket Number: No. 46998,46998
• Parties: Robert Wayne DICKERSON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ST. LOUIS SOUTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 210

697 S.W.2d 210

Robert Wayne DICKERSON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ST. LOUIS SOUTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 46998.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Eastern District,

Division One.

June 28, 1985.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer

Denied Aug. 28, 1985.

Application to Transfer Denied

Oct. 16, 1985.

Gerald D. Morris, St. Louis, for defendant-appellant.

Robert F. Ritter, Melissa G. Zoccolillo, St. Louis, for plaintiff-respondent.

UPON REMAND FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

SNYDER, Judge.

Robert Dickerson, a railroad policeman, was injured when he fell from a railroad car in the course of his job. He sued under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., and won a $1,000,000 judgment. This court affirmed the trial court's judgment. Dickerson v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 674 S.W.2d 165 (Mo.App.1984).

One of the railroad's points relied on in their appeal to this court alleged trial court error for failure to instruct the jury to take into account the present value of any award for loss of future earnings. This court following, as it must, the Missouri Supreme Court's ruling in Bair v. St. Louis San Francisco Ry. Co., 647 S.W.2d 507, 510 (Mo. banc 1983), held that it was not error to refuse to give the present value jury instruction.

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of this court. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Dickerson, --- U.S. ----, ----, 105 S.Ct. 1347, 84 L.Ed.2d 303 (1985). The Supreme Court held that this court erred in deciding that the railroad was not entitled to the present value instruction it requested. The Supreme Court mandate reads in part: "that this cause be remanded to the Court of Appeals of Missouri, Eastern District, for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of this Court." The cause is now remanded to the trial court for a new determination of damages in the calculation of which the present value of any lost future wages may be considered.

The railroad argues that because the Supreme Court used the word "reversed" in its opinion, this court has jurisdiction only to dismiss the case. It is not so. First, the railroad cites Missouri case law as controlling how the United States Supreme Court's use of the word "reversed" must be interpreted. The appropriate law to interpret a federal court's pronouncement of reversal is federal law.

Second, the Missouri authority which the railroad cites proves the inverse. It cites Abrams v. Scott, 211 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Mo. banc 1948) for the proposition that a remand to this court bestows only a limited power to enter the proper judgment. The railroad then ignores the very next sentence which states that upon remand a court must "take such steps as are directed." The opinion explains that the steps "... are determined from the mandate and the opinion of the appellate court." Abrams at 721.

The Supreme Court ruled that this court erred in applying Missouri law in determining whether it was error to refuse a jury instruction in an F.E.L.A. case when the question is a matter of federal law. Nothing in the Supreme Court's opinion supports the incredible contention that respondent's right to a recovery is extinguished by the trial court's erroneous refusal to give a jury instruction.

The Supreme Court held:

As a general matter, FELA cases adjudicated in state courts are subject to state procedural rules, but the substantive law governing them is federal. Although the Court's decisions in this area "point up the impossibility of laying down a precise rule to distinguish 'substance' from 'procedure,' " Brown v. Western R. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 296, 70 S.Ct. 105, 106, 94 L.Ed. 100 (1949), it is settled that the propriety of jury instructions concerning the measure of damages in an FELA action is an issue of 'substance' determined by federal law. Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 493, 100 S.Ct. 755, 757, 62 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980). Accordingly, petitioner's contention that it was entitled to a jury instruction on present value cannot be dismissed on the ground that such an instruction is not to be found in the Missouri Approved Instructions. Whether such an instruction should...