Dickinson v. Porter

• Decision Date: 14 December 1948
• Docket Number: 47072.
• Citation: 35 N.W.2d 66,240 Iowa 393
• Parties: DICKINSON v. PORTER, State Comptroller, et al.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

35 N.W.2d 66

240 Iowa 393

DICKINSON v. PORTER, State Comptroller, et al.

No. 47072.

Supreme Court of Iowa

December 14, 1948

Rehearing Denied March 11, 1949. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] [Copyrighted Material Omitted] [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Clewell & Cooney and Wm. G. Fuerste, all of Dubuque, for appellant.

Robert L. Larson, Atty. Gen., Oscar Strauss, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Wisdom & Wisdom, all of Des Moines, and F. H. Becker, of Dubuque, County Attorney, for appellees.

GARFIELD Justice.

Because a rehearing was granted, the former opinion herein, reported in 31 N.W.2d 110, is withdrawn and the following substituted therefor.

Plaintiff, who owns a 4-acre tract used solely for agricultural purposes in Epworth School District, Dubuque County, challenges the Agricultural Land Tax Credit Act, Ch. 426, Code, 1946, on the grounds, insofar as here urged, it violates: (1) Article III, section 30, and Article I, section 6, Iowa constitution, and section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal constitution in that the law lacks uniformity and provides arbitrary and discriminatory classifications, and (2) Article III, section 31, Iowa Constitution, in that it appropriates public money for a private purpose. The trial court held the law was not unconstitutional upon the grounds urged and plaintiff has appealed.

The challenged act, passed by the 51st General Assembly (Ch. 192) in 1945, appropriates for each fiscal year $500,000 to be apportioned as a credit against the tax on each tract of agricultural lands in school districts where the millage for the general school fund exceeds 15 mills. The amount of such credit is the amount by which the school tax exceeds a tax based on a levy of 15 mills. To be entitled to the credit each owner must deliver to the assessor or file with the county auditor a verified statement and designation of the agricultural lands upon which credit is claimed. Section 426.4. If the appropriation (of $500,000) is insufficient to pay the credits in full they shall be paid on a pro rata basis. Section 426.9.

Agricultural lands are defined by section 426.2 as 'all tracts of land of ten acres or more, and not laid off into lots of less than ten acres or divided by streets and alleys into parcels of less than ten acres, lying within any school corporation in this state and in good faith used for agricultural or horticultural purposes.'

The 48th General Assembly in 1939 by chapter 109 passed a law similar to the present Code chapter 426 except that it applied only to 'agricultural lands' within independent school districts. An owner of agricultural land in a consolidated school district challenged the constitutionality of that act on all grounds now urged by plaintiff against chapter 426. We held the earlier law 'clearly discriminates against those owning agricultural lands not located in an independent school district.' We observed however, 'If there was anything that distinguished agricultural land located in an independent school district from similar land in other school districts we would have a different situation.' Keefner v. Porter, 228 Iowa 844, 852, 293 N.W. 501, 504.

Following this decision the appointment of a commission was authorized by chapter 152, Acts 49th General Assembly, in 1941, and again by chapter 314, Acts 50th General Assembly, in 1943, to assist in the revision of laws relating to education and to prepare a proposed school code. The 50th General Assembly (Ch. 314, sec. 2) directed that the commission authorized by it 'shall give particular attention to the tax structure of the State of Iowa in so far as it concerns the school system of the state, and make recommendations with reference to same, * * *.' This commission in effect recommended adoption of the present law which was passed by the 51st General Assembly with only two dissenting votes in the house and one in the senate. This act applies the limitation of 15 mills to 'agricultural lands' in all school districts, not merely independent districts, as did the earlier law held invalid in Keefner v. Porter, supra.

Since the single basis of attack sustained by the Keefner opinion was eliminated in the enactment of the present statute, of course it is not now advanced. In other respects, however, plaintiff's petition, briefs and arguments are largely patterned after and copied from plaintiff's petition, briefs and arguments in the Keefner case. Of course if the contentions this plaintiff urges are sound now, they were equally so when Keefner v. Porter was decided. It would seem we were not then convinced of the soundness of such grounds.

We should hesitate to declare the present act void since the legislature, after the Keefner opinion was filed, reasserted its power to enact the present law with the elimination of the objectionable feature pointed out in that opinion. See Stewart v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Iowa 9, 1 Am.Rep. 238, a leading authority which upholds a law (passed a second time with modifications, after a decree of unconstitutionality) authorizing a tax in aid of railroads, frequently cited throughout the subsequent history of this and other courts. See also Minsinger v. Rau, 236 Pa. 327, 84 A. 902, Ann.Cas.1913E, 1324, which considers an attack upon a law recommended by a commission and passed by two legislative sessions.

I. All presumptions are in favor of the constitutionality of this statute and it will not be held invalid unless it is clear, plain and palpable that such decision is required. Miller v. Schuster, 227 Iowa 1005, 1014, 1015, 1020, 289 N.W. 702, and citations; Loftus v. Dept. of Agriculture, 211 Iowa 566, 570, 232 N.W. 412, and citations; 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 99a.

We have pointed out repeatedly the General Assembly has power to enact any kind of legislation it sees fit provided it is not clearly and plainly prohibited by some provision of the state or federal constitutions. Carlton v. Grimes, 237 Iowa 912, 943, 23 N.W.2d 883, 899, and citation; Loftus v. Dept. of Agriculture, supra, 211 Iowa 566, 569, 570, 232 N.W. 412. See also 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 70.

It is not our province to pass upon the policy, wisdom, advisability or justice of a statute. The remedy for unwise or oppressive legislation within constitutional bounds is not to be found in the courts but by appeal to the legislators. McQuire v. Chicago, B. & Q. Railway, 131 Iowa 340, 349, 108 N.W. 902, 33 L.R.A.,N.S., 706, and citations. See also Merchants Supply Co. v. Iowa Employment Security Comm., 235 Iowa 372, 383, 384, 16 N.W.2d 572, 578, 579; 11 Am.Jur., Const.Law, section 138.

The burden does not rest upon defendants (state and county officials charged with duties under the law) to convince us the act is constitutional. Plaintiff has the burden to satisfy us beyond a reasonable doubt (Miller v. Schuster and Loftus v. Dept. of Agriculture, both supra, and citations) the act violates the constitutional provisions invoked and to point out the manner or respect in which it violates them. In other words, she 'must point out and state with particularity the details of supposed invalidity.' 11 Am.Jur., Const.Law, section 132. To the same effect are 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law,§ 96a, page 224; Peverill v. Board of Supervisors, 201 Iowa 1050, 1056, 205 N.W. 543. See also Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59, 63, 64, 32 S.Ct. 192, 193, 56 L.Ed. 350, 352 (Holmes, J.).

Further, it is plaintiff's burden to negative every conceivable basis which may support this statute. Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88, 60 S.Ct. 406, 84 L.Ed. 590, 593, 125 A.L.R. 1383, 1386, cited with approval in Merchants Supply Co. v. Iowa Employment Security Comm., supra, 235 Iowa 372, 383, 16 N.W.2d 572, 578. See also Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 57 S.Ct. 868, 81 L.Ed. 1245, 109 A.L.R. 1327, 1333, 1336, 1337, (Stone, J.), also cited with approval in the Merchants Supply Co. case; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78, 79, 31 S.Ct. 337, 340, 55 L.Ed. 369, 377, Ann.Cas.1912C, 160, from which we quote with approval in Berg v. Berg, 221 Iowa 326, 332, 264 N.W. 821; Tolerton & Warfield Co. v. Board of Assessment and Review, 222 Iowa 908, 913, 914, 270 N.W. 427.

II. Article III, section 30, and Article I, section 6, of our state constitution, invoked by plaintiff, require that the law in question have a uniform operation throughout the state. The effect of section 1, Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitutional as applied to this case is substantially the same as these uniformity provisions of our own constitution. In general, if a law does not offend against one constitution it is inoffensive to the other. Berg v. Berg, 221 Iowa 326, 331, 332, 264 N.W. 821; Lake Superior Consol. Iron Mines v. Lord, 271 U.S. 577, 581, 46 S.Ct. 627, 628, 70 L.Ed. 1093, 1101; State v. Henneford, 3 Wash.2d 48, 99 P.2d 616, 619; Schmitt v. Nord, S.D., 27 N.W.2d 910, 912; Reed v. Bjornson, 191 Minn. 254, 253 N.W. 102, 105; City of Jackson v. Mississippi Fire Ins. Co., 132 Miss. 415, 95 So. 845, 847; 51 Am.Jur., Taxation, section 169.

Both in her petition and in argument here plaintiff's complaint is that the statute conflicts with the above constitutional provisions in that the classifications in the law are unreasonable and arbitrary. It is contended there is no basis for separately classifying (1) agricultural lands (2) of ten acres or more (3) in school districts where the millage exceeds 15 mills. The contention the act appropriates public money for a private purpose in violation of Chapter III, section 31, Iowa constitution, will be considered later.

If there is any reasonable ground for the classifications in this law and it operates equally upon all within the same class, there is uniformity in...