Dickinson v. Terminix Int'l Co.
Decision Date | 24 April 2014 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 13–0631–CG–N. |
Citation | 16 F.Supp.3d 1360 |
Parties | Scott and Melissa DICKINSON, Plaintiffs, v. The TERMINIX INTERNATIONAL COMPANY, LP, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama |
Taylor Clark Powell, Thomas F. Campbell, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiffs.
J. Burruss Riis, Hand Arendall, L.L.C., Mobile, AL, for Defendants.
CALLIE V.S. GRANADE, District Judge.
After due and proper consideration of all portions of the issues raised and a de novo determination of those portions of the recommendation to which objection is made, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge made under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and dated March 14, 2014 is ADOPTED as the opinion of this Court.
It is ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion to remand is GRANTED, and as such, this case is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama, from whence it came.
In this case, removed from the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama on December 20, 2013 (see Doc. 1), the plaintiffs have filed a motion to remand (Doc. 10), which has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.2, for entry of a report and recommendation. Consistent with the submission order (Doc. 11), the defendants have filed an opposition (Doc. 13), and the plaintiffs have filed a reply in support of remand (Doc. 16). After consideration of the pleadings, and for the reasons explained herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the motion to remand (Doc. 10) be GRANTED and that this case be REMANDED to the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama.
A. The defendants must prove that this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction, which in the context of this case means they must prove that the plaintiffs have joined a resident defendant solely to defeat the Court's jurisdiction.
“Any civil case filed in state court may be removed by the defendant to federal court if the case could have been brought originally in federal court.” Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1356 (11th Cir.1996) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) ), abrogated on other grounds by Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir.2000) ; accord City of Vestavia Hills v. General Fid. Ins. Co., 676 F.3d 1310, 1313 n. 1 (11th Cir.2012). And a federal court may exercise diversity jurisdiction over all civil actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and the action is between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Nevertheless, University of S. Ala. v. American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir.1999) ; cf. D.M.C. Enters. Inc. v. Best McAllister, LLC, Civil Action No. 10–00153–CB–N, 2010 WL 3039477, at *2 (S.D.Ala. Aug. 4, 2010) ; White v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Civil Action No. 1:11–cv–408–MHT, 2011 WL 3666613, at *3 (M.D.Ala. Aug. 22, 2011) ( ).
Therefore, the defendants must establish the propriety of removal under section 1441 and, as such, “bear[ ] the burden of establishing the existence of federal jurisdiction[,]” Brown v. Kabco Builders, Inc., Civil Action 07–0099–WS–C, 2007 WL 841690, at *1 (S.D.Ala. Mar. 15, 2007) (citing Leonard v. Enterprise Rent a Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972 (11th Cir.2002) ), which requires that they both establish complete diversity—that all plaintiffs are diverse from all defendants, Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir.1998) (citation omitted); accord Auto–Owners Ins. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 479 Fed.Appx. 228, 232 n. 3 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam)—and show that the amount in controversy more likely than not exceeds the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum, see Fitzgerald v. Besam Automated Entrance Sys., 282 F.Supp.2d 1309, 1314 (S.D.Ala.2003).
Here, the defendants have made a showing sufficient to establish—and the plaintiffs do not contest—that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum (see, e.g., Doc. 1, ¶ 13). The sole task for the Court, then, is to determine whether the non-diverse (or resident) defendant, Ken Stroh, was fraudulently joined to defeat this Court's jurisdiction. That is, the defendants can establish complete diversity of citizenship by proving that Stroh, a resident of the same state as the plaintiffs (see Doc. 1 at 10, compl., ¶ 2 ( )), has been joined solely to defeat federal diversity jurisdiction. See Tapscott, 77 F.3d at 1359 (); Sellers v. Foremost Ins. Co., 924 F.Supp. 1116, 1117 (M.D.Ala.1996) ().
The defendants' burden in this regard is “a heavy one.” See Pacheco de Perez v.
AT & T Co.,
139 F.3d 1368, 1380 (11th Cir.1998).
When a plaintiff names a non-diverse defendant solely in order to defeat federal diversity jurisdiction, the district court must ignore the presence of the non-diverse defendant and deny any motion to remand the matter back to state court. The plaintiff is said to have effectuated a “fraudulent joinder,” see Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir.1997), and a federal court may appropriately assert its removal diversity jurisdiction over the case. A defendant seeking to prove that a co-defendant was fraudulently joined must demonstrate either that: “(1) there is no possibility the plaintiff can establish a cause of action against the [non-diverse or] resident defendant; or (2) the plaintiff has fraudulently pled jurisdictional facts to bring the resident defendant into state court.” Id. The defendant must make such a showing by clear and convincing evidence. See Parks v. N.Y. Times Co., 308 F.2d 474, 478 (5th Cir.1962).
Henderson v. Washington National Insurance Co., 454 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir.2006) (footnotes omitted); accord Taylor Newman Cabinetry, Inc. v. Classic Soft Trim, Inc., 436 Fed.Appx. 888, 890 (11th Cir.2011) (per curiam); Roberson v. BancorpSouth Bank, Inc., Civil Action No. 12716CGN, 2013 WL 2896840, at *3 (S.D.Ala. June 13, 2013) (same).
In the context of fraudulent joinder, the Court is required to both evaluate the parties' factual allegations and submissions in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all uncertainties about state substantive law in favor of the plaintiff. See Crowe, 113 F.3d at 1538. And although the determination of whether a non-diverse defendant has been fraudulently joined “should be made based upon the plaintiff's pleadings at the time of removal,” Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir.1989) (citing Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 537, 59 S.Ct. 347, 83 L.Ed. 334 (1939) ), a district court “can consider any submitted affidavits and/or deposition transcripts,” id. ; see also Abrams v. Olin Corp., 248 F.R.D. 283, 291 (S.D.Ala.2007) .
Atwood v. Weyerhaeuser USA, Inc., Civil Action No. 09–0379–CG–N, 2010 WL 749337, at *5 (S.D.Ala. Feb. 26, 2010) (Granade, J.) (emphasis added); see id. at *6 ( ); Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287 ; Burden v. General Dynamics Corp., 60 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir.1995) (...
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