Dickison v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc.

• Decision Date: 18 May 1955
• Docket Number: No. 12824,12824
• Parties: P. E. DICKISON, Assessor-Collector of Taxes, et al., Appellants, v. WOODMEN OF THE WORLD LIFE INSURANCE SOCIETY, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 315

280 S.W.2d 315

P. E. DICKISON, Assessor-Collector of Taxes, et al., Appellants, v. WOODMEN OF THE WORLD LIFE INSURANCE SOCIETY, Appellee.

No. 12824.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, San Antonio.

May 18, 1955.

Rehearing Denied June 15, 1955.

Austin F. Anderson, Dist. Atty., Carlos Cadena, City Atty., J. Bruce Aycock, Asst. Dist Atty., Brewer, Mattews, Nowlin & Pat Swearingen, Jr., Greathouse & Zuercher, San Antonio, for appellants.

L. M. Bickett, San Antonio, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This suit is the consolidation of two suits, one brought by Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Society, a Nebraska corporation authorized to do business in this State as a fraternal benefit society under the provisions of Chapter 8, Title 78, R.C.S., 1925 (now Chapter 10, Vernon's Ann.Tex.Stats., Insurance Code), against certain taxing authorities, seeking to have a tract of land consisting of some 309 acres, located within the territory of such taxing authorities and fully described in its pleadings, exempt from taxation during the time the land is or was owned by it, and for permanent injunction, and the other suit is by such taxing authorities, seeking to collect taxes against this property. The taxing authorities involved are: State of Texas, County of Bexar, City of San Antonio and Alamo Heights Independent School District.

The trial was before the court without the intervention of a jury and resulted in judgment sustaining the contention of the Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Society, to the effect that such property was and is exempt from taxation, declaring all attempts to levy and collect taxes against such property by such taxing authorities to be null and void, and permanently enjoining them from collecting any such taxes during the time the subject property was or is owned by Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Society. It appears that the Society had sold all but 50 acres of its land and the judgment, insofar as the land sold is concerned, is made effective only during the time it was owned by the Society.

Appellee undertakes to support its claimed exemption from taxation of its property by the provisions of Sec. 2 of Article 8 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann.St., and Articles 4858 and 4858a, Vernon's Ann.Civ.Stats. (now Art. 10.39, Vernon's Ann.Tex.Stats., Insurance Code). Appellee asserts no tax exemption under the provisions of Art. 7150, subd. 7, Vernon's Ann.Civ.Stats., which exempts property owned and used by institutions of purely public charity and defines, for the purposes of that Article, what is meant by institutions of purely public charity.

There are other provisions of the Constitution relating to exemption from the burden of taxation of property, but the only constitutional provision here involved is Sec. 2, Art. 8. Two things are apparent from a reading of this constitutional provision: First, that the section itself does not exempt any property from taxation, but only authorizes the Legislature to do so by general laws, and, second, while the Legislature may restrict the exemption, it may not broaden it beyond the constitutional confines, and any attempt to do so would be null and void.

The effect of Art. 4858 and Art. 4858a (now Art. 10.39, Vernon's Ann.Tex.Stats., Insurance Code) is to declare all property of fraternal benefit societies organized or licensed under Chapter 8 of Title 78, R.C.S., 1925, now Chapter 10, Vernon's Ann.Tex.Stats., Insurance Code, to be exempt from taxation, except real estate and office equipment used for other than lodge purposes, and to declare such societies to be charitable and benevolent institutions.

Thus we come to the question: Does the legislative declaration operate to exempt the subject property from taxation? The pertinent portions of Art. 8, Sec. 2, provide that, 'the legislature may, by general laws, exempt from taxation * * * all buildings used exclusively and owned by * * * institutions of purely public charity; and all laws exempting property from taxation other than the property above mentioned shall be null and void.' (Italics ours.)

Whether a society is an institution of purely public charity is essentially a question of fact. This matter is made clear by the opinion of the Supreme Court in the recent case of Texas Turnpike Co. v. Dallas County, Tex., 271 S.W.2d 400, 402, wherein the Supreme Court had under consideration Art. 11, Sec. 9, of our Constitution, and Article 6674v, Vernon's Ann.Civ.Statutes. The effect of Art. 11, Sec. 9, among other things, is to declare property owned by counties, cities and towns, and used for public purposes, to be free from taxation. Art. 6674v, supra, provides, among other things, that all property of Texas Turnpike Authority, created under its provisions, is public property used for public purposes. Mr. Justice Calvert, Speaking for the Supreme Court of this State, had this to say:

'Under the foregoing facts is the property in question 'publicly owned' so as to be exempt from taxes under Article XI, Section 9 of the constitution? Public ownership, for tax-exemption purposes, must grow out of the facts; it is a legal status, based on facts, that may not be created or conferred by mere legislative, or even contractual, declaration. If the state does not in fact own the taxable title to the property, neither the Legislature by statute, nor the petitioners and the Authority by contract, may make the state the owner thereof by simply saying that it is the owner.'

We believe that the principle above announced is analogous and applicable to this case. The Legislature could not by legislative fiat declare that to be true which is not in fact true, and thus enlarge the tax exemption provided for in Art. 8, Sec. 2, supra. If appellee is not in truth and in fact an institution of purely public charity, its property is not exempt from taxation, and the Legislature cannot by mere legislative fiat bring it under the provisions of Art. 8, Sec. 2, supra.

The subject property was not owned by a separate entity, such as a hospital association, it was owned exclusively by appellee, Woodmen of...