Dickten Masch Plastics, LLC v. Williams

Decision Date10 August 2016
Docket NumberNo. 4:16-cv-00104-JEG,4:16-cv-00104-JEG
Citation199 F.Supp.3d 1207
Parties DICKTEN MASCH PLASTICS, LLC, Plaintiffs, v. Angela WILLIAMS, in her official capacity as an Iowa Civil Rights Commissioner; Patricia Lipski in her official capacity as an Iowa Civil Rights Commissioner; Mathew Hosford, in his official capacity as an Iowa Civil Rights Commissioner; Tom Conley, in his official capacity as an Iowa Civil Rights Commissioner; Douglas Oelschlaeger, in his official capacity as an Iowa Civil Rights Commissioner; Lily Lijun Hou, in her official capacity as an Iowa Civil Rights Commissioner; Lawrence Cunningham, in his official capacity as an Iowa Civil Rights Commissioner; and William E. Cooper, Jr. Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

Amanda Marie Atherton, Frank B Harty, John F. Lorentzen, Nyemaster Goode PC, Des Moines, IA, Erica Nicole Reib, Joseph E. Gumina, O'Neil, Cannon, Hollman, Dejong & Laing S.C., Milwaukee, WI, for Plaintiff.

Molly McConville Weber, Iowa Attorney General, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants.

William E. Cooper, Jr, Des Moines, IA, pro se.

ORDER

JAMES E. GRITZNER, Senior Judge, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Plaintiff Dickten Masch Plastics, LLC (Dickten Masch), ECF No. 12, and a Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Angela Williams, Patricia Lipski, Mathew Hosford, Tom Conley, Douglas Oelschlaeger, Lily Lijun Hou, and Lawrence Cunningham, in their official capacities as Iowa Civil Rights Commissioners (the State Defendants), ECF Nos. 20, 27. The State Defendants and Defendant William E. Cooper (Cooper) (collectively, Defendants), resist the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and Dickten Masch resists the Motion to Dismiss. The Court held a hearing on both Motions on June 17, 2016. Attorneys John F. Lorentzen and Amanda Marie Atherton were present, representing Dickten Masch; attorney Molly McConville Weber was present, representing the State Defendants; and Cooper, who had not yet hired an attorney for this matter, was also present. The matter is fully submitted and ready for disposition.

I. BACKGROUND

Dickten Masch operates a manufacturing facility in Ankeny, Iowa, where Cooper was employed from March 2005 until August 21, 2015. Prior to November 2014, Cooper held the position of Maintenance Supervisor, which was an exempt salaried position. On November 3, 2014, Cooper was transferred to a Maintenance Lead position (also referred to as a Maintenance Tech Lead position), which was a non-exempt hourly position. Shortly thereafter, on January 5, 2015, Cooper took short-term disability leave. During this time, Cooper collected benefits pursuant to Dickten Masch's employee short-term disability benefit plan (the Plan). Pursuant to the Plan, salaried employees (such as those in the Maintenance Supervisor position that Cooper previously held) collect 100% of their weekly earnings for up to 26 weeks, while hourly employees (such as those in the Maintenance Lead position to which Cooper was transferred) collect only 50% of their weekly earnings and no more than $300 per week. On July 6, when Cooper's short-term leave was exhausted, Cooper began long-term disability leave. Cooper was unable to return to work and was terminated on August 21, 2015.

On August 28, 2015, Cooper filed a pro se complaint (Cooper's Complaint) with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (the ICRC, or the Commission), which is authorized by statute to receive and investigate complaints of alleged unfair or discriminatory practices under Iowa law. Cooper's Complaint lists Dickten Masch as the organization that discriminated against him. On Question 6 of Cooper's Complaint, which asks what actions the respondent took that were discriminatory, checkmarks appear next to the "Demotion" and "Undesirable Assignment/Transfer" labels, but not the "Terminated" label. Question 12 of the complaint form asks, "Do you believe you were discriminated against because of a disability, real or perceived?" Cooper answered "Yes" to Question 12 and listed his disability as "Became ill with lung disease." Cooper hand-wrote additional details regarding his demotion in the narrative portion of the complaint form, primarily regarding the timing of various events and the specifics of his medical condition. In that narrative portion, Cooper also wrote: "They chose to make me hourly because salary employees are entitled to 100% salary on short term disability and by demoting me to hourly there is a saving to the company where hourly employees will receive 60% or $300 max per week. The company ‘Dickten Masch Plastics LLC is self insured up to $100,000.00 which when is paid comes out of the bottom line of there monthly expenses." Am. Compl. Ex. 2, at 5, ECF No. 25. Finally, Cooper filed an amendment to his complaint with the ICRC on April 13, 2016, in which he writes that the demotion from Maintenance Supervisor to Maintenance Lead did not accommodate his disability (lung disease), as the latter position had greater physical demands.

The parties dispute what the allegations in Cooper's Complaint mean. According to Dickten Masch, Cooper's Complaint alleges that he was demoted entirely so that Dickten Masch could save money under the Plan. Dickten Masch highlights the narrative portion of Cooper's Complaint, in which Cooper alleges a desire on the part of Dickten Masch to save money under the Plan. By contrast, the State Defendants claim that Cooper's Complaint alleges discrimination based on disability status, pointing primarily to the affirmative response to Question 12, which asks if the complainant believes he or she was discriminated against because of a disability, as well as to the April 13 amendment to Cooper's Complaint.

On September 10, 2015, the ICRC notified Dickten Masch of Cooper's Complaint and requested a response. Dickten Masch responded on October 26, 2015, with a letter that set forth its position taken in this litigation: that Cooper's Complaint alleges discrimination based exclusively on Plan status; and as such, the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) completely preempts any state law claims Cooper may allege, meaning that the ICRC has no jurisdiction to investigate the allegations in Cooper's Complaint.1 The ICRC issued a screening analysis on February 23, 2016, rejecting Dickten Masch's jurisdictional arguments and referring the matter for investigation by the Commission. Dickten Masch then filed suit in this Court on April 7, 2016, and moved for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief as well as expedited declaratory relief on May 18, 2016. The State Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss on June 2, 2016.

Following the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Dickten Masch filed an Amended Complaint. In the Amended Complaint, Dickten Masch pursues injunctive relief against the State Defendants in their official capacities as Commissioners of the ICRC. Dickten Masch alleges that it is the administrator and fiduciary of the Plan, which by its terms is governed by ERISA. It argues that the only claim set forth in Cooper's Complaint is that Cooper was demoted so that Dickten Masch could realize savings under the Plan, and thus any action taken by the Commissioners to investigate or otherwise adjudicate the claim(s) in Cooper's Complaint, on behalf of a state authority (the ICRC), violates the preemption provisions of ERISA. Dickten Masch requests that this Court enjoin the State Defendants from investigating or otherwise proceeding with Cooper's Complaint. Dickten Masch also requests declaratory relief against both Cooper and the State Defendants. Specifically, Dickten Masch requests a declaration that Cooper's Complaint only sets forth a claim for interference with ERISA rights under 29 U.S.C. § 1140, and that the claim may only be brought in federal court.

Although the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was filed prior to the filing of Dickten Masch's Amended Complaint, the State Defendants renewed their motion with a supplemental brief shortly thereafter to address the Amended Complaint. The State Defendants argue, first, that Dickten Masch fails to establish subject matter jurisdiction because Dickten Masch fails to plead a federal question and also because it lacks Article III standing. The State Defendants also argue that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Finally, the State Defendants argue that this Court should abstain from hearing Dickten Masch's claims pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971).

II. DISCUSSION
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Mamot Feed Lot and Trucking v. Hobson, 539 F.3d 898, 902 (8th Cir.2008). This Court thus has a special obligation to consider whether it has subject matter jurisdiction before it proceeds with the case, and it must dismiss the action if it finds that subject matter jurisdiction is not present. Hart v. United States, 630 F.3d 1085, 1089 (8th Cir.2011). The burden of proving federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking to establish it. Great Rivers Habitat All. v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 615 F.3d 985, 988 (8th Cir.2010).

1. Federal Question Jurisdiction

Dickten Masch alleges that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.2 "[A] district court's federal question jurisdiction extends only to ‘civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.’ " Mamot, 539 F.3d at 902 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ). To determine whether a claim arises under federal law, courts are guided by the well-pleaded complaint rule. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207, 124 S.Ct. 2488, 159 L.Ed.2d 312 (2004). In other words, federal question jurisdiction exists "in those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief...

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