Diefenderfer v. Pierce

Decision Date27 September 1990
Docket NumberNo. S90A0961,S90A0961
Citation396 S.E.2d 227,260 Ga. 426
PartiesAllen F. DIEFENDERFER v. James L. PIERCE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

John W. Spears, Jr., Kraus & Spears, Decatur, for diefenderfer.

Albert Sidney Johnson, County Atty., Joan F. Roach, Decatur, Andrew Whalen, III, Mullins & Whalen, Griffin, for Pierce.

CLARKE, Chief Justice.

Allen Diefenderfer filed a petition for an order quo warranto, asking the court to declare that James Pierce, who does not have a college degree, does not possess the statutory qualifications for the position of Executive Assistant to the Chief Executive Officer of DeKalb County. The court denied the motion. We reverse.

The qualifications for the position, found in Georgia Laws of 1981 at 4312, are:

(c) The Executive Assistant shall hold a college degree in public administration, political science, urban affairs, business administration, engineering, or a related field and must have at least five years of experience in a supervisory capacity as an employee, director, administrator, or manager of a city or county government or a state or federal agency or equivalent experience in the private sector or any combination thereof. (emphasis supplied)

The trial court found that Pierce does not have a college degree, but is otherwise qualified for the position. The court relied on the phrase "or any combination thereof," and construed the act to allow Pierce to hold the position. We cannot concur with the trial court's construction of the act.

In construing a legislative act, a court must first look to the literal meaning of the act. Telecom * U.S.A. v. Collins, Comm'r., 260 Ga. 362, 393 S.E.2d 235 (1990). If the language is plain and does not lead to any absurd or impractical consequences, the court simply construes it according to its terms and conducts no further inquiry. Hollowell v. Jove, 247 Ga. 678, 279 S.E.2d 430 (1981). Here, the language of the act is plain and unambiguous.

There are two components to the qualifications for Executive Assistant to the Chief Executive Officer of DeKalb County: an education component and an experience component. Both education and experience are required. The phrase "any combination thereof" logically and correctly applies only to the work experience component. It cannot mean that any combination of experience can substitute for the education requirement.

Therefore, we conclude that Pierce does not meet the statutory qualifications for the position.

Judgment reversed.

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33 cases
  • Cross v. Stokes
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • November 12, 2002
    ...consequences, the court simply construes it according to its terms and conducts no further inquiry. [Cit.]" Diefenderfer v. Pierce, 260 Ga. 426, 426-27, 396 S.E.2d 227 (1990). The statute clearly and plainly prohibits a DVA guardian who is not his ward's next of kin from being named as a be......
  • Samay v. Som, A94A1602
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • June 27, 1994
    ...or impracticable consequences, the court simply construes it according to its terms and conducts no further inquiry. Diefenderfer v. Pierce, 260 Ga. 426, 427, 396 S.E.2d 227. OCGA § 9-10-94 by its terms provides that the manner of service may be as provided by law "within the state" of Geor......
  • Read v. Benedict, s. A91A0181
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • May 13, 1991
    ...impracticable consequences, the court simply construes it according to its terms and conducts no further inquiry." Diefenderfer v. Pierce, 260 Ga. 426, 426-427, 396 S.E.2d 227. To construe OCGA § 13-1-13 so as to preclude the award of damages in a suit grounded in tort when the alleged volu......
  • Jones v. NordicTrack, Inc., S01Q0568.
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • July 16, 2001
    ...the property or "reasonably be affected" by it. See Mansfield v. Pannell, 261 Ga. 243, 244, 404 S.E.2d 104 (1991); Diefenderfer v. Pierce, 260 Ga. 426, 396 S.E.2d 227 (1990). The fact that the statute also states that a manufacturer is liable when the property is "not merchantable and reaso......
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