Telecom*USA, Inc. v. Collins, s. S90A0558

• Decision Date: 05 July 1990
• Docket Number: S90X0561,S90A0562 and S90X0563,Nos. S90A0558,S90X0559,S90A0560,s. S90A0558
• Parties: Page 235 393 S.E.2d 235 260 Ga. 362 TELECOM*USA, INC. v. COLLINS, Comr., et al. BIBB CO. BD. TAX ASSESSORS v. TELECOM*USA, INC. COLONIAL PIPELINE CO. v. COLLINS, Comr., et al. BARTOW CO. BD. TAX ASSESSORS v. COLONIAL PIPELINE CO. PLANTATION PIPE LINE CO. v. COLLINS, Comr., et al. BIBB CO. BD. TAX ASSESSORS v. PLANTATION PIPE LINE CO. Supreme Court of Georgia
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 235

393 S.E.2d 235

260 Ga. 362

TELECOM*USA, INC. v COLLINS, Comr., et al.

BIBB CO. BD. TAX ASSESSORS v TELECOM*USA, INC.

COLONIAL PIPELINE CO. v COLLINS, Comr., et al.

BARTOW CO. BD. TAX ASSESSORS v COLONIAL PIPELINE CO.

PLANTATION PIPE LINE CO. v. COLLINS, Comr., et al.

BIBB CO. BD. TAX ASSESSORS v. PLANTATION PIPE LINE CO.

Nos. S90A0558, S90X0559, S90A0560, S90X0561, S90A0562 and S90X0563.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

July 5, 1990.

Reconsideration Denied July 26, 1990.

John K. Larkins, Jr., David B. Poythress, Nickolas P. Chilivis, Chilivis & Grindler, Atlanta, for Telecom*USA, Inc. in No. S90A0558, Colonial Pipeline Co. in No. S90A0560 and Plantation Pipe Line Co. in No. S90A0562.

William D. Healan, Jr., Winder, E.S. Sell, Jr., Sell & Melton, Macon, for Marcus Collins et al.

E.S. Sell, Jr., Sell & Melton, Macon, G. Carey Nelson, Nelson & Bradley, Cartersville, for Bd. of Tax Assessors of Bibb County et al. and Bd. of Tax Assessors of Bartow County et al.

John K. Larkins, Jr., Chilivis & Grindler, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Warren R. Calvert, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Law, Atlanta, for Telecom*USA, Inc. in No. S90X0559, Colonial Pipeline Co. et al. in No. S90X0561, and Plantation Pipe Line Co. et al. in No. S90X0563.

Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Warren R. Calvert, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Law, Atlanta, for Marcus E. Collins, Sr., Com'r et al. in No. S90A0560.

Warren R. Calvert, Lucy Sheftall, Asst. Attys. Gen., Dept. of Law, Atlanta, for Marcus E. Collins, Sr., Com'r et al. in No. S90A0562.

CLARKE, Chief Justice.

TELECOM*USA, Inc. ("Telecom"), Colonial Pipeline Company ("Colonial"), and Plantation Pipe Line Company ("Plantation") are public utilities which own property in various Georgia counties. Each of the companies brought an action in Fulton County Superior Court to challenge the 1989 ad valorem tax assessments on their property. Because of uncertainty about the procedural requirements of the newly amended OCGA § 48-2-18, the utilities joined the county boards of tax assessors and county commissioners as parties in the Fulton County action and simultaneously filed separate appeals in the counties where the property is located. Colonial has 37 local appeals; Plantation has 30 local appeals; and Telecom has 13 local appeals.

In the Fulton County actions, each utility filed a motion seeking (1) to stay the local appeals pending the outcome of the Fulton County action; (2) to enjoin the counties from assessing their property at an amount higher than the "undisputed amount" during the pendency of the action; and (3) to enjoin the counties from assessing taxes at an amount greater than that finally established in the Fulton County appeal. In each of the Fulton County cases most of the county commissioners and county boards of tax assessors filed joint motions to dismiss the action against them for lack of jurisdiction. The court denied all motions. These three interlocutory appeals and three cross appeals ensued. We affirm the denial of the utilities' motions and reverse the denial of the counties' motion to dismiss, except as to the utilities' claims for declaratory judgment.

1. The utilities' motions to stay the local appeals: Prior to 1989, if a utility objected to a tax assessment, it appealed to the State Board of Equalization ("Board"). The Board held a hearing, made findings of fact and conclusions of law and ruled on the appeal. If the utility was dissatisfied with the result, it could appeal to the Superior Court in Fulton County. In 1988, the legislature amended OCGA § 48-2-18 to eliminate the hearing before the Board and to provide two new appeal procedures. Section (c) of the statute provides for a direct appeal to the Superior Court of Fulton County. ¹ Section (d) provides for an administrative appeal in each county where the utility owns property. ² The statute does not state explicitly whether the appeals are to proceed simultaneously, serially, or alternatively, and does not state which appeal shall be final. The utilities argue that the amended statute creates a litigator's nightmare, requiring appeals that are redundant, vexatious, oppressive and ruinously expensive. They assert that they are entitled to an injunction to avoid a multiplicity of lawsuits and the possibility of conflicting results.

To decide this issue, we must first interpret the amended statute. We begin our analysis with the "golden rule" of statutory construction, which requires us to follow the literal language of the statute "unless it produces contradiction, absurdity or such an inconvenience as to insure that the legislature meant something else." Department of Transportation v. City of Atlanta, 255 Ga. 124, 137, 337 S.E.2d 327 (1985) (Clarke, J. concurring specially). When literal reading of the statute produces such an absurdity, the appellate court must then seek to make sense out of the statute, while being faithful to the legislative intent. Id. To divine the legislative intent, the court considers the purpose of the statute and its impact on the body of law as a whole. Id. The court also considers the law as it existed before the statute was passed and identifies the mischief sought to be corrected. Id. Finally, when a taxing statute has doubtful meaning, it must be construed liberally in favor of the taxpayer and against the State. Thompson v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 200 Ga. 216, 224, 39 S.E.2d 225 (1946).

Certainly, it would create an absurdity to require utilities to litigate and re-litigate the same issues in each county in the State. Thus, although the statute establishes two separate appeals procedures, we must assume that the legislature did not intend for the two procedures to be simply redundant. Nor could the legislature have intended that one procedure be totally controlling over the other so that one would be meaningless. Buice v. Dixon, 223 Ga. 645, 157 S.E.2d 481 (1967). The only logical interpretation of the statute is one that gives the two appeals different purposes.

To ascertain what different purpose might be accomplished by each appeal, we look first to the plain language of the statute. Section (c) of the statute deals with the issuance by the Commissioner of a "proposed assessment" and an appeal from that "proposed assessment". Section (d) provides for the county board of tax assessors to issue a "final assessment" and provides for another appeal. The utilities argue that the "proposed assessment" and the "final assessment" are the same. Thus, they say, the appeals from each of these assessments would necessarily involve the same issues. We do not agree.

The stated purpose of the 1988 amendment to OCGA § 48-2-18 was "to extensively revise provisions relating to ad valorem taxation of public utilities; to provide for local assessment; to provide for state assistance in the event of appeals; to change the method of assessment of public utilities; to revise the duties and responsibilities of the State Board of Equalization. ..." 1988 Ga.Laws p. 1568 (emphasis added.) The changes in the statute can best be understood as they stand in contrast to the former version of the statute. The 1988 amendments to Title 48 left intact the old provisions relating to the "unit tax" method for public utilities. See OCGA § 48-5-511. The amendments did not relieve the Commissioner and the Board of their responsibility to make an assessment of all the utility's taxable assets in the state as a unit and apportion it among the counties. Compare OCGA § 48-2-18(b) and (c) as enacted by 1978 Ga.Laws, p. 309 § 2, and OCGA § 48-2-18(b) and (c) as enacted by 1988 Ga.Laws, p. 1568, § 1. The real "change in the method of assessment" is found in OCGA § 48-2-18(d), in which the counties are given thirty days after the receipt of the proposed digest to make a "final assessment" and provide notice to the taxpayer. We find no statutory mention of the county's right to make a "final assessment" before the 1988 amendments. We note also that the legislature described assessment issued by the Commissioner as a "proposed assessment" and the assessment by the county board of tax assessors as the "final assessment." Thus, the plain language of the statute, its caption, and its history, all indicate that the legislature intended for the counties to play a new role in the taxation of utilities. The essence of the counties' new role is the right to make an assessment that is different from the Commissioner's "proposed assessment" and to deal with appeals from its "final assessment."

The legislative history of the statute also supports this construction. The House Bill which became the existing statute was reported out of the House Ways and Means Committee by substitute without any provision for an appeal from the Board's "proposed assessment." H.B. 337, Ga.House Journal, 1988 Reg.Sess. p. 1330. It made provision, however, for appeals of the county boards in the counties in which the "final assessments" were made. Id. at 1332. The portion of the statute dealing with an appeal from the Board's action was inserted as a floor amendment. Id. at 1338. Without that amendment, all appeals would have been from the assessment of the county boards.

Additional evidence of the intent of the legislature is contained in the fiscal note provided to the House Ways and Means Committee by the state auditor and the Office of Planning and Budget which describes the bill as one providing for the property of utilities to be "assessed by local taxing jurisdictions (cities, counties and school districts) instead of the Department of Revenue." Ga.Senate Journal 1988 Reg.Sess. p. 2099. The fiscal note also recites, "the Department would still be involved in developing proposed assessments; however, the final assessment and collection of the tax would be the responsibility of the local tax jurisdiction. The Bill would also eliminate provisions requiring the State Board of Equalization to hear appeals involving certain...