Dier v. Peters

• Decision Date: 01 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11–1581.,11–1581.
• Citation: 815 N.W.2d 1
• Parties: Joseph O. DIER, Appellant, v. Cassandra Jo PETERS, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

815 N.W.2d 1

Joseph O. DIER, Appellant,
v.
Cassandra Jo PETERS, Appellee.

No. 11–1581.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 1, 2012.

[815 N.W.2d 3]

Barry S. Kaplan of Kaplan, Frese & Nine, Marshalltown, for appellant.

Lynn J. Wiese of Barker, McNeal, Wiese & Holt, Iowa Falls, for appellee.

MANSFIELD, Justice.

This case presents the question whether an individual who made voluntary expenditures based on a mother's fraudulent representation that he had fathered her child has a cause of action against the mother for recovery of those payments. Because we conclude that such a cause of action is consistent with traditional concepts of common law fraud, there is no prevailing public policy reason against recognizing such a cause of action, and Iowa's statutes do not speak to the issue, we hold that a cause of action may be pursued. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court granting the mother's motion to dismiss and remand for further proceedings.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History.

Because this case was decided on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,

[815 N.W.2d 4]

we assume the factual allegations of the petition are true. O.D. was born to Cassandra Jo Peters on February 10, 2009. Peters knew that Joseph O. Dier was not the child's biological father, but nonetheless told Dier that he was. Based on the mother's representations, Dier provided financial support for the mother and the child.

Dier filed an application in the district court to establish custody of the minor child. After Peters received the report of the child custody evaluator, she was afraid she would not get custody of the child and requested a paternity test. That test excluded Dier as the biological father. Dier then requested a second paternity test which again excluded him as the biological father.

On August 2, 2011, Dier filed a separate petition at law seeking reimbursement from Peters of monies “expended to the Defendant, monies for the minor child, and monies expended in custody litigation.” On August 25, Peters moved to dismiss the petition. She asserted that Dier's petition “fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for the reason that the State of Iowa does not recognize an action for ‘paternity fraud’ nor has the Iowa Legislature created any such action by statute.” Dier resisted the motion, arguing that Peters “engaged in fraudulent activity in enticing me to believe that I was the child's father and securing financial assistance from me from the beginning of the child's birth until recently.” He asked that the district court “overrule the Motion to Dismiss as this matter is fraudulent and the Defendant has acted with utmost malice and hatred.”

On September 20, 2011, the district court granted Peters' motion to dismiss. In its order dismissing Dier's action, the trial court concluded that the “current status of the law demands that this case be dismissed.” Dier now appeals.

II. Standard of Review.

We review a district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for the correction of errors at law. McGill v. Fish, 790 N.W.2d 113, 116 (Iowa 2010). “We accept as true the facts alleged in the petition and typically do not consider facts contained in either the motion to dismiss or any of its accompanying attachments.” Id.

III. Analysis.

The sole issue on appeal is whether Iowa law allows a putative father to bring a paternity fraud action against a biological mother to obtain reimbursement of payments that were voluntarily made. “Paternity fraud,” also known as “misrepresentation of biological fatherhood” or “misrepresentation of paternity,” “occurs when a mother makes a representation to a man that the child is genetically his own even though she is aware that he is not, or may not be, the father of the child.” Hodge v. Craig, No. M2009–00930–COA–R3–CV, 2010 WL 4024990, at *12 & n. 9 (Tenn.Ct.App. Oct. 13, 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), appeal granted (May 25, 2011). Numerous courts around the nation have considered whether a putative father may bring an independent claim for damages against a biological mother based on paternity fraud. See Day v. Heller, 264 Neb. 934, 653 N.W.2d 475 (2002); Miller v. Miller, 956 P.2d 887 (Okla.1998). Unlike here, paternity fraud claims frequently have been accompanied by claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress or have sought the reimbursement of court-ordered child support payments as damages. See Day, 653 N.W.2d at 477–78;Miller, 956 P.2d at 891, 905. Dier, however, seeks only reimbursement

[815 N.W.2d 5]

of payments that he made without court compulsion.

Courts in other jurisdictions are divided as to whether to recognize paternity fraud claims. Courts disallowing such claims have relied heavily on considerations of public policy and child welfare.¹ Courts allowing paternity fraud claims have concluded that paternity fraud is not dissimilar from any other tort claim and should be actionable provided the elements of the tort are met. See G.A.W., III v. D.M.W., 596 N.W.2d 284, 290 (Minn.Ct.App.1999). These courts have either discounted the public policy concerns or concluded that the interest in recompensing the putative father and discouraging paternity fraud outweighed the potential harm to the child. ²

[815 N.W.2d 6]

Although the issue of whether to recognize a cause of action for paternity fraud is one of first impression in this court, we came close to addressing the subject eight years ago. In Brooks v. Brooks, No. 03–1217, 2004 WL 240207 (Iowa Ct.App. Feb. 11, 2004), the court of appeals decided an appeal from a district court's order granting summary judgment to the wife in a paternity fraud case brought by her estranged husband. The court of appeals quoted extensively from the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in Day, which found that public policy and child welfare concerns precluded a fraud action. Brooks, 2004 WL 240207, at *1–2 (citing Day, 653 N.W.2d at 479–481). Our court of appeals indicated that it found the reasoning in Day “persuasive” but ultimately declined “to decide whether such causes of action should be recognized in Iowa.” Id. at *2. The court concluded that it was “up to the legislature or our supreme court to establish new causes of action even when they appear to have merit.” Id.

We granted further review. However, we deadlocked three-to-three and, thus, the district court's grant of summary judgment was affirmed by operation of law in a nonprecedential order. Order, Brooks v. Brooks, No. 03–1217 (Iowa Sept. 1, 2004); see alsoIowa Code § 602.4107 (2011).

Although we have not previously determined the viability of a tort action for paternity fraud, we have held in a series of cases that parents cannot obtain retroactive relief from court-ordered child support. See State ex rel. Baumgartner v. Wilcox, 532 N.W.2d 774, 776–77 (Iowa 1995) (citing In re Marriage of Shepherd, 429 N.W.2d 145, 146–47 (Iowa 1988)); In re Evans, 267 N.W.2d 48, 51–52 (Iowa 1978) (citing Pucci v. Pucci, 259 Iowa 427, 431–32, 143 N.W.2d 353, 356–57 (1966)); Welch v. Welch, 256 Iowa 1020, 1027–28, 129 N.W.2d 642, 646 (1964); Delbridge v. Sears, 179 Iowa 526, 536, 160 N.W. 218, 222 (1916)).

In Wilcox, after a putative father established that he was not the biological father, he sought to be relieved of “court-ordered obligations to pay past and future child support.” 532 N.W.2d at 775. The central issue in that case was whether the putative father could be relieved of past accrued but unpaid court-ordered child support obligations. Id. at 776–77.Iowa Code section 600B.41(7)(c) (1993) provided that “[i]f the court finds that the establishment of paternity is overcome, in accordance with all of the conditions prescribed, the established father is relieved of all future support obligations owed on behalf of the child.” Wilcox, 532 N.W.2d at 777.

We held that “where the rights of the parties have been established, support payments which have accrued are vested and the courts, without statutory authority, cannot take them away.” Id. Thus, the putative father was responsible for making the accrued support payments on behalf of the minor child. Id. at 778.

[815 N.W.2d 7]

In Wilcox, we rested our holding, in part, on the fact that Iowa Code § 600B.41A(4)( b) (1995), which had not yet taken effect, provided:

Any periodic support payment, due prior to the date the order determining that the established father is not the biological father is filed, is unaffected by this action and remains a judgment subject to enforcement.

Section 600B.41A(4)( b) has since been amended and provides that “[i]f the court finds that the establishment of paternity is overcome ... the court shall enter an order which provides ... [t]hat any unpaid support due prior to the date the order determining that the established father is not the biological father is filed, is satisfied.” See 1997 Iowa Acts ch. 175, § 215 (now codified at Iowa Code § 600B.41A(4)( b) (2011)). Thus, the specific holding of Wilcox with respect to accrued but unpaid child support has been legislatively overruled.

In any event, Wilcox does not control the case before us. Our conclusion in Wilcox rested on a long line of cases holding that “courts do not have the authority under the common law to reduce court-determined support payments retroactively.” Wilcox, 532 N.W.2d at 776–77 (citing cases). We stated that this rule “reflects the policy of protecting the stability and integrity of court judgments.” Id. at 777 (citing Shepherd, 429 N.W.2d at 147). The present matter does not involve a court-imposed child support decree. Thus, the attendant concern of respect for the integrity of valid judgments present in Wilcox is inapplicable here. Id.

A. Traditional Law of Fraud. As noted, Dier is not seeking relief under Iowa Code section 600B.41A(4)( b ), which permits a putative father who has overcome the establishment of paternity to avoid all unpaid and future support obligations. Rather, Dier...