Dill v. State
| Decision Date | 20 February 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 41468,41468 |
| Citation | 254 Ga. 17,325 S.E.2d 765 |
| Parties | DILL v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Paul S. Weiner, Jonesboro, for David Julian Dill.
Robert E. Keller, Dist. Atty., Jonesboro, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Dennis R. Dunn, for the State.
David Julian Dill was convicted of murdering Betty J. Dill by shooting her during a domestic quarrel, 1 and was sentenced to life imprisonment. He appeals, and we affirm. 2
1. In his first enumeration Dill argues that the court erred in instructing the jury as follows: (Emphasis supplied.) Dill contends that the emphasized instruction amounted to licensing the jurors to inject personal prejudices into their deliberations. To demonstrate that he was harmed by the latitude which the instruction allegedly afforded the jury, Dill speculates that the jury may have been biased against husbands who kill their wives during domestic squabbles. He further speculates that the jurors may have thought that it could deter further homicides of this kind by pillorying Dill, and that they therefore based their inference that he intended to kill his wife upon their desire to make an example of him.
The instruction in question is substantially the same as a charge which we considered in Pollard v. State, 249 Ga. 21, 22(2), 287 S.E.2d 189 (1982). 3 In that case the defendant alleged that the instruction was an "unrestrained permissive presumption" violative of due process, but we disagreed, holding that the defendant had failed to demonstrate that the charge violated his due process rights. Pollard, id. at 22, 287 S.E.2d 189. We reach the same conclusion here. As we observed in Pollard, the charge merely advised and guided the jury as to what ultimate fact it was authorized to infer from certain basic facts; those basic and ultimate facts are rationally connected, and the latter are more likely than not to flow from the former. Pollard, id. at 22, 287 S.E.2d 189. Moreover, there is absolutely no indication that the jury interpreted the instruction as allowing them to draw upon their own biases to concoct spurious basic facts. The court expressly informed the jurors in another portion of its charge that the law did not permit them "to be governed by sympathy, resentment, prejudice or public opinion." The charge of which Dill complains does not contradict or lessen the force of the latter direction, and Dill has not attempted to show that the jurors in fact predicated their verdict upon their personal prejudices. We therefore find no error.
2. Dill's counsel asked a witness to testify as to Betty Dill's general reputation in the community for violence. The prosecution objected on the basis that Dill had not made out a prima facie case of self-defense. The court agreed, and excluded the evidence. In his second enumeration Dill, who did not claim self-defense, argues that the reputation evidence was relevant to bolster his own testimony that his wife had threatened to shoot him; that he had picked up the pistol only to hide it from her; that she had grabbed for it; and that her homicide was an accident resulting from their struggle for the pistol.
This enumeration has no merit. The admission of evidence of the violent nature of the deceased in a homicide prosecution is strictly limited. Harrison v. State, 251 Ga. 837(3), 310 S.E.2d 506 (1984).
3. In his final enumeration appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to authorize the verdict, and that the...
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Heidler v. State
...in your deliberations by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion, or public feeling." See Dill v. State, 254 Ga. 17(1), 325 S.E.2d 765 (1985); Duggan v. State, 225 Ga.App. 291, 295(3), 483 S.E.2d 373 (1997). Compare Legare v. State, 250 Ga. 875, 878(2), 302 ......
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Dearmore v. State, A90A1414
...did not violate the due process clause. Freeman v. State, 183 Ga.App. 264(1), 358 S.E.2d 623; see Parker, supra; see also Dill v. State, 254 Ga. 17(1), 325 S.E.2d 765. Moreover, viewing the charges as a whole (see generally, Byrd v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 248, 251, 215 S.E.2d 251), we are satisfie......
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Duggan v. State
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Arthur v. State
...to make the prima facie showing of self-defense, the trial court correctly granted the State's motion in limine. See Dill v. State, 254 Ga. 17, 18(2), 325 S.E.2d 765 (1985). Judgment All the Justices concur. 1. The crimes were committed on April 24, 2001. The grand jury indicted Arthur on J......