Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Polinsky
| Decision Date | 21 April 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. S-93-515,S-93-515 |
| Citation | 530 N.W.2d 637,247 Neb. 821 |
| Parties | DILLARD DEPARTMENT STORES, INC., Appellee, v. Yvette POLINSKY, Appellee, and Dan Dolan, Commissioner of Labor of the State of Nebraska, Appellant. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Administrative Law: Courts: Appeal and Error. In an appeal from the Nebraska Appeal Tribunal to the district court regarding unemployment benefits, the district court conducts the review de novo on the record, but on review by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, the judgment of the district court may be reversed, vacated, or modified for errors appearing on the record.
2. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. When reviewing an order for errors appearing on the record, the inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.
3. Appeal and Error. When reviewing a question of law, an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of the district court's ruling.
4. Administrative Law: Presumptions: Proof. A rebuttable presumption of validity attaches to the actions of administrative agencies. The burden of proof rests with the party challenging the agency's action.
5. Employment Security: Termination of Employment. Each job and the facts of its termination must be considered separately with regard to disqualification for benefits.
6. Employment Security. Ordinarily, the Employment Security Law does not grant benefits to employees who leave their work purely voluntarily.
7. Employment Security. The Employment Security Law is to be liberally construed to accomplish its beneficent purposes.
8. Employment Security. The rule of construction that the Employment Security Law is to be liberally construed in order that its beneficent purposes may be accomplished applies to the interpretation of the law but not to consideration of the evidence offered in support of a claim under the law.
9. Employment Security: Time. The statutory language of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-628(a)(1) (Cum.Supp.1992) links the timing of disqualification from benefits to the period immediately following the week in which the employee has left work voluntarily without good cause.
10. Employment Security: Time. The week in which an employee actually leaves work is the determinative factor regarding subsequent eligibility for benefits.
11. Statutes. In the absence of anything indicating to the contrary, statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and when the words of a statute are plain, direct, and unambiguous, no interpretation is necessary or will be indulged to ascertain their meaning.
12. Statutes. It is not within the province of the courts to read a meaning into a statute that is not there or to read anything direct and plain out of a statute.
John F. Sheaff and John H. Albin, Lincoln, for appellant.
David A. Barron, of Cline, Williams, Wright, Johnson & Oldfather, Lincoln, for appellee Dillard Dept. Stores.
This case involves the issue of whether an employee is entitled to unemployment compensation benefits under the Employment Security Law, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-601 et seq. (Reissue 1988 & Cum.Supp.1992), where the employee gave notice to the employer and was terminated during the notice period. The Commissioner of Labor (Commissioner) appeals the order of the Douglas County District Court of May 11, 1993, which reversed the decision of the appeal tribunal of the Nebraska Department of Labor and found that Yvette Polinsky, a former employee of Dillard Department Stores, Inc. (Dillard), was not entitled to unemployment compensation benefits, except for certain dates within the notice period, namely October 10 to 14, 1992.
The testimony to which reference is made was given before the Nebraska Appeal Tribunal on November 25, 1992. This testimony became the bill of exceptions before the district court and was received in evidence by the district court at the hearing on the petition for review on April 2, 1993.
The essential facts are undisputed. Dillard, appellee, employed Polinsky as an auditor in the customer service department from October 9, 1991, until October 2, 1992. On September 30, 1992, Polinsky gave Dillard a written 3-week notice of resignation. The parties agree that Polinsky shortened her notice period to 2 weeks, apparently because tension developed between Polinsky and her supervisor after Polinsky had tendered her notice of resignation. In the absence of discharge, Polinsky's notice period would have expired on October 14, 1992. Polinsky testified that she was willing and available to work through the full 2-week notice period.
The record shows that upon being advised of her resignation, Dillard began seeking a replacement for Polinsky. Dillard informed Polinsky on October 2 that her employment would end at the end of her shift that day. On October 13, Polinsky received her final compensation, which consisted of accrued vacation benefits of $230. Dillard did not pay Polinsky wages for the notice period.
Cat McGrath-Farmer, the operations manager for Dillard's customer service department, testified that Dillard terminated Polinsky prior to the expiration of Polinsky's notice period because Dillard was seeking a replacement worker and that the budget allowed for only one employee per position at a time. The record shows that Kathy Grigaitis was hired as Polinsky's replacement. Grigaitis first applied for an auditor's position with Dillard on August 10, 1992, and was still available for employment on October 2, when she was called in to interview for Polinsky's position. Grigaitis began work on October 5.
Polinsky applied for unemployment compensation benefits. Polinsky informed the unemployment office that she had given notice to Dillard, but had been released prior to the expiration of her notice period. On October 30, 1992, a deputy at the unemployment office determined:
You were separated from your job with the above employer on 09-30-92 after submitting your resignation notice. Your employer did not allow you to continue work until the effective date of your resignation. Your actual separation was due to a discharge for reasons other than misconduct, and not a voluntary quit.
No disqualification is assessed on this separation. Benefits are allowed if otherwise payable.
The deputy concluded that Polinsky was disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits from October 4 through 10, 1992, because the accrued vacation benefits that Dillard paid to Polinsky exceeded the weekly benefit amount. The deputy also found that no other disqualification from benefits was required.
Dillard appealed the deputy's findings to the Nebraska Appeal Tribunal. The administrative law judge held a hearing on November 25, 1992. At the hearing, McGrath-Farmer testified for Dillard and Polinsky testified on her own behalf. On December 2, 1992, the administrative law judge affirmed the claims deputy's determinations. The administrative law judge found that Dillard "severed the employment relationship on October 2, 1992," and that the "separation [was] at the discretion of the employer, and therefore a discharge." The administrative law judge found that there was "no evidence of misconduct" and that the separation "was non-disqualifying." The administrative law judge concluded that Polinsky "was discharged under non-disqualifying conditions and is entitled to benefits for weeks claimed, if otherwise eligible."
On January 8, 1993, Dillard filed in the district court for Douglas County a petition for review of the decision of the Nebraska Appeal Tribunal. A hearing was held on April 2, 1993. On May 11, the district court issued an order reversing the decision of the Nebraska Appeal Tribunal and disqualifying Polinsky from unemployment compensation benefits for not less than 7 nor more than 10 weeks after her intended resignation date of October 14, 1992. The district court order provided that Polinsky was entitled to receive unemployment compensation benefits "only for the period between October 10 and 14, 1992."
In its order, the trial court found that "in this case, Polinsky's separation was brought about entirely by her own volition, i.e., her notice of resignation." The district court reasoned that to permit unemployment compensation benefits would unjustly enrich the employee. The district court also stated that the decision of the Nebraska Appeal Tribunal
places an employer at a disadvantage, since it must either wait to fill the prospectively vacant position, and thus risk losing a potential new employee, or it may fill the position before the end of the notice period, and suddenly become liable for unemployment compensation benefits for which it would otherwise have no liability.
In so finding, the district court relied on decisions from other states. Polinsky and the Commissioner appeal the May 11, 1993, order of the district court.
In the Commissioner's brief on appeal the assignments of error are stated generally as follows: (1) The district court erred by finding that Polinsky voluntarily left her employment; (2) the district court erred by requiring an employee who is discharged prior to the date of her intended resignation to establish good cause for leaving; and (3) the district court erred by failing to liberally construe the Employment Security Law for the beneficent purpose of paying benefits. Polinsky has not separately assigned errors.
In an appeal from the Nebraska Appeal Tribunal to the district court regarding unemployment benefits, the district court conducts the review de novo on the record, but on review by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, the judgment of the district court may be reversed, vacated, or modified for...
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