State v. Atkins

• Decision Date: 14 June 1996
• Docket Number: No. S-95-299,S-95-299
• Citation: 549 N.W.2d 159,250 Neb. 315
• Parties: STATE of Nebraska, Appellant, v. Robert ATKINS, Appellee.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Page 159

549 N.W.2d 159

250 Neb. 315

STATE of Nebraska, Appellant, v. Robert ATKINS, Appellee.

No. S-95-299.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

June 14, 1996.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Statutes: Appeal and Error. The interpretation of a statute presents a question of law, in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the court below.

2. Statutes. A statute is open for construction only when the language used requires interpretation or may reasonably be considered ambiguous.

3. Statutes: Appeal and Error. In the absence of anything to the contrary, statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning; an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous.

4. Statutes. It is not within the province of the courts to read a meaning into a statute that is not there, nor to read anything direct and plain out of a statute.

5. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Presumptions: Proof. When passing on the constitutionality of a statute, a court begins with a presumption of validity, and the burden of demonstrating a constitutional defect rests with the challenger.

6. Statutes: Judicial Construction: Legislature: Intent: Presumptions. Where a statute has been judicially construed and that construction has not evoked an amendment, it will be presumed that the Legislature has acquiesced in the court's determination of the Legislature's intent.

7. Equal Protection. As a general matter, the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires the government to treat similarly situated people alike.

8. Equal Protection. The dissimilar treatment of dissimilarly situated persons does not violate equal protection rights.

9. Equal Protection: Proof. The initial inquiry in an equal protection analysis focuses on whether one has demonstrated that one was treated differently than others similarly situated; absent this threshold showing, one lacks a viable equal protection claim; if one can make the threshold showing, the inquiry then shifts to whether the legislation at issue can survive judicial scrutiny.

10. Equal Protection: Statutes: Legislature. In cases not dealing with a fundamental right or suspect class, all that is required to sustain the legislation is that there be a rational relationship between a legitimate state interest and the statutory means selected by the Legislature to accomplish that purpose.

11. Equal Protection. The rational relationship standard, as the most relaxed and tolerant form of judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, is offended only if the classification rests on grounds which are wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective.

12. Equal Protection: Legislature. Social and economic measures run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution only when the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that a court can only conclude that the Legislature's actions were irrational.

13. Equal Protection. A similarly situated inquiry focuses on whether the challenger is similarly situated to another group for purposes of the challenged governmental action.

14. Equal Protection: Prisoners. City and county jail inmates are not similarly situated to inmates of the state prison system for the purposes of awarding good time.

Kent D. Turnbull, Lincoln County Attorney, for appellant.

Robert P. Lindemeier, Lincoln County Public Defender, for appellee.

Don Stenberg, Attorney General, and Laurie Smith Camp, Lincoln, for State of Nebraska regarding constitutional issue.

WHITE, C.J., and CAPORALE, FAHRNBRUCH, LANPHIER, WRIGHT, CONNOLLY, and GERRARD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Taking exception to the district court's affirmance of the county court's order concerning the amount by which the jail sentence the county court imposed upon the defendant-appellee, Robert Atkins, was to be reduced for good time, the plaintiff-appellant, State of Nebraska, perfected this appeal under the provisions of Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 24-1106 and 29-2315.01 (Reissue 1995).

FACTS

In accordance with Atkins' plea, the county court found him guilty of having been a minor unlawfully in possession of alcohol and on May 17, 1994, sentenced him to 10 days in the county jail. Complying with a "General Order" of the district court, the county court further ordered that Atkins be awarded a " 'Good Time' " reduction of the sentence on a "day for day basis," in the same manner as good time is credited to "persons similarly confined, but held under the direction of the Dept. of Corrections." The State appealed to the district court, contending that the county court's good time order was contrary to law; the district court affirmed the county court's judgment.

The resolution of this appeal is controlled by Neb.Rev.Stat. § 47-502 (Reissue 1993), which provides:

Any person sentenced to a city or county jail shall have his or her term reduced seven days for each fourteen consecutive days during which he or she has not committed any breach of discipline or other violation of jail regulations. The reductions authorized by this section shall be granted at the end of each period of fourteen days, with such periods to run consecutively from the date of confinement following sentencing.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

As a matter controlled by statute, we are presented with questions of law, in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the court below. In re Interest of Rondell B., 249 Neb. 928, 546 N.W.2d 801 (1996).

ANALYSIS

The district court reasoned that the language of § 47-502 is ambiguous and that unless construed so as to treat county jail inmates like their counterparts in the state prison system, the statute would infringe upon the federal equal protection rights of the former. Thus, contrary to the State's contention, the district court did not rule that § 47-502 is unconstitutional.

Nonetheless, the unique character of the district court's general order and judgment in this case requires that we undertake two separate and distinct inquiries. We must first determine whether the district court properly construed § 47-502. Then, as a separate matter, we must determine whether the proper construction of the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause.

Statutory Construction.

Before embarking on a study of the statutory language, we recall that a statute is open for construction only when the language used requires interpretation or may reasonably be considered ambiguous. Omaha Pub. Power Dist. v. Nebraska Dept. of Revenue, 248 Neb. 518, 537 N.W.2d 312 (1995); State v. Melcher, 240 Neb. 592, 483 N.W.2d 540 (1992).

In the absence of anything to the contrary, statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning; an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. Seevers v. Potter, 248 Neb. 621, 537 N.W.2d 505 (1995); Proctor v. Minnesota Mut. Fire & Cas., 248 Neb. 289, 534 N.W.2d 326 (1995). Nor is it within the province of the courts to read a meaning into a statute that is not there, nor to read anything direct and plain out of a statute. Nebraska Life & Health Ins. Guar. Assn. v. Dobias, 247 Neb. 900, 531 N.W.2d 217 (1995); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Polinsky, 247 Neb. 821, 530 N.W.2d 637 (1995). See, also, In re Interest of Rondell B., supra.

Moreover, when passing on the constitutionality of a statute, a court begins with a presumption of validity, and the burden of demonstrating a constitutional defect rests with the challenger. See Friehe v. Schaad, 249 Neb. 825, 545 N.W.2d 740 (1996).

Relying on Williams v. Hjorth, 230 Neb. 97, 430 N.W.2d 52 (1988), the district court found that § 47-502 was ambiguous and open to construction. In Williams, which concerned the interpretation of a 1984 rendition of the statute, we found the statutory language "with such periods to run consecutively from the date of confinement following sentencing" to be ambiguous and then undertook an examination of the statute's legislative history to determine the intent of the Legislature. As a result, we construed § 47-502 such as to make good time credit in the jail system applicable to time spent in jail awaiting sentencing. Because the current version of § 47-502 contains the same statutory language at issue in Williams, the district court concluded that the statute was ambiguous and open to judicial construction.

In doing so, the district court overlooked the controlling rule that where a statute has been judicially construed and that construction has not evoked an amendment, it will be presumed that the Legislature has acquiesced in the court's determination of the Legislature's intent. Johnson v. Holdrege Med. Clinic, 249 Neb. 77, 541 N.W.2d 399 (1996); Mayfield v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 231 Neb. 308, 436 N.W.2d 164 (1989); Nelson v. Dolan, 230 Neb. 848, 434 N.W.2d 25 (1989); Erspamer Advertising Co. v. Dept. of Labor, 214 Neb. 68, 333 N.W.2d 646 (1983).

In its 1993 amendment of the version of § 47-502 at issue in Williams, the Legislature made only one change; it changed from 21 to 14 the number of days a city or county jail inmate had to serve before earning 7 days of good time. 1993 Neb.Laws, L.B. 113. That amendment left the statutory language construed in Williams intact. Accordingly, not only was there no need for the district court to turn to legislative history to ascertain the Legislature's intent, it was wrong to do so. The Legislature had already made clear its intent by its acquiescence in our interpretation.

The other provision of § 47-502 which pertains to the amount of good time...