Dillard v. Washington Public Emp. Retirement System

• Decision Date: 29 May 1980
• Docket Number: No. 46482,46482
• Citation: 93 Wn.2d 677,611 P.2d 1231
• Parties: Marguerite L. DILLARD, Respondent, v. The WASHINGTON PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Appellant.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 677

93 Wn.2d 677

611 P.2d 1231

Marguerite L. DILLARD, Respondent, v. The WASHINGTON PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Appellant.

No. 46482.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

May 29, 1980.

Schroeter, Goldmark & Bender, Paul O'Neil, Seattle, for appellant.

Slade Gorton, Atty. Gen., Matthew J. Coyle, Employment Sec. Dept., Olympia, for respondent.

HICKS, Justice.

Marguerite Dillard's application in 1974 for disability retirement was denied by the Washington Public Employees' Retirement Board (Board). The Superior Court for Pierce County, reviewing that administrative decision under RCW 34.04.130, affirmed the Board. The Court of Appeals, Division Two, by a divided court, reversed the Superior Court and the Board and granted the retirement sought by Dillard. The Washington Public Employees' Retirement System, acting under RAP 13.2(a), which at the time allowed an appeal as a matter of right when an appellate court divided in reversing a trial court, brought the matter here. We affirm the Court of Appeals.

Beginning in 1959, Dillard was employed as a hospital attendant at Western State Hospital (WSH). In 1970, she was assigned as a ward attendant on Ward M, which housed violent-prone, suicidal and self-destructive mental patients. Staff members, including Dillard, were frequently assailed by these patients, often resulting in their sustaining bruises, scratches and pulled out hair. On one occasion, Dillard was forced over a fourth-story balcony and rescued while hanging from the rail. The assailant fell to her death on the concrete below.

In addition to experiencing physical assaults, staff members often witnessed unsettling traumatic incidents in the course of a working day. For example, one patient bit off another patient's ear and ate it. Cleaning up broken glass and spilled blood was not an unusual part of the daily routine. As a consequence, staff was hard to keep on this ward; in early years, virtually the entire staff turned over on an annual basis.

Dillard has a long history of physical and medical problems with a strong neurotic component. In 1974, her situation culminated in a diagnosis of psycho-physiological reaction to anxiety, which resulted in her complete inability to perform her duties at the hospital. The disability was diagnosed as being caused by the stresses and strains of working with and around violent patients.

Dillard applied for a duty disability retirement under RCW 41.40.200. As originally enacted, that statute read:

(U)pon application of a member, . . . a member who becomes totally incapacitated for duty as the natural and proximate result of the actual performance of duty, . . . shall be retired: . . .

After being amended in 1951, the statute now reads:

(U)pon application of a member, . . . a member who becomes totally incapacitated for duty as the natural and proximate result of an accident occurring in the actual performance of duty, . . . shall be retired: . . .

(Italics ours.)

The Board denied Dillard's application because it concluded that the statutory requirement of an "accident" had not been met. As noted above, the Superior Court affirmed the Board's decision. The Court of Appeals reversed the Superior Court and the Board, and held that the series of occurrences leading to Dillard's disability constituted an "accident" within the meaning of RCW 41.40.200. Dillard v. Washington Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys., 23 Wash.App. 461, 597 P.2d 428 (1979).

Under RCW 34.04, a court reviewing an administrative decision in a contested case may affirm the agency decision or it may reverse the decision if substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the agency decision was affected by error of law. RCW 34.04.130(6). Here, the Superior Court affirmed the agency decision. The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the Board applied an erroneous standard of law in construing the term "accident". ¹

There is no question that Dillard's total inability to perform her duties at WSH was a direct result of her employment there. The Board specifically found (T)hat Ms. Dillard became totally incapacitated for duty as a natural and proximate result of the tension and strain placed upon her by her work over a period of years.

As noted above, to be entitled to duty disability retirement, one must be incapacitated for duty as the result of an accident. Can it be said, as did the majority of the Court of Appeals, that Dillard's condition is the result of an "accident"?

The term "accident" is not defined in the statute, RCW 41.40.200, or elsewhere in the act. We have said that in such instances a word should be accorded its ordinary meaning. Pacific First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. State, 92 Wash.2d 402, 409, 598 P.2d 387 (1979). The Heritage Illustrated Dictionary and Information Book (1977) defines accident as "(a)n unexpected and undesirable event; a mishap". The Court of Appeals elected to use the definition of accident found in Viking Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Pacific Indem....