Dingman v. City of Council Bluffs

• Decision Date: 03 June 1958
• Docket Number: No. 49511,49511
• Citation: 90 N.W.2d 742,249 Iowa 1121
• Parties: Boyd DINGMAN, William Beltz and John Langstrom, for themselves and Representing other Qualified Electors of the City of Council Bluffs, Iowa, Appellees, v. The CITY OF COUNCIL BLUFFS, Iowa, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 742

90 N.W.2d 742

249 Iowa 1121

Boyd DINGMAN, William Beltz and John Langstrom, for themselves and Representing other Qualified Electors of the City of Council Bluffs, Iowa, Appellees, v. The CITY OF COUNCIL BLUFFS, Iowa, Appellant.

No. 49511.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 3, 1958.

Rehearing Denied July 24, 1958.

David E. Stuart, City Atty., and John M. Peters, Asst. City Atty., Council Bluffs, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner and DeVere Watson, Council Bluffs, for appellees.

LARSON, Justice.

The plaintiffs, for themselves and on behalf of other qualified electors of the City of Council Bluffs, sought a declaratory judgment to test the legality of certain proceedings of the city council respecting the issuance of general obligation bonds for the construction of storm sewers in an area in the city where no such facilities previously existed. Defendant does not question the propriety of this action, and the relevant facts are not in dispute.

On December 9, 1957, the city council by resolution ordered construction of a storm sewer system and pumping station in a limited area in the city, previously unimproved, proposing to pay for the improvement by issuing general obligation bonds. The area was not organized as a separate sewer district. On January 6, 1958, the plaintiffs and 871 other qualified electors, being more than a sufficient number to meet statutory requirements, filed a petition asking that the question of the issuance of the bonds to cover the costs of the construction be submitted to a vote of all the city electors. The council denied the petition on January 13, 1958, and this action followed.

The principal question both before the lower court and here is whether, in the face of the petition filed by the required number of voters under Chapter 408A, Code 1954, general obligation bonds for the proposed sewer construction of direct benefit to property in a limited area, may be issued by the city council without first getting the approval of the electorate at a special election.

The pertinent provisions of the statute, Chapter 408A, Code of Iowa 1954, which became effective April 16, 1953, as Chapter 195, Acts of the 55th G.A., as an act relating to the authorization and issuance of bonds by cities and towns, follow:

'Section 1. Any other statute notwithstanding, except where an election is required under some other statute, before any city or town shall institute proceedings for the issuance of bonds * * * the governing body thereof shall cause a notice * * * to be published * * *.

'Sec. 2. If at any time before the date fixed for taking action for the issuance of such bonds a petition is filed * * * asking that the question of issuing such bonds be submitted to the legal voters of the municipality, the governing body thereof shall either by resolution declare the proposal * * * to have been abandoned or shall call a special election to vote upon the question of issuing the bonds.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 3 pertains to the form of the question to be submitted, Section 4 to the notice requirements, and Section 5 to the requirement of a 60% majority. Section 6 authorizes the governing body to proceed with the issuance of bonds if no petition is filed pursuant to due notice.

Section 7, the meaning of which is the nub of this controversy, provides:

'Nothing herein contained shall be construed to apply to bonds issued in connection with street improvements, bridges, viaducts, sewers or sewage treatment works nor to funding or refunding bonds nor to bonds that have theretofore been authorized or approved at an election required or provided to be held under any other law.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 8 restricts these bonds to indebtedness payable by ad valorem taxes, and Section 9 excludes special charter cities of 50,000 or more.

Generally speaking, this statute appears to place certain restrictions on the power of the municipality to issue general obligation bonds in excess of $25,000. Above that amount it must first give public notice of its intention to so do. If the requisite number of qualified electors object, the authority to proceed is terminated unless the action is approved by 60% of the electors at a special municipal election. Section 408A.7 appears as a proviso or an exception to this restriction in the case of (1) bonds issued in connection with street improvements, sewers, etc., or to (2) funding or refunding bonds, or to (3) bonds that (a) have been authorized or (b) approved at an election required or provided to be held under any other law.

Plaintiffs' contention that the proviso in Section 408A.7 relating to bonds issued for sewers, etc. refers only to previously-issued bonds, was upheld by the trial court and the city appealed. Apparently this was recognized by the court as the key issue. Indeed the trial court said: 'If the words 'bonds issued' refer to or describe a past and future event or a future event only, then the defendant's position is right in the absence of other countervailing language in the statute.'

Defendant, on the other hand, contends that the court, although acknowledging the rule, failed to give the words used in Section 480A.7 their plain, obvious and rational meaning as determined from the character and use of the language in the whole statute, and failed to give the section an intelligent, purpose; that it erred in its grammatical conclusion that a perfect participle indicates past time rather than completed action, and in attempting to apply a strict grammatical construction to a word taken out of context. Defendant contends such reasoning tends to defeat the obvious legislative intent, and that the error in considering an isolated word in a statute, without giving consideration to the construction, purpose and intent of the statute as a whole, calls for a reversal of the court's judgment. Defendant especially complains of the court's conclusion that 'Ordinary rules of syntax and proper English usage are sufficient to resolve the problem.' In this regard defendant contends the court has placed the cart before the horse, for generally speaking, the rules of syntax and proper English usage are properly resorted to as further aids in resolving the meaning of the legislation when, by considering the whole statute, the plain meaning and intent is not evident according to the usual, normal and proper understanding of the language used. Defendant complains that the court resorted to a narrow, technical, grammatical meaning of the word 'issued' removed out of context, to establish a legislative intent far from that which is evident when the language used in the entire statute is given its plain, obvious and rational meaning. We agree with these contentions.

I. In the absence of previous construction of this enactment the intent of the legislature must be determined both from the language used and the purpose of the legislation. We have long recognized the rule that where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and its meaning clear and unmistakable, there is no room for construction, and the courts are not permitted to search for its meaning beyond the statute itself. Long v. Northrup, 225 Iowa 132, 140, 279 N.W. 104, 109, 116 A.L.R. 1475; 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, § 223 to 226 inclusive; Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bettendorf, 241 Iowa 358, 362, 41 N.W.2d 1, and cases cited therein. Such is the case before us.

A statute is not to be read as though open to construction as a matter of course. Statutory construction may be properly involved only when the legislative acts contain such ambiguities or obscurities that reasonable minds may disagree or be uncertain as to their meaning. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bettendorf, supra, and citations. If the language given its plain and rational meaning is precise and free from ambiguity, no more is necessary than to apply to the words used their natural and ordinary sense in connection with the subject considered Case v. Olson, 234 Iowa 869, 873, 14 N.W.2d 717, and cases cited. We said in the case of In re Adoption of Alley, 234 Iowa 931, 934, 14 N.W.2d 742, 744: 'We are not permitted to write into the statute words which are not there.' Also see Eysink v. Board of Supervisors, 229 Iowa 1240, 296 N.W. 376.

Thus it would seem improper for the court to either read into section 408A.7, between the word 'bonds' and the word 'issued', the words 'previously' or 'to be', and we do not think it is necessary in this statute. Nevertheless, the controversy seems to resolve around the question of whether the legislature meant 'bonds previously issued' or 'bonds to be issued subsequently' in connection with street improvements, bridges, viaducts, sewers, etc., and we will consider those positions.

Taken by its four corners, this statute provides for public notice, for objections, and for a special election before general obligation bonds are issued, except in cases otherwise specifically provided, and except those issued for certain named improvements and for refunding. Without a strained, narrow, technical or grammatical examination of the term 'bonds issued', we find no ambiguity in this enactment. We think it means bonds issued pursuant to this legislation.

Support for this conclusion is found in the cases of Bowman v. City of Davenport, 243 Iowa 1135, 53 N.W.2d 249, and Hansen v. Henderson, 244 Iowa 650, 56 N.W.2d 59. In the Bowman case it is stated at page 1144 of 243 Iowa, at page 254 of 53 N.W.2d: 'All parts must be considered. It is fundamental in the construction of statutes that the ultimate object is to determine the real purpose and meaning.'

The plain, obvious and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense which may be uncovered by the ingenuity and study of an acute and powerful intellect. Payne v. Ostrus, 8 Cir., 50 F.2d 1039, 77 A.L.R. 531.

Again we said in Hansen v. Henderson, supra, at page 665 of 244 Iowa, at page...