Director of Div. of Employment Sec. v. Town of Mattapoisett

• Decision Date: 23 August 1984
• Citation: 392 Mass. 858,467 N.E.2d 1363
• Parties: , 19 Ed. Law Rep. 1131 DIRECTOR OF the DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY v. TOWN OF MATTAPOISETT.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1363

467 N.E.2d 1363

392 Mass. 858, 19 Ed. Law Rep. 1131

DIRECTOR OF the DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY v. TOWN OF MATTAPOISETT.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Plymouth.

Argued Feb. 8, 1984.

Decided Aug. 23, 1984.

Donald J. Fleming, Mattapoisett, for defendant.

Francis X. Bellotti, Atty. Gen., and George J. Mahanna, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff, submitted a brief.

Before WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and LYNCH, JJ.

ABRAMS, Justice.

This appeal challenges a determination of a District Court judge that the town of Mattapoisett (town) was required to reimburse the Division of Employment Security (DES) for unemployment benefits paid to a tenured teacher terminated under G.L. c. 71, § 42, for conduct unbecoming a teacher. In its answer, the town claimed that DES was obliged to give issue-preclusive effect to the discharge proceeding and had to conclude that the teacher's discharge was "attributable solely to deliberate misconduct in wilful disregard of the employing unit's interest." G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e )(2), as amended by St.1982, c. 489, § 5. Thus, the town asserts that the teacher was disqualified from receiving benefits, and that DES is not entitled to any reimbursement under G.L. c. 151A, § 15, for benefits paid to the teacher. ¹ The instant appeal puts the cart before the horse because on this record it appears that issues relating to the teacher's entitlement to benefits are currently the subject of appeals pending in a District Court.

We summarize the somewhat tortuous procedural background of this case. The teacher, Marjorie Springgate, was discharged on June 21, 1978, following an evidentiary hearing which, the school committee found, substantiated charges that on various occasions from May 15, 1977, through March 24, 1978, she disrupted classes of other teachers, pushed a student, made false statements to administrative officials, behaved in an argumentative and overbearing manner, and, after being warned that further unprofessional conduct would be grounds for termination, made additional false statements and pushed another teacher. The teacher appealed the school committee's decision to the Superior Court. G.L. c. 71, § 43A. During the pendency of that appeal, the teacher applied for and received unemployment benefits from DES in a decision which the town has appealed and which, the town advises us, is currently pending in a District Court awaiting resolution of the instant case.

After a trial de novo, a Superior Court judge found that none of the charges against the teacher was substantiated by credible evidence, and that the school committee had failed to establish the teacher's dismissal for "inefficiency, incapacity, conduct unbecoming a teacher ... insubordination or other good cause." G.L. c. 71, § 42, as amended through St.1972, c. 464, § 2. The Superior Court judge entered judgment reinstating the teacher. The school committee appealed to the Appeals Court, which, concluding that the Superior Court judge's findings were clearly erroneous, reversed and remanded for the entry of judgment upholding the discharge. Springgate v. School Comm. of Mattapoisett, 11 Mass.App. 304, 415 N.E.2d 888 (1981). Following the Appeals Court's decision, the teacher again applied for, and again obtained, unemployment benefits from DES; the town's appeal from that decision, according to the town, is currently pending in the District Court along with the appeal of the earlier decision awarding benefits.

One week after the Appeals Court upheld the discharge, DES filed a complaint under G.L. c. 151A, § 15, in a District Court to recover from the town amounts paid to the teacher during the period from her discharge until February, 1979, which appears to be the month in which she was reinstated by the Superior Court. ² On February 2, 1982, a District Court judge entered judgment, along with findings and rulings, in favor of DES. The town appealed to the Appellate Division of the District Courts. On April 19, 1983, the Appellate Division, finding no error, affirmed. The town filed a timely appeal to this court.

We note our disapproval of the sequence in which these intertwined cases are being litigated. The general rule is that a judgment may be collaterally attacked only "if other means of obtaining relief from the judgment are unavailable to the applicant or the convenient administration of justice would be served by determining the question of relief in the course of the subsequent action." Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 80 (1982). See Vose v. Morton, 4 Cush. 27, 31 (1849). Issues pertaining to the validity of DES decisions awarding benefits to the teacher are appropriately resolved on the pending direct appeals from those decisions, not by means of collateral attack in the instant litigation. General Laws c. 151A, § 15(b ), as amended through St.1948, c. 603, § 6, provides that "[a]ctions brought under this subsection shall be given precedence over other civil cases except petitions for review arising under [G.L. c. 151A, § 42] " (emphasis added). The town was therefore remiss in litigating the current action prior to the appeal from the DES decision awarding the benefits in question. See note 2 supra. Absent special circumstances, determination of a cause of action entirely contingent on the validity of an appealed judgment in a separate proceeding should be stayed pending resolution of the appellate process unless the detriment to the litigants of delay outweighs the benefits of judicial economy and orderly adjudication. In light of the town's right to have the § 42 petition for review adjudicated before an adjudication of the § 15 action, as well as its alternative right to be credited or reimbursed, after payment, for any amounts determined to have been paid erroneously, see G.L. c. 151A, § 18, as appearing in St.1982, c. 489, § 4, we perceive no such detriment in this case.

The record before us is completely bereft of information regarding the substance of the DES decisions. Given this deficiency and the procedural posture of the cases, we think the issue is not properly before us. Nonetheless, to resolve any existing uncertainty, we shall consider whether the adjudication that the teacher's discharge was authorized under G.L. c. 71, § 42, precluded DES from determining that the teacher's discharge is not "attributable solely to deliberate misconduct in wilful disregard of the [town's] interest." See Wellesley College v. Attorney Gen., 313 Mass. 722, 731, 49 N.E.2d 220 (1943). We answer that question in the negative. We leave open questions concerning the extent, if any, to which specific factual findings in a G.L. c. 71, § 42, adjudication are entitled to preclusive effect in any subsequent G.L. c. 151A proceeding.

Issue preclusion operates to prevent a party from relitigating an adjudicated issue essential to a valid and final prior judgment binding on that party. ³ Almeida v. Travelers Ins. Co., 383 Mass. 226, 229-230, 418 N.E.2d 602 (1981); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982). The findings of the school committee were not, however, entitled to preclusive effect because they were divested of the requisite finality upon the filing of an appeal entitling the teacher to a de novo review in the Superior Court. ⁴ See 1B Moore's Federal Practice, par. 0.416, at 523 (1983). Compare Almeida v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra at 230-231, 418 N.E.2d 602 (findings of administrative tribunal given preclusive effect where court limited to substantial evidence review). The town's argument that the determination of the Appeals Court ⁵ should have been given preclusive effect is unavailing because the Appeals Court had not yet decided the appeal at the time DES adjudicated the teacher's eligibility for the benefits at issue in this G.L. c. 151A, § 15, action. ⁶

In addition, the town's allegation of error founders on the basic requirement for issue preclusion: commonness of issues. The standard of "inefficiency, incapacity, conduct unbecoming a teacher insubordination or other good cause," on which discharges under G.L. c. 71, § 42, must be grounded is substantially less rigorous than the G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e )(2), standard of "deliberate misconduct in wilful disregard of the employing unit's interest," pursuant to which a claimant may be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. Discharge proceedings focus on the needs of the school committee, and a discharge will be upheld upon "any ground which is not arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable, in bad faith, or irrelevant to the committee's task of running a sound school system." Springgate v. School Comm. of Mattapoisett, supra at 308, 415 N.E.2d 888, and cases cited. In marked contrast, "the critical issue in determining whether disqualification [for unemployment benefits] is warranted is the claimant's state of mind in performing the acts that cause [her] discharge." Garfield v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 377 Mass. 94, 97, 384 N.E.2d 642 (1979). Thus, there is no basis under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e )(2), for denying benefits to "a worker [who] is ill-equipped for [her] job or has a good faith lapse in judgment or attention," Garfield v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., supra,...