District of Columbia v. Smith, 8780.
| Decision Date | 26 November 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 8780.,No. 8806.,No. 8805.,8780.,8805.,8806. |
| Citation | 329 A.2d 128 |
| Parties | In the Matters of DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. Robert Earl SMITH and George Cecil Lucas, Jr. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. James WEST. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. Theodore CAMPBELL. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
David P. Sutton, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., with whom C. Francis Murphy, Corp. Counsel, Louis P. Robbins, Principal Asst. Corp. Counsel, and Richard W. Barton, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., were on the memorandum, for District of Columbia.
Jonathan B. Marks, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., and John A. Terry, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on the memorandum, for the U. S.
Paula K. Miller, and Gary J. Kushner, law student counsels, with whom Antonio R. Salazar, law student counsel, was on the memorandum, for Messrs. Smith, Lucas, West, and Campbell. Sandra Rothenberg, Arlington, Va., and C. Michael Schatzow were supervising attorneys; David Niblack, Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance for defendants Smith and Lucas.
Before GALLAGHER, YEAGLEY and HARRIS, Associate Judges.
These cases are before us on certification pursuant to D.C.Code 1973, § 23-101(f). Each of the defendants was charged by the Corporation Counsel with tampering with a parked vehicle in violation of Art. 25, § 15, of the Police Regulations of the District of Columbia. The defendants challenged the authority of the Corporation Counsel to prosecute them, contending that the United States Attorney is the proper prosecutorial authority. We disagree, and hold that the Corporation Counsel is the appropriate authority for the prosecution of the cases.
While we are authorized to dispose of such questions "in a summary way", D.C. Code 1973, § 23-101(f), our reasoning may be set forth rather briefly. Until the 1973 amendment of the tampering regulation, the penalty for conviction of such an offense was limited to a fine of $300. See D.C.Pol.Reg. Art. 30, § 4. On June 27, 1973, however, the District of Columbia Council concluded that "the offense of tampering with a motor vehicle is of sufficient seriousness and concern to the community to warrant the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment in addition to or as an alternative to a fine." D.C.Reg. No. 73-15. Accordingly, it then enacted the following amendment: "Any person violating this section shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $300 or imprisoned for not more than 10 days, or both."
Defendants contend that the amendment divested the Corporation Counsel of prosecutorial authority over tampering offenses. Their argument is based upon a restrictive interpretation of D.C.Code 1973, § 23-101. In relevant part, it provides:
(a) Prosecutions for violations of all police or municipal ordinances or regulations and for violations of all penal statutes in the nature of police or municipal regulations, where the maximum punishment is a fine only, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, shall be conducted in the name of the District of Columbia by the Corporation Counsel . . . except as otherwise provided in such ordinance, regulation, or statute, or in this section.
. . . . . .
(c) All other criminal prosecutions shall be conducted in the name of the United States by the United States attorney . . . except as otherwise provided by law.
Historically, and without challenge, the Corporation Counsel has prosecuted alleged violations of the Police Regulations. Basically, the statute authorizes prosecution by the Corporation Counsel in two categories of offenses. The first includes "violations of all police or municipal ordinances or regulations". The second relates to an obviously separate type of offense, i. e., "violations of all penal statutes in the nature of police or municipal regulations, where the maximum punishment is a fine only, or imprisonment not exceeding one year". (Emphasis added.) See District of Columbia v. Ackerman, D.C.App., 283 A.2d 24 (1971). Defendants argue that the penalty language modifies and limits the police regulations language, and that the absence of the term "or both" from the punishment clause of § 23-101(a) means that the Council's action amending the tampering regulation precludes prosecution by the Corporation Counsel.
There are a number of reasons for our inability to accept defendant's position. The most important is the one we have just indicated: We interpret the statute to give prosecutorial authority to the Corporation Counsel as to all municipal ordinances and regulations, irrespective of the prescribed punishment. For us to conclude that the "fine only, or imprisonment not exceeding one year" clause was meant to modify prosecutions under police regulations would be to condone two anomalies. The District of Columbia Council, empowered to make and enforce police regulations for the protection of property within the District by D.C.Code 1973, § 1-226, may not prescribe any imprisonment in excess of 10 days. D.C.Code 1973, § 1-224a. To treat a one-year imprisonment limitation as the demarcation line of prosecutorial authority under police regulations, with the Council's being without the power to prescribe a penalty in excess of 10 days, would present the first anomaly. The second arises from another statutory comparison. To accept defendants' argument would be to impart to the Council authority to alter the bounds of the prosecutorial jurisdiction of the United States Attorney (and the Corporation Counsel) by a mere addition to or deletion...
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