Dixon v. Brooklyn City & N.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 October 1885
• Citation: 100 N.Y. 170,3 N.E. 65
• Parties: DIXON v. BROOKLYN CITY & N. R. CO.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

100 N.Y. 170

3 N.E. 65

DIXON

v.BROOKLYN CITY & N. R. CO.¹

Court of Appeals of New York.

Filed October 13, 1885.

EARL, RAPALLO, and FINCH, JJ., dissent.

Joshua M. Van Cott, for appellant, Brooklyn City & N. R. Co.

N. C. Mook, for respondent, Timothy Dixon.

MILLER, J.

This action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff on the seventeenth of January, 1881, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant. The plaintiff sought to enter a car upon defendant's road by way of the rear platform, but finding it full, he passed along by the side of the car in order to reach the front platform, and slipped on the snow, and was thrown under the wheels of the car, and seriously injured. The car was moving slowly at the time, and at the place where he slipped there was a ridge of snow, which the evidence tended to show had been thrown up by the defendant's snow-plough and sweepers, about three feet high, three feet wide at the base, and one foot and a half at the top, sloping towards the car, and so near it as to leave merely room for the car to pass. The surface of the ridge was covered with a thin coating of recently fallen snow, which made it difficult to perceive that underneath it was hard and slippery; the snow having lain there for some weeks,-much longer than was reasonably sufficient for its removal.

The first question which arises on the appeal relates to the right of the defendant to leave the snow where it was after the same had been removed from the track, and it claims that having lawfully cleared the snow from the tracks, and owing no duty to replace it upon the same or remove it from the street, the plaintiff should have been nonsuited on the trial. The conclusion of the jury that the ridge of snow was caused by the defendant's ploughs and sweepers, and that it had existed for a longer period of time than was reasonably sufficient for its removal, was justified by the evidence. The character and extent of the obstruction, and the propriety of its removal, as well as the time within which it should have been removed, were proper matters for the consideration of the jury in determining the liability of the defendant. There would seem to be no reasonable ground for claiming that, where there was a very large accumulation of snow alongside of the tracks by reason of its removal from the same, which accumulation necessarily might be the cause of injury to persons who sought to enter the cars, and it was allowed to remain for a long period of time, to the inconvenience of passengers traveling in the cars, and causing loss of life or limb, the company would not be liable for the damages sustained by its neglect in not removing the snow. While the railroad company would have the right to remove the snow from its tracks, it could not lawfully cause an obstruction which would interfere with the safe passing and repassing of persons traveling upon the road.

The duty imposed upon a railroad company is the same as that which is incurred by every owner of property adjoining a street in a populous city. Such owner is bound to remove the snow from the sidewalk to the street, but would not be justified in permitting its accumulation to so large an extent as to produce injury to those who might have occasion to use the street. He cannot negligently cause or maintain an obstruction or a nuisance upon or in front of his own premises which will occasion injury to passers-by without being liable for the damage sustained thereby. The same rule would seem to be applicable to street railroads, and while they are permitted to enjoy the use of their tracks, they must take care that they create no obstruction to persons passing to and from the same. They are bound to exercise reasonable care and diligence in the removal of snow and ice, preventing its accumulation during the winter season, and, if they are chargeable with negligence, are liable for the consequences arising from the same. Whatever...