Dixon v. Dixon
| Decision Date | 01 February 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 35336,35336 |
| Citation | 194 So.2d 897 |
| Parties | Ralph DIXON, Petitioner. v. Sylvia DIXON, as guardian of James M. Dixon, Jr., Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Writ of Certiorari to the District Court of Appeal, Second District, 184 So.2d 478.
R.B. Crawford, Jr., Bartow, for petitioner.
Charles R. Mayer, of Mayer & Breathitt, Lakeland, for respondent.
The petition for writ of certiorari reflected apparent jurisdiction in this court. We issued the writ and have heard oral argument of the parties. After hearing argument and upon consideration of the petition, we have determined that the cited decisions present no direct conflict as required by Article V, Section 4, Florida Constitution, F.S.A. Therefore, the petition is denied and the writ discharged.
It is so ordered.
The original plaintiff, Provident Life & Accident Insurance Company, filed its complaint in interpleader asserting that it held $8,000.00 payable as benefits upon the life of the deceased, James Mathew Dixon, that Ralph Dixon claimed the benefits as named beneficiary under the plaintiff's policy; that Sylvia Dixon claimed benefits on behalf of her son, James Dixon, Jr. pursuant to a court order in a divorce proceeding, requiring the decedent to maintain insurance for his minor son; and that the company was wholly indifferent as between the defendants and not sure as to the legal owner of the money. Thereafter, by court order the money was placed in the court registry until the rights of the parties in interest could be determined.
The claim of the petitioner, Ralph Dixon, to the proceeds of the policy is based on his designation as beneficiary of the existing policy. He contends that he was informed by the decedent that he was named beneficiary for the purpose of making an equal distribution of the policy proceeds among decedent's three children, the two daughters of a prior marriage and the son of the dissolved marriage to Sylvia Dixon. His claim is as trustee for these children.
The claim of the respondent, Sylvia Dixon, as guardian of James M. Dixon, Jr., contends that she was designated beneficiary of insurance contracts during her marriage to James Dixon, the deceased, and that, although Provident Life & Accident Insurance Company was substituted by the employer, Virginia Carolina as carrier for its employee group insurance plan, her son's rights were established to any insurance carried on employee, James Dixon, by a stipulation between the parties and the final decree of divorce from Dixon.
The chancellor relying on Cadore v. Cadore (Fla.1963), 67 So.2d 635, found that the deceased had retained his power to change beneficiaries despite the divorce decree and entered an order finding for the "cross-defendant Ralph Dixon, in his fiduciary capacity as trustee for the three minor children of the decedent James Dixon, viz: Marilyn Dixon and Karen Dixon, and James M. Dixon, Jr., in equal shares, share and share alike ***".
On appeal the District Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed the trial court holding that Cadore, supra, was distinguishable and that the question was, *** "whether the stipulation and decree amounted to a divesting of the incidents of ownership similar to a gift or only a requirement for change of beneficiary, revocable at will," and held "that the terms of the stipulation were so encompassing as to amount to a surrender of the essential incidents of ownership" citing, inter alia, Miller v. Gulf Life Insurance Co., (1943), 152 Fla. 221, 12 So.2d 127.
I have carefully examined both of the main authorities relied on by the petitioner and the respondent, Cadore, supra, and Miller, supra, and find that the facts and the principles applied in those cases are not inapposite but relate to situations in which each has a field of operation. I feel, however, that this cause must be decided on the guiding principle in Cadore that absent a valid and legal restraint of which the insurance company has notice an insured may change beneficiaries when that right is reserved in the policy....
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