Dixon v. Nat'l Sec. of Ala., Inc.
| Decision Date | 08 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:18-cv-00013-RAH |
| Parties | VANESSA DIXON, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL SECURITY OF ALABAMA, INC., d/b/a DTA SECURITY SERVICES Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
This action arises out of alleged race discrimination and retaliation that Vanessa E. Dixon (Plaintiff or Dixon) suffered at the hands of her employer, National Security of Alabama, Inc. d/b/a DTA Security Services (Defendant or DTA).
According to Dixon, as set forth in this matter's operative pleading (Amended Complaint) (Doc. 8), DTA did nothing to stop her immediate supervisor's racial harassment. Instead, the powers that be eventually reassigned and then discharged her due to her complaints. In somewhat confusing fashion, Dixon advances the same essential claim against DTA under several related, but distinct, federal statutes in a single count (Count One): 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She follows Count One with a separate general count (Count Two) for "Damages."
DTA has moved for summary judgment as to both of Dixon's claims on the basis of Dixon's inability to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. In this regard, DTA attacks Dixon for having failed to demonstrate sufficiently either any adverse employment action or temporal proximity between any improper act and her separation. It further challenges the cogency of her claims under Sections 1981 and 1983.
For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that summary judgment is due to be granted.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (), summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Rule 56 [ ] mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (alteration in original). The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue ofmaterial fact. Id. at 323. If the movant meets this threshold, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings" to establish that there is a "genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
On summary judgment, a court must construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.1 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Turnes v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 36 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 1994). Any factual disputes will thus be resolved in the non-movant's favor, but when—but only when—sufficient competent evidence supports the non-moving party's version of the disputed facts. Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2002). However, "mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion." Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing Bald Mountain Park, Ltd. v. Oliver, 863 F.2d 1560, 1563 (11th Cir. 1989)).
A dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The non-movant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. ZenithRadio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, that party must present "affirmative evidence" of material factual conflicts to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. If the non-movant's response relies on nothing more than conclusory allegations, the court must enter summary judgment for the movant. See, e.g., Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1565, n.6 (11th Cir. 1997); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 1995).
DTA is a provider of neighborhood security services in Montgomery, Alabama. (See Doc. 8 at 2; see also Doc. 15 at 1.)
Dixon has been employed with DTA on two occasions as a certified security officer. (Doc. 47-2 at 5, 13-14.) On the first occasion, Dixon left her employment due to injuries she suffered as a result of an unrelated slip and fall accident at a local hospital. (Id. at 5.) No discrimination-related issues plagued her first stint with DTA. (Id. at 14.)
The current litigation arises out of Dixon's second spell. During this time, which lasted from May 2014 to June 2015, Dixon was assigned to a post located near Huntingdon College in Montgomery, Alabama. (Id. at 6, 8.) The parties dispute Dixon's exact date of separation and whether she actually separated from DTA.According to Dixon, her employment with DTA changed with the appointment of Lena Williams (Williams) as Captain and therefore Dixon's supervisor in January 2015. (Doc. 47-2 at 14, 16, 32; see also Doc. 50-1.) Until that point, her working days had been uneventful and satisfactory. (Doc. 47-2 at 14, 16, 32; see also Doc. 50-1.) Unfortunately, this working relationship apparently soured and turned adversarial at the outset. (Doc. 47-2 at 27; see also Doc. 50-1.)
Dixon traces this animosity to one thing: Williams did not want African-Americans assigned to the Huntingdon College post. (See Doc. 47-2 at 21-22, 32.) Allegedly, as told to her by a "white" DTA co-employee, Williams hoped to make the post "all white again." (Id. at 21-22, 32.) On another occasion, a client (a local resident) told Dixon that she should watch out for herself because Williams had told her that she did not like African-Americans. (Id. at 22.) Later, Williams began calling and giving Dixon directives and verbal counseling almost immediately. (Id. at 20.) At one point, Williams warned Dixon to do precisely what Williams instructed her to do in handling paperwork or she was going to "hang" and then "drag" Dixon down to the main office. (Docs. 50-1; see also Doc. 47-2 at 21.) Once, Williams threw Dixon's paperwork across a car and ordered Dixon to pick it all up in front of several DTA clients. (Doc. 47-2 at 22; see also Doc. 50-1.)
Dixon alleges more. Allegedly, Williams would follow her and watch her while she performed her duties. (Doc. 50-1; see also Doc. 47-2 at 22.) Dixon alsohad to complete tasks that were not required of other white employees assigned to Williams' post, such as gassing up the patrol car and picking up newspapers, boxes and the mail. (Doc. 47-2 at 23.)
For her part, Williams denies that she ever made such statements or took such actions against Dixon. (Doc. 52-1 at 1-2.)
Dixon was not alone in her issues with Williams. Indeed, a co-employee, Tina Tait (Tait), believed she was harassed as well. In her complaints to DTA's management, Tait identified Dixon as a witness to harassment and discrimination by Williams. (Doc. 47-2 at 26, 40; see also, e.g., Doc. 50 at 2; Doc. 50-1.)
Dixon met with DTA management about Williams, during which she confirmed that Williams also was harassing her. (Doc. 50-1.) Dixon subsequently complained to Major Harry Christian (Christian) and Captain McGhee at DTA about Williams' conduct. (Doc. 47-2 at 14, 18, 24, 29, 35; see also Doc. 50-1.) Among others, Dixon recounted Williams' alleged "hang" and "drag" threats. (Doc. 50-1; see also Doc. 47-2 at 18, 33.)
As alleged by Dixon, DTA management opted to ignore all these complaints. (Doc. 47-2 at 18, 26.) The unsurprising resulted: Williams' behavior toward Dixon to worsened. (Id.; see also Doc. 50-1.)
On April 13, 2015, Dixon filed a charge of discrimination (Charge) with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). (Doc. 50-1.) In the Charge,Dixon stated that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her race, beginning as early as January 15, 2015, the date that Williams became her supervisor. (Doc. 47-2 at 13; see also Doc. 50-1.) She also claimed that she had experienced retaliation in terms of intensified harassment by her supervisor, i.e. Williams, after she met with DTA management about the harassment complaint lodged by Tait. (Doc. 47-2 at 19-20; see also Doc. 50-1.)
Despite Dixon's filing of her EEOC charge, Williams' harassment intensified. For example, Dixon overhead a conversation between another employee and Williams in which Williams inquired about whether Dixon had been moved and whether the employee could work at the Huntingdon post in Dixon's place. (Doc. 47-2 at 19.) Not long thereafter, in late May or early June 2015, Dixon was moved from the Huntingdon post and re-assigned to a warehouse location in Montgomery. According to Dixon, she was reassigned from the post in retaliation for her complaints about Williams' harassment and discrimination. (Id. at 25.)
DTA, according to a June 8, 2015 memorandum, gives a different explanation for what transpired. Per its version, on June 2, 2015, Christian told Dixon that two guards were returning to DTA from the Huntington post because of a cut-back in hours. (Doc. 47-6; see also Doc. 47-7.) For this reason, and no other, Dixon was reassigned to a new, higher-paying post at Southeastern Stud. (Docs. 47-6; see also Doc. 47-7.)
Although this new assignment netted better pay, Dixon proved unable to manually open and close a gate due to a longstanding back condition. (Doc. 47-2 at 17, 27-29.) Dixon contends DTA moved her to this new post knowing she could not work it. (Id. at 28-29.) According to DTA, however, no such foreknowledge existed, and it first learned of Dixon's issue when Dixon herself reported back that the gate was too heavy for her to close. (Doc. 50-4.)
This dilemma prompted a conversation with Christian....
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