DMS v. Barber
Decision Date | 13 June 2002 |
Docket Number | No. C8-00-2227.,C8-00-2227. |
Citation | 645 N.W.2d 383 |
Parties | D.M.S., Petitioner, Appellant, v. Kennedy BARBER, Defendant, The Professional Association of Treatment Homes (PATH), a non-profit Minnesota Corporation, Respondent. |
Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Patrick T. Tierney, Thomas E. McEllistrem, Collins, Buckley, Sauntry & Haugh, P.L.L.P., Saint Paul, MN, for Appellant.
Jeanette M. Bazis, Greene Espel, P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, MN, for Respondent.
Barbara J. Felt, Reinhardt & Anderson, Saint Paul, MN, for Amicus Curiae.
Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.
In August or September 1992, 13-year-old D.M.S. was placed in the home of Kennedy Barber, a foster parent supervised by the Professional Association of Treatment Homes (PATH). Approximately five months later, on February 22, 1993, D.M.S. was removed from the Barber home after D.M.S. informed a Hennepin County social worker that he felt uncomfortable in the Barber home, that Barber was sleeping with boys in his bedroom, and that Barber had asked D.M.S. if he would sleep with Barber. D.M.S. commenced an action against PATH on June 8, 1999, approximately nine months after his 19th birthday and more than six years after February 22, 1993. D.M.S. alleged that PATH negligently hired, supervised, and retained Barber as a foster parent, and also claimed that PATH was liable for Barber's abuse under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The district court granted PATH's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the statute of limitations had run on both claims. D.M.S. appealed and the court of appeals affirmed. We granted D.M.S.'s petition for review to decide whether his claims are barred by the statute of limitations, and we now reverse and remand.
D.M.S. was born on September 10, 1979. Hennepin County placed D.M.S. in Kennedy Barber's foster home under the supervision of PATH sometime in August or September 1992. Barber was licensed as a foster-care provider in October 1990 at the recommendation of PATH, a non-profit private agency licensed by the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) to provide foster home placement for children unable to remain in their current living situation. In addition to placing children, PATH is responsible for supervising and evaluating foster-care homes and making recommendations to DHS regarding whether to grant or revoke foster-home licenses. D.M.S. claims that, shortly after his placement in the Barber home, Barber began to touch him in an inappropriate manner. The touching began with uncomfortably long hugs and then moved on to kissing, fondling, and, eventually, oral sex. In a deposition, D.M.S. reported that he initially felt as though he was in a "daze" and "didn't understand it." Over time, D.M.S. felt "used," "like a piece of meat or something." He further stated that he often had a sick feeling in his stomach and "just felt bad." At some point, D.M.S. told his mother about Barber's conduct. On February 22, 1993, D.M.S. reported Barber's conduct to a Hennepin County social worker and he was removed from the Barber home that day.1
On June 8, 1999, D.M.S. served PATH with a summons and complaint alleging that PATH was liable for the injuries caused by the acts of sexual abuse committed by Barber.2 The complaint alleged that PATH was negligent in its hiring, retention, and supervision of Barber, its failure to investigate and act upon prior allegations of sexual misconduct against Barber, and its placement of D.M.S. in Barber's care. In addition, the complaint alleged that PATH was responsible for Barber's wrongful conduct under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
The district court granted PATH's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that D.M.S.'s negligence-based claims were barred by the six-year statute of limitations set forth in Minn.Stat. § 541.073, subd. 2(a) (2000), and that his respondeat superior claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Minn.Stat. § 541.07(1) (2000). D.M.S. appealed and the court of appeals affirmed.
On review of a summary judgment, we determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the law. Jefferson v. Comm'r of Revenue, 631 N.W.2d 391, 394-95 (Minn.2001), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1304, 152 L.Ed.2d 215 (2002); State ex rel. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn.1990). Determination of whether summary judgment was properly granted on statute of limitations grounds depends in part on construction of the implicated statutes. Ryan v. ITT Life Ins. Corp., 450 N.W.2d 126, 128 (Minn.1990). Statutory construction is a question of law subject to de novo review. Burkstrand v. Burkstrand, 632 N.W.2d 206, 209 (Minn.2001); Ryan, 450 N.W.2d at 128.
We first consider whether D.M.S.'s negligence claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Generally, personal injury actions grounded on negligence must be commenced within the six-year period of limitation provided in Minn. Stat. § 541.05(5) (2000). Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Reed Cleaners, 265 Minn. 503, 506 n. 1, 122 N.W.2d 178, 180 n. 1 (1963); see Villaume v. Wilkinson, 209 Minn. 330, 332, 296 N.W. 176, 177 (1941). Under the minority tolling statute, Minn.Stat. § 541.15(a)(1) (2000), when a negligence action accrues during a plaintiff's infancy, the plaintiff must commence the action either within one year of reaching the age of majority or within the six-year period of limitation, whichever is later. See Anderson v. Lutheran Deaconess Hosp., 257 N.W.2d 561, 562 (Minn.1977)
; Langer v. Newmann, 100 Minn. 27, 29, 110 N.W. 68, 68-69 (1907).
In 1989, the legislature, recognizing the unique nature of personal injuries caused by sexual abuse, enacted what is now commonly referred to as the delayed discovery statute. Act of May 19, 1989, ch. 190, § 2, 1989 Minn. Laws 485, 486-87 ( ). Under the delayed discovery statute, the period of limitation for an action against a person who negligently permits sexual abuse to occur, like the period of limitation for negligence actions in general, is six years. Minn.Stat. § 541.073, subds. 2(a), 3(2) (2000). Significantly, the delayed discovery statute also provides that the six-year period of limitation does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows or has reason to know that his or her personal injury was caused by sexual abuse. Id. Interpreting this statutory language in Blackowiak v. Kemp, 546 N.W.2d 1 (Minn.1996), we observed that "as a matter of law one is `injured' if one is sexually abused," and stated that the "ultimate question" posed by the delayed discovery statute is "the time at which the complainant knew or should have known that he/she was sexually abused." Id. at 3. This question is answered through the application of the objective, reasonable person standard. W.J.L. v. Bugge, 573 N.W.2d 677, 681 (Minn.1998); Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3. Thus, to decide whether the six-year period of limitation expired before D.M.S. commenced his action against PATH on June 8, 1999, we must determine the time at which a reasonable person standing in D.M.S.'s shoes would have known he was sexually abused.
PATH argues that D.M.S. knew that he had been sexually abused no later than February 22, 1993, the date on which D.M.S. reported Barber's misconduct to a social worker, and that D.M.S. had six years from that date to commence his action. The soundness of PATH's argument depends on the accuracy of its assumption that it is reasonable to expect a child to understand that he or she has been the victim of sexual abuse. The legislative history and purpose of the delayed discovery statute and our prior cases interpreting the statute cast doubt on the validity of this assumption.
The legislature drafted the delayed discovery statute in response to concerns that victims of sexual abuse, particularly those victimized by someone in a position of authority and those victimized during childhood, often react to the abuse by developing psychological coping mechanisms that prevent them from commencing a legal action within the normal period of limitation for negligence or battery actions. Bugge, 573 N.W.2d at 680 n. 5; see also Hearing on H.F. 461, H. Comm. Judiciary, Criminal Justice Div., 76th Minn. Leg., Feb. 28, 1989 (audio tape); Hearing on S.F. 315, S. Comm. Judiciary, Criminal Law Div., 76th Minn. Leg., Feb. 17, 1989 (audio tape). These coping mechanisms can take any number of forms, including feelings of denial, shame, and guilt, and repression of memories of the abuse. See Bugge, 573 N.W.2d at 680 n. 5
(; Hearing on )S.F. 315. By enacting the delayed discovery statute, the legislature sought to address this phenomenon by giving sexual abuse victims more time to recognize the abuse they suffered. Bugge, 573 N.W.2d at 680; Hearing on H.F. 461; Hearing on S.F. 315.
We first had occasion to interpret and apply the delayed discovery statute in Blackowiak. In that case, Blackowiak alleged that he had been sexually abused by Kemp in 1970 or 1971, when Blackowiak was 11 years old. 546 N.W.2d at 2. Blackowiak commenced his action against Kemp approximately 21 years later, in 1992. Id. The sole issue on appeal was whether Blackowiak's claim was timely under the delayed discovery statute. Id. We held that Blackowiak's claim was barred on the ground that the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated that Blackowiak knew of the sexual abuse more than six years before he brought suit. Id. at 3.
The court's analysis of the facts in Blackowiak is instructive on the question of whether a victim of childhood sexual abuse can be reasonably expected to know of the abuse for purposes of the delayed discovery statute. Soon after 11-year old Blackowiak was sexually abused, he told a friend to "watch out for" Kemp because Blackowiak did not want the friend to be abused. Id....
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