Dobson Tel. Co. v. State ex rel. Okla. Corp. Comm'n (In re Dobson Tel. Co.)
| Decision Date | 22 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case Number: 113362 |
| Parties | In the MATTER OF the Application of DOBSON TELEPHONE COMPANY d/b/a McLoud Telephone Company for Funding From the Oklahoma Universal Service Fund, Dobson Telephone Company d/b/a McLoud Telephone Company, Appellant, v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Corporation Commission, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma |
Clyde A. Muchmore, William H. Hoch, Melanie Wilson Rughani, Mark S. Grossman, CROWE & DUNLEVY, A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and Ron Comingdeer, Kendall Parrish, RON COMINGDEER & ASSOCIATES, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellant.
Robert J. Campbell, Jr., OKLAHOMA CORPORATION COMMISSION, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellee.
¶ 1 Dobson Telephone Company, d/b/a McLoud Telephone Company, appeals a Final Order from the Oklahoma Corporation Commission denying Dobson's request for funding from the Oklahoma Universal Service Fund. Dobson sought reimbursement for costs incurred when it was required by the City of Oklahoma City to relocate its telecommunications lines to accommodate the widening of a city street. The Oklahoma Universal Service Fund was established pursuant to the Oklahoma Telecommunications Act of 1997 to make funds available to eligible telecommunications service providers like Dobson "to promote and ensure the availability of primary universal services, at rates that are reasonable and affordable...." 17 O.S.2011 139.106(B). The Commission determined that reimbursement was not authorized unless the request to relocate had been made by a State agency. The Commission's interpretation defeats the purpose of the Fund. The Commission's Final Order is vacated, and this case is remanded for further proceedings.1
¶ 2 Dobson is a telecommunications provider serving nine exchanges and providing "general universal services" to approximately eleven thousand subscribers in central Oklahoma. To service its McLoud exchange, Dobson maintains telecommunications lines and other facilities in the right-of-way of Choctaw Road in the City of Oklahoma City. In September of 2012, the City notified Dobson that it would have to move its telecommunications lines and facilities to accommodate the widening of Choctaw Road. Dobson did so at a cost it represented to be $420,842.41. In December of 2013, Dobson submitted a request for reimbursement of that cost to the Oklahoma Universal Service Fund.2 The Fund is administered by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, and the Commission's Public Utility Division investigated Dobson's request. The Division determined that Dobson's request was governed by 17 O.S.2011 139.106(K)(1)(b). That section authorizes reimbursement for costs "required by existing or future federal or state regulatory rules, orders, or policies or by federal or state law...." According to the Division, this provision only applies to highway right-of-way relocation costs incurred at the direction of the Oklahoma Department of Transportation or a board of county commissioners. Consequently, the Division concluded that the Fund was not authorized to pay relocation costs required as a result of the City's relocation demand. The Division recommended denial of Dobson's request for reimbursement.3
¶ 3 Dobson filed a Request for Reconsideration. It attached a copy of Oklahoma City Ordinance No. 23499 50-13. The ordinance authorizes public utilities like Dobson to use City street rights-of-way for location of telecommunications lines but also requires relocation at the utility's expense when requested to do so by the City. After further briefing, the matter was argued to the Commission en banc. The Commission found: "The City, not the State, owns the right-of-way here, and the Legislature has not enacted either a general law or a local law that applies to relocation of [Dobson's] utility line." The Commission concluded that relocation pursuant to a municipal ordinance failed to show the requisite increase in costs "arising from federal or state action" for reimbursement from the Fund because a municipal ordinance is not a "state law."4 The Commission adopted the Division's recommendation and denied Dobson's request for reimbursement from the Fund. The validity of the Commission's decision is dependent on the correctness of its interpretation of the statutory term "state law."
¶ 4 The Oklahoma Constitution provides that appellate review of Corporation Commission orders "shall be judicial only, and in all appeals involving an asserted violation of any right of the parties under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma, the Court shall exercise its own independent judgment as to both the law and the facts." Okla. Const. art. 9, 20. In other appeals, appellate review "shall not extend further than to determine whether the Commission has regularly pursued its authority, and whether the findings and conclusions of the Commission are sustained by the law and substantial evidence." Id . The issue in this appeal concerns only the Commission's legal interpretation of the Fund statute. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law. Troxell v. Okla. Dep't of Human Servs. , 2013 OK 100, ¶ 4, 318 P.3d 206.
¶ 5 The issues raised in Dobson's appeal necessarily concern its property interest in reimbursement for expenses contemplated by the Fund statute, a fundamental interest protected by the Oklahoma and United States Constitutions. However, that characterization does not determine the applicable standard of review. Whether this court exercises its "independent judgment" as to the Commission's statutory interpretation or reviews that interpretation to determine whether it is "sustained by the law," our review is the same and no different than the de novo review we employ regarding issues of law in other contexts. Legal issues involving statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review. Heffron v. District Court of Oklahoma Cnty. , 2003 OK 75, ¶ 15, 77 P.3d 1069. De novo review is non-deferential, plenary and independent. Neil Acquisition, L.L.C. v. Wingrod Inv. Corp ., 1996 OK 125, n.1, 932 P.2d 1100.
¶ 6 Dobson appeals the denial of its request for reimbursement of the costs it incurred when it was required by the City of Oklahoma City to relocate its telecommunications lines. Disposition of Dobson's appeal requires the interpretation and construction of the Oklahoma Telecommunications Act of 1997, 17 O.S.2011 and Supp. 2014 139.101 to 139.110. The particular section at issue, which created the Oklahoma Universal Service Fund, authorizes reimbursement to providers like Dobson for certain cost increases. As identified by the parties, the relevant portion of that section provides:
17 O.S.2011 139.106(K)(1)(b). According to the Commission, this provision would have permitted reimbursement had Dobson incurred the cost of relocating its telecommunications lines as the result of an order from the Department of Transportation or a board of county commissioners. But, because this relocation was required by a municipality, pursuant to a municipal ordinance, reimbursement was not authorized. The Commission reached this conclusion based on its narrow interpretation of the term "state law." We find the Commission's interpretation untenable.
¶ 7 When the Commission received Dobson's request for reimbursement, its Public Utility Division investigated the application "to identify which government authority owned the road (i.e., State, County, or City)." The Division recommended denial of Dobson's request after determining that the City owned the road, and neither the Oklahoma Department of Transportation nor any board of county commissioners had ordered the relocation. The brief in support of the Division's recommendation states that the Division The Commission adopted the Division's recommendation, finding that the term "state law" does not include municipal ordinances. That issue has not been previously decided by any Oklahoma court.
¶ 8 However, in August of 2015, after this case was decided, the Commission amended its Rules and Regulations related to the Telecommunications Act to add a definition of the word "state," a previously undefined term: "‘State’ means the State of Oklahoma." Oklahoma Administrative Code 165:59-1-4 ). Assuming that the Commission amended its rules to make clear that "state law" means state statute, and that relocation expenses resulting from municipal direction would not be reimbursed from the Fund, the Commission's action is relevant for two reasons.5 First, it establishes that there is no "longstanding" interpretation of the Fund statute to which we can refer. See Schulte Oil Co., Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n , 1994 OK 103, ¶ 4, 882 P.2d 65 (). Second, the word "state"...
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Dobson Tel. Co. v. State ex rel. Okla. Corp. Comm'n (In re Dobson Tel. Co.), Case Number: 113362
...392 P.3d 295In the MATTER OF the Application of DOBSON TELEPHONE COMPANY d/b/a McLoud Telephone Company for Funding From the Oklahoma Universal Service Fund,Dobson Telephone Company d/b/a McLoud Telephone Company, Appellant,v.State of Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Corporation Commission, Appell......