Troxell v. Okla. Dep't of Human Servs.

• Decision Date: 26 November 2013
• Docket Number: No. 107885.,107885.
• Citation: 318 P.3d 206
• Parties: Kelly and Tina TROXELL, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES; Howard Hendrick, in his official capacity as the Director of Human Services; Richard DeVaughn; Ron Mercer; Jay Dee Chase; Patrice Douglas; Mike Peck; Gerri Webb; Aneta Wilkinson; and George Young, in their official capacities as members of the Oklahoma Commission for Human Services, Defendants/Appellees.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

318 P.3d 206

Kelly and Tina TROXELL, Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES; Howard Hendrick, in his official capacity as the Director of Human Services; Richard DeVaughn; Ron Mercer; Jay Dee Chase; Patrice Douglas; Mike Peck; Gerri Webb; Aneta Wilkinson; and George Young, in their official capacities as members of the Oklahoma Commission for Human Services, Defendants/Appellees.

No. 107885.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Nov. 26, 2013.

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION III, ON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TULSA COUNTY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA; HONORABLE LINDA G. MORRISSEY, TRIAL JUDGE.

¶ 0 Parents who adopted special needs children challenged decision by the Department of Human Services (DHS) to provide a lower assistance subsidy for the children than the assistance subsidy that would be paid if the children were in a foster placement. This decision was upheld upon administrative review by DHS and sustained by the district court and Court of Civil Appeals upon judicial review. Parents filed a petition for certiorari, seeking review of the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals.

CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED, COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED, REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Steven Alan Novick, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiffs/Appellants.

Travis Smith, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendants/Appellees.

REIF, V.C.J.

¶ 1 This case concerns the monthly subsidy provided by the Oklahoma Department of Human Services (DHS) to adoptive parents of special needs children. The controversy in this regard stems from a decision by DHS to pay foster parents of special needs children a higher subsidy amount than is paid to adoptive parents. DHS has set the monthly foster placement subsidy at $365.00 per child, while capping the monthly adoptive placement subsidy at $310.50 per child.

¶ 2 Kelly and Tina Troxell, the adoptive parents of two special needs children, challenged this two-tier subsidy system through the DHS administrative hearing process and through judicial review proceedings in the district court and the Court of Civil Appeals. They have relied on the Court of Civil Appeals opinion in Laws v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Department of Human Services, 2003 OK CIV APP 97, ¶ 16, 81 P.3d 78, 84. This case ruled that a prior two-tier system of subsidy payments “arbitrarily and without authority, limited adoptive parents to an amount less than that provided to foster parents.” Neither DHS in its administrative proceedings nor the courts in judicial review found the Laws opinion to be dispositive and rejected the Troxells' challenge.

¶ 3 DHS has defended the current two-tier system of monthly subsidy assistance by noting it is not prohibited either by the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 ¹ (the federal act that provides funding for the subsidies), or by the Childrens' Bureau of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (the federal agency that oversees implementation of the subsidy program by the states). DHS specially notes that the Childrens' Bureau issued an interpretation ²of the Act (after the Laws opinion) that confirmed two-tier systems were not prohibited by the Act. In addition, DHS points out that Congress and the Oklahoma Legislature have specially provided that the monthly adoption subsidy cannot exceed the amount that would be paid if the children were in foster care. See42 U.S.C. § 673(a)(3)³ and 10 O.S.Supp.2003, § 7510–1.5(A).⁴ DHS reads these special provisions to mean that the subsidy for children in adoptive placements can be in any reasonable amount up to and including the amount of the subsidy for children in foster placements, but not more.

¶ 4 Clearly, the resolution of the controversy in this case requires an interpretation of both federal and Oklahoma statutory law. This identical task was undertaken by the Court of Civil Appeals in the Laws case. Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the Laws opinion correctly state the standard of review to be applied. The guiding principles for review are found in the court's declarations that interpretation of statutory law presents a question of law and statutes are construed to determine legislative intent in light of the general policy and purpose that underlie them. 2003 OK CIV APP 97, ¶¶ 14–15, 81 P.3d at 83–84. Also important are the court's observations that the DHS interpretation of the statutes in question must be reviewed de novo, but the informal interpretations by the Childrens' Bureau should be considered in ascertaining the purpose, policy and meaning of the federal statutes. See id.

¶ 5 To be sure, nothing in either federal law or state law prohibits a two-tier system of subsidies. Also, the statutory provisions that prohibit paying a greater subsidy to adoptive parents than paid to foster parents do imply that the adoption placement subsidy can be less than the foster care placement subsidy. Significantly, the Laws opinion does not prohibit DHS from using a two-tier system or require parity in the subsidies for adoptive placements and foster placements. In fact, the Laws opinion expressly recognized that “[t]he State may indeed pay less to an adoptive parent than to a foster parent because individual cases may and do vary as the needs of the child may vary.” Id. ¶ 17, 81 P.3d at 84 (emphasis omitted). The Laws opinion further emphasized that “payment of the maximum is obviously not automatically required in every case.” Id. ¶ 22, 81 P.3d at 85.

¶ 6 The effect of the two-tier system that the Laws case condemned was the imposition of “a ceiling different for each class of case, such that the adoptive parent may never under any circumstances obtain assistance equal to assistance provided to foster parents.” Id. ¶ 17, 81 P.3d at 84 (emphasis omitted). The Court of Civil Appeals found that “[t]he purpose of the [subsidy program] is to encourage adoption of special needs children by providing assistance to alleviate the financial burdens associated with the special needs of the children.” Id. ¶ 22, 81 P.3d at 85. The court concluded a predetermined limit on adoption assistance was inconsistent with this purpose. Id. ¶ 21, 81 P.3d at 85. The court said “[o]nly the individual needs of the child and circumstances of the family govern the limits [of assistance], subject to the [foster] cap,” id. ¶ 22, 81 P.3d at 85, and the burden is on DHS “to justify ... a cap on assistance to adoptive parents other than the maximum tied to foster care payments.” Id. ¶ 21, 81 P.3d at 85. In the final analysis, the State cannot impose a limitation on subsidies that “artificially frustrates the purpose of the Act ... and [fails] to meet the needs of the child and to consider the family circumstances.” Id.

¶ 7 Despite acknowledging that the Act does not prohibit two-tier systems, the informal interpretation by the Childrens' Bureau, relied upon by DHS, does not endorse their use. In fact, the informal interpretation, like the Laws case, stresses that the State must negotiate the amount of the adoption assistance payment with the adoptive family taking into consideration “the needs of the child and the circumstances of the family.” Admin. for Children & Families, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Child Welfare Policy Manual § 8.2D.4 (2012)(answer to question 7). The informal interpretation also cautions about an adverse consequence of fixing a ceiling on the subsidy for adoption placements. Id. More importantly, nothing in the informal interpretation provides DHS “a license to discriminate against adoptive parents,” Laws, 2003 OK CIV APP 97, ¶ 16, 81 P.3d at 84, contrary to the binding interpretation of law as set forth in the Laws case. Until the Legislature declares a different policy, DHS must administer financial assistance to special needs children within the legal guidance of the Laws case.

¶ 8 Upon de novo review, this Court finds that the Court of Civil Appeals opinion in the Laws case identified the public policy and purpose underlying the monthly subsidy payment for special needs children, whether in adoptive placements or foster placements. We further find the Laws opinion correctly interpreted both federal and State law in light of that policy and purpose, and held “the underlying legislative intent is to make the subsidy available to all adoptive parents and in an amount up to the maximum provided by law.” Id. ¶ 23, 81 P.3d at 85. We now approve the Laws opinion for publication and give it precedential effect for our decision in this case.

¶ 9 Although the Laws opinion dealt with the pre–1999 subsidy system, the current ceiling at issue in this case suffers from the same defect as the pre–1999 system. That is, DHS is attempting to apply a predetermined fixed amount of subsidy without allowing adoptive parents to show greater need up to the amount provided for special needs children in foster care. This is contrary to the policy and purpose of the statutory law providing and regulating financial assistance to people who undertake parental responsibility and care of special needs children.

¶ 10 The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals in the case at hand is vacated and the district court order sustaining the decision of the Department of Human Services is reversed. This case is remanded to the district court with directions to vacate the decision of the Department of Human Services and further remand the case to Department of Human Services for redetermination of the monthly subsidy amount for the two special needs children of Kelly and Tina Troxell consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.

CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED, COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED, REVERSED AND REMANDED.

¶ 11COLBERT, C.J., REIF, V.C.J., WATT, EDMONDSON, and GURICH, JJ., concur.

¶ 12KAUGER, WINCHESTER, and COMBS, JJ., concur in result.

COMBS, J., with whom KAUGER, and WINCHESTER, JJ., join, concurring in result.

I would make the opinion prospective from the date of its issuance.

¶ 13TAYLOR, J., dissents.

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