Dockter v. State

• Decision Date: 19 March 2019
• Docket Number: S-17-0233
• Parties: Chad Alan DOCKTER, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

436 P.3d 890

Chad Alan DOCKTER, Appellant (Defendant),

v.The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

S-17-0233

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

March 19, 2019

Representing Appellant: Chad Alan Dockter, pro se.

Representing Appellee: Peter K. Michael, Attorney General; Christyne M. Martens, Deputy Attorney General; Caitlin F. Harper, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Benjamin E. Fischer, Assistant Attorney General.

Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

FOX, Justice.

[¶1] In his direct appeal, we affirmed Mr. Dockter’s convictions and sentences for kidnapping, unlawful entry, misdemeanor theft, property destruction, interference with an emergency call, and domestic battery. While that appeal was pending, Mr. Dockter filed two motions for a new trial in the district court. The court denied those motions, and we affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] Mr. Dockter raises seven issues for our consideration, which we rephrase as:

I. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Dockter’s motions for a new trial?

A. Was Mr. Dockter entitled to counsel to pursue a motion for a new trial after his direct appeal had ended?

B. Was Mr. Dockter’s proposed evidence that he lived with the victim at the time of the crimes "newly discovered evidence"?

C. Can a defendant raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a motion for a new trial based on "newly discovered evidence"?

D. Did Mr. Dockter’s proposed evidence that the State failed to disclose it was prosecuting one of its witnesses warrant a new trial?

E. Does Mr. Dockter’s contention that the State knowingly allowed two witnesses to commit perjury qualify as "newly discovered evidence"?

F. Can a defendant raise a claim of cumulative error in a motion for new trial based on "newly discovered evidence"?

FACTS

[¶3] To provide context for Mr. Dockter’s claims in this appeal, we restate the facts from Mr. Dockter’s direct appeal:

Appellant and the victim Amanda Yearsley dated for six months before Ms. Yearsley ended the relationship in May 2015. Ms. Yearsley then met with Appellant to inform him that she was pregnant in July of 2015. After that, the two communicated sporadically through early August 2015.

On August 14, 2015, Ms. Yearsley was at a bar where she worked ... when Appellant showed up. He stopped by to repay some money he owed her, and wanted to talk, but eventually he started to cause a scene. Because of his belligerent behavior, Ms. Yearsley suggested that they take the conversation back to her place. While they were at Ms. Yearsley’s apartment, she used a smartphone, an iPhone 6, that Appellant had given her daughter. This apparently annoyed Appellant, so he snatched it from her and left. After Appellant departed with her cell phone, Ms. Yearsley called the police to report it, but she declined to pursue charges.

The next day, August 15, Ms. Yearsley activated her old iPhone 5. Later that day, while she was in the shower getting ready for work, the shower curtain swung open, and there was Appellant. He grabbed her by the throat, and took her out of the shower and into the bedroom. As she started to scream, he placed his other hand over her nose and mouth. Once in the bedroom, Appellant put Ms. Yearsley on the bed and told her she needed to listen to him and that she had no choice but to do so. She continued to squirm and scream, and Appellant body-slammed her onto the ground with one hand still on her throat and the other over her nose and mouth. Ms. Yearsley struggled to breathe and almost blacked out, which caused her to become still. Appellant then removed his hands and let her sit up.

Once free from Appellant’s grasp, Ms. Yearsley ran to the bathroom and turned off the shower. She picked up a piece of the shower rod that had fallen on the floor and tried to defend herself with it. It was no use, however, as Appellant followed her to the bathroom and was able to pick her up in a "bear hug." However, she managed to grab her reactivated iPhone 5 from the bathroom counter before Appellant carried her out to the living room.

Once in the living room, Appellant sat down on the couch with Ms. Yearsley on his lap, still clenched in a bear hug. Appellant told her how much he loved her and that she just needed to listen to him. Unbeknownst to him, Ms. Yearsley had succeeded in dialing 911 and hitting send. When a dispatcher answered the 911 call, Appellant discovered what she had done. He grabbed the phone, punched Ms. Yearsley in the thigh, exited through the front door, and took off in his car.

Dockter v. State , 2017 WY 63, ¶¶ 3-7, 396 P.3d 405, 406 (Wyo. 2017) ( Dockter I ).

[¶4] In April 2016, a jury convicted Mr. Dockter of kidnapping Ms. Yearsley "with the intent to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize her," unlawful entry into her home, misdemeanor theft of her iPhone, property destruction, interference with an emergency call, and domestic battery.¹ In his direct appeal from those convictions, Mr. Dockter argued that the State failed to present sufficient evidence he unlawfully confined Ms. Yearsley or that he stole her iPhone. Dockter I , 2017 WY 63, ¶ 2, 396 P.3d at 406. We affirmed. Id. at ¶ 27, 396 P.3d at 411.

[¶5] We issued our decision in Dockter I on June 1, 2017. Before that, Mr. Dockter filed two pro se motions for a new trial under W.R.Cr.P. 33(c) in the district court: one on March 15, 2017 ("the First Motion"); and the other on May 3, 2017 ("the Second Motion"). In his First Motion, he argued that various documents established that he was living at Ms. Yearsley’s address and that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for not discovering and raising this at trial. He argued this evidence was "newly discovered" and that it refuted the charge that he unlawfully entered Ms. Yearsley’s home.

[¶6] In his Second Motion, in addition to generally reasserting some of his arguments from his First Motion, Mr. Dockter argued that the State failed to disclose before trial that it was prosecuting one of its witnesses, Kyle Christensen, in a separate criminal case, and that Mr. Christensen and Ms. Yearsley committed perjury at his trial.

[¶7] The district court appointed the Public Defender’s Office to represent Mr. Dockter. On June 16, 2017, the court held a hearing on both of Mr. Dockter’s motions. At the beginning of the hearing, the Public Defender’s Office objected to its appointment because Mr. Dockter’s direct appeal had ended, and Mr. Dockter did not have the right to counsel to pursue his motions. The district court agreed and concluded that Mr. Dockter was not entitled to a public defender. The court then heard from Mr. Dockter, pro se , regarding his two motions.

[¶8] On August 1, 2017, the district court denied Mr. Dockter’s motions. The court concluded the evidence that Mr. Dockter contended was newly discovered was "largely not newly discovered or deserving of any significant weight when compared to the trial evidence presented." This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶9] "We generally review the district court’s decision on a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion." Emerson v. State , 2016 WY 44, ¶ 11, 371 P.3d 150, 153 (Wyo. 2016) (citations omitted). A court’s discretion is limited to whether it could reasonably conclude as it did. Id. We will not disturb the court’s decision "absent a showing that some facet of the ruling [was] arbitrary or capricious." Id. (citations omitted).²

DISCUSSION

I. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Dockter’s motions for a new trial

[¶10] Because Mr. Dockter’s motions were made nearly a year after his trial, the only avenue to secure a new trial was to present the trial court with "newly discovered evidence." W.R.Cr.P. 33(c). Motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence are "not favored by the courts and [are] viewed with great caution." Emerson , 2016 WY 44, ¶ 12, 371 P.3d at 153.

A defendant who seeks a new trial based on newly discovered evidence typically must demonstrate the following: (1) that the evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial; (2) that it was not owing to the want of due diligence that it did not come sooner; (3) that it is so material that it would probably produce a different verdict, if the new trial were granted; and (4) that it is not cumulative, viz., speaking to facts in relation to which there was evidence at the trial.

Id. A defendant must establish all four elements to warrant a new trial. Id.³

A. Mr. Dockter did not have a right to counsel to pursue a motion for a new trial after his direct appeal ended

[¶11] Before addressing Mr. Dockter’s substantive arguments, we consider his claim that he was entitled to counsel while he pursued his motions. The Public Defender Act does not grant a defendant the right to appointed counsel to pursue a post-conviction motion. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-104 (LexisNexis 2017). Rather, a court has the discretion to appoint counsel in such circumstances. Patrick v. State , 2005 WY 32, ¶ 17, 108 P.3d 838, 844 (Wyo. 2005).

[¶12] Mr. Dockter quotes Story v. State , 788 P.2d 617, 627 (Wyo. 1990), to support his argument that he was entitled to counsel: "Without doubt, the hearing on a motion for new trial is a critical stage of the proceedings. It is the only opportunity to present to the trial court certain matters that may warrant a new trial, and to make a record on those matters for appellate review." This quote, however, does not support Mr. Dockter’s argument. First, it is from the dissent in Story . Id. (Urbigkit & Macy, JJ., dissenting). Second, it is quoting a Texas case. Id. (quoting Owens v. State , 763 S.W.2d 489, 492 (Tex. App. 1988) ). While precedent from other jurisdictions is persuasive to this Court in some circumstances, it is not controlling. And, finally, the quote addresses when a court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine a motion for a new trial, not the right to counsel in such circumstances. Id. Mr. Dockter was not entitled to appointed counsel to pursue his ...