Doctor v. Stevenson

• Decision Date: 20 July 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.:2:14-cv-3774-MGL-MGB
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Tremon L. Doctor, Petitioner, v. Robert Stevenson, Warden, Respondent.

Tremon L. Doctor, Petitioner, v. Robert Stevenson, Warden, Respondent.

Civil Action No.:2:14-cv-3774-MGL-MGB

DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLESTON DIVISION

July 20, 2015

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The Petitioner, a state prisoner, seeks habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is before the Court on the Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 19; see also Dkt. No. 20.)

Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review the instant petition for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.

The Petitioner brought this habeas action on September 22, 2014. (Dkt. No. 1 at 16 of 16; see also Dkt. No. 1-3.) On January 28, 2015, Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 19; see also Dkt. No. 20.) By order filed January 28, 2015, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the Petitioner was advised of the summary judgment procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion. (Dkt. No. 21.) Petitioner filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion on March 4, 2015. (Dkt. No. 23.)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Petitioner is currently confined at Broad River Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections ("SCDC"). In September of 2005, the Richland County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner for murder. (R. at 35-36.) In February of 2007, the Richland County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner for armed robbery, conspiracy to commit kidnapping, and carjacking. (R. at 29-34.) Petitioner was represented by Megan Lee, Esquire, and Micah Leddy, Esquire. (See R. at 13.) On March 31, 2008, the Petitioner pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter, carjacking, and armedrobbery before the Honorable J. Michelle Childs. (R. at 3-28.) That same day, Judge Childs sentenced Petitioner to twenty-five years on the voluntary manslaughter conviction, ten years for armed robbery, and five years for carjacking. (See R. at 27.) Those sentences were set to run concurrently to each other. (See R. at 27.)¹

Petitioner appealed and was represented by LaNelle C. Durant, Esquire, of the South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense. (See R. at 124.) In an Anders² brief filed on November 3, 2008, Petitioner raised the following issue:

Did the trial court err in not insuring that appellant's guilty plea complied with the mandate of Boykin v. Alabama?

(R. at 127; see also R. at 124-31. ) In an unpublished opinion filed on November 23, 2009, the South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. (R. at 132-33.)³ The remittitur was issued on December 9, 2009. (Dkt. No. 20-3.)

Petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief ("PCR") on October 26, 2010. (R. at 38-47.) Petitioner raised the following grounds for relief in his PCR application: ineffective assistance of counsel; unintelligent and involuntary guilty plea; and due process violation, Brady violation. (R. at 39.) In support of those grounds, Petitioner asserted, inter alia,

A-1) . . . Counsel [was] ineffective for advising applicant he would get life without the possibility of parole if applicant proceeded to trial, which forced applicant into a guilty plea. Counsel stated that she could not win at trial on warrant numbers I-979436, I-979437, and I-979438, because she could not explain why applicant was caught in vehicle which contained paperwork that belonged to victims. Co-defendant (Keith Goins), clearly stated on the night in question . . . that he went back to where crime took place and picked applicant up, and that applicant took no part in crime. . . .

A-2) Counsel ineffective in murder case for failing to request charges on involuntary manslaughter. Counsel's conduct was deficient because applicant's statement as well as statement from the State's key witness supported the involuntary manslaughter.

A-3) Counsel ineffective for failing to have preliminary hearing, not knowing ahead of time when trial was scheduled, failing to adequately investigate all evidence, and failing to interview witnesses; counsel came to applicant on Thursday, March 27, 2008, and stated that trial was to start on Monday, March 31, 2008. Counsel did not try to prepare for the task at hand. Counsel asked applicant did he know whether or not if the victims was still around, and did applicant think that victims was going to show up for trial; therefore counsel could not have interviewed them.

B-1) Guilty plea was not voluntarily and intelligently given . . . The record in this case indicates the trial court failed to adequately advise appellant of his constitutional rights so that he could waive those rights knowingly and intelligently. . . . The Judge advised appellant of these rights in a cursory manner that failed to convey the importance of these rights. Thus the plea was not voluntarily and intelligently given because the full consequences of the plea was not explained.

B-2) Guilty plea was not voluntarily and intelligently given; counsel stated that she could not win trial and if applicant was to go through with trial he would be given life without parole. March 31, 2008, after being told this, applicant asked counsel to get him in front of Judge for relieve [sic] of counsel. Counsel then got upset and left. . . . Counsel then came back stating that the Judge (Childs) would not allow applicant to be relieved of counsel and that applicant had one of two choices: start trial and risk getting life sentence or take plea, so applicant was forced to take the plea.

C) Forensic evidence was not fully provided nor were all witness interviews provided by the prosecution in violation of Brady and my due process.

(R. at 44-47.)

On February 14, 2012, an evidentiary hearing was held before Judge Clifton B. Newman, Jr. (R. at 55-113.) Petitioner was present and represented by Charles T. Brooks, III, Esquire. (See R. at 55.) In a written order dated February 27, 2013, Judge Newman denied the application for post-conviction relief and dismissed the petition. (R. at 114-22.)

Petitioner, through his attorney Lanelle Cantey Durant of the South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, filed a Johnson Petition for Writ of Certiorari on October 23, 2013. (Dkt. No. 20-4.)⁴ Through counsel, Petitioner raised the following issue:

Did the PCR court err in failing to find plea counsel ineffective for not insuring that petitioner's plea was entered freely, voluntarily and knowingly?

(Dkt. No. 20-4 at 3 of 11.) Ms. Durant also filed a petition to be relieved as counsel. (Dkt. No. 20-4 at 10 of 11.)

In an order dated August 21, 2014, the Supreme Court of South Carolina denied the petition for a writ of certiorari and granted counsel's request to withdraw. (Dkt. No. 20-5.)⁵ The matter was remitted to the lower court on September 8, 2014. (Dkt. No. 20-6.)

Petitioner then filed the instant habeas petition, wherein he raised the following grounds for review (verbatim):

Ground One: The state trial court erred in failing to find plea counsel ineffective pursuant to Boykin v. Alabama.

Supporting Facts: Trial counsel's misadvised Petitioner in pleading to the offenses would result in a lesser included offense. (1) The court sentence Petitioner under section 16-3-50; voluntary manslaughter; section 16-11-330(A) armed robbery and section 16-3-1575(B)(1) on testimony of "words alone" without more are not sufficient evidence to sustain a sentence and conviction under the law.

Ground One(A): Ineffective assistance of counsel, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984) and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Lucy v. Evitts, 469 U.S. 396 (1985).⁶

Ground Two: Counsel erred in dissuading Petitioner in entering a involuntary plea: Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).

Ground Three: Was Petitioner prejudiced by counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance under Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52.

Ground Four: Did the court's erred in finding "words alone" are sufficient evidence to support a conviction and sentence under S.C. Code Ann. § 16-1-10?

Ground Five: Did the court's erred in finding "words alone" are sufficient evidence to support a sentence and conviction under S.C. Code Ann. § 16-30-330(A)?

Ground Six: Did the court's erred in finding "words alone" are sufficient evidence to support a sentence and conviction under S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-1075(B)(1)?

(Dkt. No. 1; Dkt. No. 1-1.)

APPLICABLE LAW

Summary Judgment Standard

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment "shall" be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). "Facts are 'material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a 'genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." The News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "'the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor.'" Id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)); see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990).

Habeas Standard of Review

Since the Petitioner filed his petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), review of his claims is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997); Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 618 (4th Cir.1998). Under the AEDPA, federal courts may not grant habeas corpus relief unless the underlying state adjudication:

1. resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

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