Dodge v. Bonners Ferry Police Dep't

• Decision Date: 04 October 2019
• Docket Number: Docket No. 46696
• Citation: 450 P.3d 298,165 Idaho 650
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: Shane R. DODGE and Christine L. Dodge, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BONNERS FERRY POLICE DEPARTMENT, Officer William Cowell and Officer Brandon Blackmore, Defendants-Respondents.

165 Idaho 650

450 P.3d 298

Shane R. DODGE and Christine L. Dodge, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.BONNERS FERRY POLICE DEPARTMENT, Officer William Cowell and Officer Brandon Blackmore, Defendants-Respondents.

Docket No. 46696

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, August 2019 Term.

Opinion Filed: October 4, 2019

Shane and Christine Dodge, pro se appellants.

Lake City Law Group, PLLC, Coeur d'Alene, for respondents.

SUBMITTED ON THE BRIEFS

BURDICK, Chief Justice.

Shane R. and Christine L. Dodge appeal the Boundary County district court's dismissal of their tort claim against the Bonners Ferry Police Department, Sergeant William Cowell, and Officer Brandon Blackmore for failure to file a notice of tort claim pursuant to Idaho Code sections 6-610 et seq. , and for failure to post a bond prior to commencing their cause of action. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On the evening of June 17, 2018, Appellants Shane R. Dodge and his wife Christine L. Dodge ("the Dodges") were returning home with their son after having dinner together, when they turned onto District Two Road and saw a police car partially blocking their lane of travel. At that time, two Bonners Ferry police officers, Sergeant William Cowell and Officer Brandon Blackmore, were conducting a traffic stop of another vehicle. To avoid hitting them, Mr. Dodge drove slowly by the two cars, and then pulled over about four car-lengths away. He exited his car and approached the police officers. He informed them that the location "was a pretty stupid place to pull people over." Sergeant Cowell instructed Mr. Dodge that he could be arrested for obstruction or interfering with the traffic stop, whereupon Mr. Dodge said, "go to hell." Mr. Dodge was then arrested and placed in the back of the patrol car. When she saw her husband being arrested, Mrs. Dodge exited her car and attempted to approach and question the officers. When she asked the officers why they were arresting her husband, Sergeant Cowell told Officer Blackmore to arrest her too, but Officer Blackmore ordered her to leave the scene. Mr. Dodge was taken to the county jail and booked. Thereafter, he posted bond and was released.

On August 27, 2018, the Dodges filed suit against the Bonners Ferry Police Department, Sergeant Cowell, and Officer Blackmore ("Respondents"). The Dodges alleged that on June 17, 2018: Mr. Dodge was arrested without probable cause in violation of Idaho Code section 19-603 ; the officers used excessive force in violation of Idaho Code section 19-610 ; the officers assaulted, battered, and falsely imprisoned Mr. Dodge in violation of Idaho Code sections 18-901(a) and (b), 18-903(a)(b)(c), and 18-2901 ; the officers falsified a police report in violation of Idaho Code section 18-3201 ; and the officers assaulted Mrs. Dodge in violation of Idaho Code section 18-901(a) and (b). On the same day they filed the complaint, the Dodges also filed a motion requesting that the court waive the requirement in Idaho Code section 6-610 that they post a bond before commencing the suit.

On September 24, 2018, Respondents filed an answer, admitting several of the facts alleged by the Dodges but denying that the officers had committed any wrongful act or violated any of the Dodges’ rights.

On December 13, 2018, exactly 180 days after the Dodge's claims arose, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the Dodges failed to file notice of their tort claim or post a bond prior to commencing their suit as required by Idaho Code sections 6-908 and 6-610. Respondents also filed a motion to shorten time, requesting the motion to dismiss be heard on December 20, 2018 the same day several other motions made by the Dodges were scheduled to be heard. The district court granted the motion to shorten time the same day and set the motion to dismiss to be heard on December 20, 2018.

At the hearing, Respondents argued the suit had to be dismissed because the Dodges had failed to comply with the statutory requirements for filing a tort claim against a government entity. The Dodges moved for a continuance so they could review Respondents arguments more fully. The court denied the Dodges’ motion for a continuance, explaining that:

[N]ormally I would grant you a continuance. But I've reviewed the case law and [Respondents’ counsel] and the [Respondents] are absolutely right. If you haven't filed a tort claim, you are — it has to be filed within 180 days of the injury that you're suing over, the claims.

And that 180 days has not been — you can't fix that. So there's no reason to grant you any more time.

The most recent case that I'm aware of in front of me, it's an Idaho Supreme Court case, Allied Bail Bonds versus Kootenai County. It was a First District case involving — that was before Judge Mitchell in Kootenai County, very similar. It had both of these issues.

And the Supreme Court held that complying with the Idaho Tort Claims Act is a mandatory condition to bringing suit. It's fatal to a claim no matter how legitimate the claim may be or might not be.

And so I can't — granting you additional time there's no way — if you haven't filed — if you didn't file the tort claim it wouldn't do us — there's no point ... [U]nless you can tell me that you filed a notice of tort claim, you are prohibited from bringing this lawsuit. It has to be done first.

Accordingly, the district court granted Respondents’ motion to dismiss. The Dodges timely appealed.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether the district court erred in dismissing the Dodges’ case for failure to file notice of their tort claim pursuant to Idaho Code section 6-906.

2. Whether the district court erred by granting Respondents’ motion to shorten time to hear arguments on their motion to dismiss.

3. Whether the district court erred by denying the Dodges a continuance of the hearing on December 20, 2018.

4. Whether the Respondents are entitled to attorneys fees on appeal.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When this Court reviews an order dismissing an action pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), we apply the same standard of review we apply to a motion for summary judgment. After viewing all facts and inferences from the record in favor of the non-moving party, the Court will ask whether a claim for relief has been stated. The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.

Losser v. Bradstreet , 145 Idaho 670, 672–73, 183 P.3d 758, 760–61 (2008) (citations omitted). "[A] district court's dismissal of a complaint under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) shall be reviewed de novo ." Taylor v. McNichols , 149 Idaho 826, 832, 243 P.3d 642, 648 (2010).

"The decision whether to grant a motion to continue is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court." PHH Mortgage v. Nickerson , 160 Idaho 388, 394, 374 P.3d 551, 557 (2016) (citing Everhart v. Washington Cnty. Rd. & Bridge Dep't , 130 Idaho 273, 275, 939 P.2d 849, 851 (1997) ). This Court has also said that a trial court has discretion to grant a motion to shorten time when it finds that good cause exists. Brinkmeyer v. Brinkmeyer , 135 Idaho 596, 601, 21 P.3d 918, 923 (2001) ; Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker , 133 Idaho 1, 6, 981 P.2d 236, 241 (1999).

When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.

Lunneborg v. My Fun Life , 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018) (emphasis in original).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The district court did not err in granting the Respondents’ motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the notice requirement of the Idaho Tort Claims Act.

On appeal, the Dodges argue that the district court erred not only in granting the Respondents’ motion to dismiss for failure to file a notice of tort claim as required by the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), but also that the district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the ITCA's bond requirement. Because we find the failure to file a notice of tort claim dispositive in this case, this Court need not address the bond issue.

The Dodges allege they suffered damages when Sergeant Cowell and Officer Blackmore acted in violation of a number of criminal and procedural statutes. Generally speaking, the ITCA abrogates sovereign immunity and renders governmental entities subject to liability for money damages under specified circumstances.¹ Van v. Portneuf Medical Center, 147 Idaho 552, 557, 212 P.3d 982, 987 (2009) (citing Athay v. Stacey, 146 Idaho 407, 419, 196 P.3d 325, 337 (2008) ). Recognizing that they seek money damages for the alleged harm, the Dodges properly cite to the ITCA as the law that governs their claims.

The ITCA provides that "no claim or action shall be allowed against a governmental entity or its employee unless the claim has been presented and filed within the time limits prescribed by this act." I.C. § 6-908. Section 6-906 of the ITCA proscribes the applicable time limit:

All claims against a political subdivision arising under the provisions of this act and all claims against an employee of a political subdivision for any act or omission of the employee with in the course or scope of h is employment shall be presented to and filed with the clerk or secretary of the political subdivision within one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is later.

I.C. § 6-906.

"The failure to file within the ITCA time limitation acts as a bar to any further action." Cobbley v. City of Challis, 138 Idaho 154, 157, 59 P.3d 959, 962 (2002) (citing McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 113 Idaho 719, 722, 747 P.2d 741,...