Dodson v. Ector Cnty.
| Decision Date | 04 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 11-20-00227-CV |
| Parties | CRYSTAL RENEA DODSON, Appellant v. ECTOR COUNTY, TEXAS, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 358thDistrict Court Ector County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. D-18-08-1183-CV-A
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Williams, J., and Wright, S.C.J [5]
Appellant Crystal Renea Dodson, filed suit against Ector County and former county jailer Alfred John Herrera, asserting causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for common law civil assault and battery. Appellee, Ector County, was only alleged to have violated Appellant's constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court ultimately granted, and the County was dismissed from the primary suit in a final judgment and severance order. Appellant challenges the trial court's ruling in a single issue. We affirm.
Appellant alleged in her petition that she was sexually assaulted in 2016 by Ector County jailer Herrera. Prior to Appellant bringing this civil lawsuit, Herrera pled guilty to two counts of improper sexual activity with a person in custody-with each count involving a different victim. Appellant alleged that Herrera sexually assaulted another inmate prior to his assault of Appellant and that the other inmate informed the Ector County Sheriff's Prison Rape Elimination Office (PREA Office) of the offense. According to Appellant, the County ignored letters from this other inmate, which allowed Herrera the opportunity to sexually assault Appellant.
Appellant pleaded one cause of action against Appellee.[1] Appellant claimed that Appellee was responsible for the assault perpetrated by Herrera and that Appellee's policies, customs, and practices, "caused the deprivation and violation of [Appellant's] constitutional rights and civil rights." Appellant included in her pleading that Appellee's "deliberate indifference and failure to supervise, train and discipline employees" caused the harms she suffered. Appellee filed a combined no-evidence and traditional motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion on both no-evidence and traditional grounds. Appellant filed this appeal challenging the trial court's grant of summary judgment. She alleges in a single issue that the summary judgment evidence created a fact question as to whether Appellee had a custom of ignoring complaints of sexual assault, which caused Appellant's injuries.
We review the trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Lujan v. Navistar, Inc., 555 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2018) (citing Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003)). When the trial court's order does not specify the grounds for its summary judgment, we will affirm it if any of the theories are meritorious. Knott, 128 S.W.3d at 216. Generally, if a party moves for summary judgment on both no-evidence and traditional grounds, we first consider the no-evidence motion. Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, 520 S.W.3d 39, 45 (Tex. 2017).
A no-evidence motion for summary judgment is reviewed under the same legal sufficiency standard as a directed verdict. Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013). Under this standard, the nonmovant has the burden to produce more than a scintilla of evidence to support each challenged element of its claims. Id. Evidence is less than a scintilla if it is "so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion" of a fact. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003) (quoting Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983)). A trial court must grant a motion for no-evidence summary judgment unless the nonmovant produces some evidence "raising a genuine issue of material fact." Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(i); see also Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006).
A party moving for traditional summary judgment bears the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c); Nassar v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 508 S.W.3d 254, 257 (Tex. 2017). For a trial court to grant a traditional summary judgment motion, a defendant must conclusively negate at least one essential element of the cause of action being asserted or conclusively establish each element of an affirmative defense. Sci. Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997). Evidence is conclusive only if reasonable people could not differ in their conclusions. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 816 (Tex. 2005). If the movant initially establishes a right to summary judgment on the issues expressly presented in the motion, then the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present to the trial court any issues or evidence that would preclude summary judgment. See City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678-79 (Tex. 1979).
In reviewing both traditional and no-evidence summary judgments, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmovant and resolving any doubts against the movant. Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 248; Wilson, 168 S.W.3d at 824.
In her sole issue, Appellant alleges that the trial court erred in granting both motions for summary judgment because Appellant satisfied the requirements laid out by the United States Supreme Court in Monell. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
The Monell test is used to determine local government liability when a § 1983[2]violation has been alleged. See id. "[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents." Id. at 694. It "cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Id. at 691. However, if the execution of a local government's policy or custom, either "made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent an official policy, is what inflicted the injury, the government as an entity shall be responsible under § 1983." Id. at 694. As used, a "policy" is "a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." Id. at 690. A "custom" is a "persistent and widespread" practice, though not officially adopted. Id. at 691. The custom must be "so widespread as to have the force of law," and so "well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents [the governmental entity's] policy." Escobar v. Harris Cty., 442 S.W.3d 621, 639 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) . "In other words, there must be 'sufficient instances of tolerant awareness by supervisors of abusive conduct to support an inference that they had a policy, custom or usage of acquiescence in such abuse.'" Lucente v. Cty. of Suffolk, 980 F.3d 284, 298 (2d Cir. 2020) (emphasis added) (quoting Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 2012)). Official policies, longstanding and accepted practices, or actions taken by a policymaking authority may all be used to show official government policy or custom. Harris Cty. v. Coats, 607 S.W.3d 359, 373 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.). Ordinarily, a customary local government policy may not be inferred from a single constitutional violation. Escobar, 442 S.W.3d at 639. As a result, "[i]solated unconstitutional actions by local government employees will almost never trigger employer liability." Coats, 607 S.W.3d at 373 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001)).
To establish local government liability under § 1983, the claimant must prove each of three critical elements. Coats, 607 S.W.3d at 373; see also Culbertson v. Lykos, 790 F.3d 608, 628 (5th Cir. 2015); Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). The evidence must show: (1) a policymaker, (2) an official policy or custom, and (3) a violation of a constitutional right whose "moving force" is the policy or custom. Escobar, 442 S.W.3d at 638 (quoting Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578). When a local government official follows or executes an unconstitutional municipal policy and thereby causes injury, § 1983 municipal liability may result. Coats, 607 S.W.3d at 373. However, when a local government official causes injury by violating a person's constitutional rights, but does so contrary to a constitutional policy, the governmental entity is rarely liable under § 1983-if ever. Id.
Appellant alleged in the broadest terms that Ector County's policies, customs, and practices provided inadequate supervision, training, and discipline of employees. According to Appellant, these deficient policies and customs caused the violation of Appellant's constitutional rights, a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Appellee asserted in its motion for summary judgment that there was no evidence of any official policy, custom, or practice on the part of Appellee upon which liability may arise under § 1983.
We first address the no-evidence basis for summary judgment. See Lightning Oil Co., 520 S.W.3d at 45. In response to Appellee's no-evidence motion for summary judgment, it is critical that Appellant have provided summary judgment evidence of incidents that permit an inference of a known and accepted practice or custom. Evidence merely showing a deviation by a governmental employee "fail[s] to raise a genuine issue of...
To continue reading
Request your trial