Doe, Matter of

Decision Date03 June 1997
Docket NumberNo. COA97-323,COA97-323
Citation485 S.E.2d 354,126 N.C.App. 401
CourtNorth Carolina Court of Appeals
PartiesIn the Matter of .Jane DOE, Petitioner

Donald E. Gillespie, Jr., Greensboro, and Deborah K. Ross, Raleigh, for minor petitioner.

PER CURIAM.

On 17 March 1997, minor petitioner filed an appeal to this Court after her Petition for Waiver of Parental Consent for Minor's Abortion was denied upon an appeal for trial de novo in superior court. On 21 March 1997, this Court entered an abbreviated order reversing the superior court and ordering a waiver of the parental consent requirement. This memorandum opinion in support of the order is filed by the senior judges of this Court as an aid to the courts and attorneys participating in cases filed pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 90-21.6, et seq. (Cum.Supp.1996).

In the case below, minor Jane Doe, pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 90-21.8, sought judicial waiver of the parental consent requirement of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 90-21.7 to have an abortion. In accordance with the statute, a hearing was held in district court. Waiver was denied. Doe appealed for a hearing de novo in superior court. The matter came on for hearing on 11 March 1997, and the superior court entered an order denying the petition for waiver on 13 March 1997.

The evidence and the findings show that the sixteen-year-old petitioner is mature; that she does well in school, participates in extracurricular activities, and has a part-time job; and that she has been informed about the procedures involved in an abortion and the consequences thereof, including the possibility of death, and has been informed about alternatives to abortion including raising the child herself or giving the child up for adoption. The court found, and the evidence shows, that the petitioner is a junior in high school and would ultimately like to attend a four-year college and perhaps law school thereafter. The court found that petitioner believes that she does not have the financial resources to pay for the birth and subsequent care of the child and that she is not ready, emotionally or financially, to care for a newborn child. Petitioner further believes that her parents, who are divorced, would not provide emotional or financial support during the pregnancy or subsequent birth of the child. Petitioner testified that her parents have previously indicated that they do not approve of and are opposed to abortion and that she believes that her parents, if informed, would not consent to an abortion. The court made findings consistent with petitioner's testimony and did not find that petitioner was lacking credibility. Despite these findings based on the evidence, the superior court concluded that the petitioner minor was not "well-informed enough" to make the abortion decision on her own. Doe appealed to this Court.

We first address whether there is a right of direct appeal from a superior court judge's refusal to grant a parental waiver to have an abortion. We are convinced that no appeal of right lies to this Court from an order of the superior court entered pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 90-21.8(h) and that the exclusive appeal remedy, available as of right, is the appeal from the district court to the superior court. We reach this conclusion based on the plain language of the statute, the legislative history of House Bill 481, and our examination of relevant case law.

The pertinent part of the statute at issue provides:

(d) Court proceedings under this section shall be confidential and shall be given precedence over other pending matters necessary to ensure that the court may reach a decision promptly. In no case shall the court fail to rule within seven days of the time of filing the application.... At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence relating to the emotional development, maturity, intellect, and understanding of the minor; the nature, possible consequences, and alternatives to the abortion; and any other evidence that the court may find useful in determining whether the parental consent requirement shall be waived.

(e) The parental consent requirement shall be waived if the court finds:

(1) That the minor is mature and well informed enough to make the abortion decision on her own; or

(2) That it would be in the minor's best interests that parental consent not be required; or

(3) That the minor is a victim of rape or of felonious incest under G.S. 14-178.

(f) The court shall make written findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting its decision....

* * * * * *

(h) The minor may appeal an order issued in accordance with this section. The appeal shall be a de novo hearing in superior court. The notice of appeal shall be filed within 24 hours from the date of issuance of the district court order. The de novo hearing ... shall be held as soon as possible within seven days of the filing of the notice of appeal. The record of the de novo hearing is a confidential record and shall not be open for general public inspection. (Emphasis added.)

N.C. Gen.Stat. § 90-21.8.

The plain language of the statute provides for appeal to superior court and nothing more. The statutory language, "de novo," prescribes the standard of review on appeal in superior court. The statute simply does not provide for appeal to the appellate division.

We find support for this reading of the statute in the legislative history of House Bill 481. The original version of the bill provided for appellate review at the appellate division however, that language was taken out before the bill was enacted. We can infer that the legislative intent was not to provide for direct appeal to the appellate division.

We also note that the "Rules for Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. 90-21.8(h)," adopted by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina on 1 October 1995, do not mention an automatic right of appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Rules provide detailed instructions for the proceedings in district court and superior court. For review beyond superior court, Rule 9 provides: "Appeal Transcript. In the event the minor should seek appellate review of the order of the Superior Court, the presiding judge shall immediately order that a transcript of the proceedings be prepared at State expense." Rules For Appeal Pursuant To N.C. Gen.Stat. § 90-21.8(h). "Appellate review" is not synonymous with "automatic right of appeal." Appellate review can be established by means other than by right of appeal. In N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A-1422(c)(3) (1988), for example, appellate review of the denial of certain motions for appropriate relief is by writ of certiorari.

In reviewing the case law, we find the United States Supreme Court has established that a state may require a minor to obtain the consent of a parent as a prerequisite to obtaining an abortion, provided there is an adequate judicial bypass mechanism. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). A judicial bypass mechanism, however, is unconstitutional if it unduly burdens the right of a woman to choose to terminate her pregnancy. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 61 L.Ed.2d 797, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887, 100 S.Ct. 185, 62 L.Ed.2d 121 (1979). An undue burden exists if the effect of a provision of the law places a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus obtains viability. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674. A judicial alternative to parental consent for a minor's abortion "must assure that a resolution of the issue, and any appeals that may follow, will be completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained." Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 644, 99 S.Ct. at 3048, 61 L.Ed.2d at 814. This assurance exists if N.C. Gen.Stat. § 90-21.8 is interpreted as establishing appeal to the superior court as the exclusive appeal available as of right.

Finally, we do not believe the general statutory provision providing for direct appeal to this Court, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7A-27(b)(1995), is applicable here. As noted previously, the General Assembly struck language providing for appeal to this Court before ratifying House Bill 481. We read that action as manifesting an intent to preclude appeal under the provisions of § 7A-27(b).

Although no appeal of right lies to this Court, the minor may petition this Court for a writ of...

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5 cases
  • Manning v. Hunt
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • July 11, 1997
    ...but may petition for a writ of certiorari, which the appellate courts must review promptly under standard procedures. In re Doe, 485 S.E.2d 354, 357 (N.C. Ct.App.1997). Any person who, with knowledge or with reckless disregard as to whether the patient is an unemancipated minor, intentional......
  • In re Jane Doe
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • February 25, 2000
    ... ... It should also go without saying that a minor's socio-economic status should not bear on the decision ...         As discussed earlier in this opinion, the standard of review is legal sufficiency. Thus, unless Jane Doe has shown as a matter of law that she is mature and sufficiently well informed, we would ordinarily affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. After reviewing this record, we conclude that she has not established as a matter of law that she is sufficiently well informed to make the decision to have an abortion ... ...
  • RB ex rel. VD v. State, No. 2001-CA-00361-SCT.
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • July 19, 2001
    ... 790 So.2d 830 In the Matter of R.B., A Minor, by and Through Her Next Friend, V.D., ... STATE of Mississippi ... No. 2001-CA-00361-SCT ... Supreme Court of Mississippi ... See, e.g., Ex parte Anonymous, 664 So.2d 882 (Ala.1995) ; In re T.P., 475 N.E.2d 312, 315 (Ind.1985) ; In re Doe, 126 N.C.App. 401, 485 S.E.2d 354, 358 (1997) ; In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 249, 255-57 (Tex.2000) ; In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 346, 360 (Tex.2000) ... ...
  • In re Doe
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • April 5, 2006
    ... ... See Dep't of State, Div. of Elections v. Martin, 885 So.2d 453, 455 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Racetrac Petroleum, Inc. v. Delco Oil, Inc., 721 So.2d 376 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (stating that "judicial interpretation of Florida statutes is a purely legal matter and therefore subject to de novo review"). The ... circuit court improperly held Doe to the standard of a fully-grown adult, quoting Webster's definition of a mature person as one "fully developed in body and mind." The statute does not require Doe to prove that she has the maturity of an adult ... ...
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