Doe v. Coughlin

• Decision Date: 24 November 1987
• Citation: 518 N.E.2d 536,523 N.Y.S.2d 782,71 N.Y.2d 48
• Parties: , 518 N.E.2d 536, 56 USLW 2330 In the Matter of John DOE et al., Appellants, v. Thomas A. COUGHLIN, III, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Correctional Services, et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 782

523 N.Y.S.2d 782

71 N.Y.2d 48, 518 N.E.2d 536, 56 USLW 2330

In the Matter of John DOE et al., Appellants, v. Thomas A. COUGHLIN, III, as Commissioner of the New York

State Department of Correctional Services, et al.,

Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 24, 1987.

Deborah Schneer, Robert Selcov, Poughkeepsie, David C. Leven, New York City, and Maurie G. Heins, Syracuse, for appellants.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. (Frank K. Walsh, O. Peter Sherwood and Peter H. Schiff, Albany, of counsel), for respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SIMONS, Judge.

Petitioners John and Jane Doe were married June 6, 1985. At the time, John Doe was an inmate of the Auburn Correctional Facility serving a 5 1/2- to 11-year indeterminate sentence. In October 1985 he qualified for participation in the Family Reunion Program and petitioners subsequently were afforded a two-day conjugal visit in a trailer on prison grounds. In December 1985 John Doe was diagnosed as suffering from Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and respondents, various correction officials, denied petitioners further conjugal visits. Petitioners contend respondents' ruling violated their State and Federal constitutional rights, was arbitrary and capricious and unlawfully discriminated against John Doe on the basis of his handicap, contrary to provisions of the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794).

I

The Family Reunion Program allows selected inmates to spend a period of days with their spouses or various enumerated relatives in a private trailer located within the prison complex but outside the main prison buildings. Its purpose is to "preserve, enhance and strengthen family ties that have been disrupted as a result of incarceration", thereby enabling inmates to adjust to society more easily when released from prison (7 NYCRR 220.1). The program is not available at all correctional facilities but in those where it is, approval by the administrator is required for each visit and participation is governed by the regulations issued by the Department of Correctional Services (see, 7 NYCRR 220.1 et seq.). Under these regulations, an applicant who has a diagnosed communicable disease may be disqualified from participating in the program unless found eligible after special review (7 NYCRR 220.3[c] [8] ).

In December 1985, upon discovering John Doe had AIDS, correction officials transferred him to the prison hospital. His wife continued to visit him there and in February 1986 John Doe submitted another application seeking permission to participate in the Family Reunion Program. His application was denied and the denial was upheld on administrative appeal on the ground that John Doe had been diagnosed "as having a communicable disease". Although petitioners acknowledge the nature of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome and recognize its dangers, they deny it is a "communicable disease" or that their participation in the Family Reunion Program may reasonably be denied because John Doe is afflicted with it. Accordingly, they commenced this article 78 proceeding in the nature of mandamus to review the Correction Department's ruling and also to obtain declaratory relief. Supreme Court declared petitioners' rights had not been violated and therefore dismissed their petition. The Appellate Division, 125 A.D.2d 783, 509 N.Y.S.2d 209, affirmed and we granted petitioners leave to appeal. We now affirm.

II

Preliminarily, we note that petitioners' attorney informed the court at oral argument that after this appeal had been perfected John Doe was transferred to the Midstate Correctional Facility at Marcy--an institution which has not established a Family Reunion Program. Petitioners' counsel nevertheless maintains this transfer did not render the appeal moot. We agree. Although petitioners sought an order compelling respondents to permit conjugal visits, relief that cannot be granted at Midstate Correctional Facility, they also sought a declaration of their rights. John Doe remains incarcerated within the correctional system and his particular location is a matter subject to the Commissioner's broad discretion (see, Correction Law § 23; Matter of Johnson v. Ward, 64 A.D.2d 186, 188, 409 N.Y.S.2d 670). That being so, petitioners have a continuing interest in the litigation because John Doe may be transferred in the future to a facility which has established a Family Reunion Program. Thus, the litigation remains adversarial and "the differences between [petitioners] and [respondents] give rise to a 'justiciable controversy' for which a declaratory judgment would be an appropriate remedy" (East Meadow Community Concerts Assn. v. Board of Educ., 18 N.Y.2d 129, 135, 272 N.Y.S.2d 341, 219 N.E.2d 172; see also, Cohen and Karger, Powers of the New York Court of Appeals § 98, at 417-418 [rev ed.] ).

III

A

Petitioners advance three constitutional claims: that respondents denied petitioners their fundamental right to marital privacy, that they denied them due process of law, and that they denied them equal protection of the laws.

The right to privacy, in constitutional terms, involves freedom of choice, the broad, general right to make decisions concerning oneself and to conduct oneself in accordance with those decisions free of governmental restraint or interference (see, People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 485, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 415 N.E.2d 936; 2 Rotunda-Nowak-Young, Constitutional Law, Substance and Procedure § 18.26 et seq.). This "right to be let alone" has been called the "most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men" (Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S.Ct. 564, 572, 72 L.Ed. 944 [Brandeis, J., dissenting] ). Among the decisions protected by the right to privacy, are those relating to marriage (Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510); procreation (Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655); contraception (Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349; Griswold v. Connecticut, supra ) and personal contact (Cooper v. Morin, 49 N.Y.2d 69, 424 N.Y.S.2d 168, 399 N.E.2d 1188, cert. denied sub nom. Lombard v. Cooper 446 U.S. 984, 100 S.Ct. 2965, 64 L.Ed.2d 840 [contact visits, as distinguished from conjugal visits, for pretrial detainees]; see generally, 2 Rotunda-Nowak-Young, Constitutional Law, Substance and Procedure §§ 15.7 [as to fundamental rights generally], 18.30 [a] [as to the right to engage in sexual acts] ).

An individual does not automatically forfeit all constitutional rights upon conviction of a crime. The courts have recognized, for example, that even those confined to a correctional facility retain rights to freedom of speech (Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495) and freedom of religion (Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263; Matter of Rivera v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 501, 483 N.Y.S.2d 187, 472 N.E.2d 1015); the right to petition the government for redress of grievances, which includes access to courts (Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718); that they are protected against invidious discrimination (Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 88 S.Ct. 994, 19 L.Ed.2d 1212); and that they may claim protection of the Due Process Clause to prevent additional deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law (Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935). Relevant to this appeal, the Supreme Court has recently held that inmates retain some privacy rights, specifically the right of an inmate serving less than a life sentence to marry (see, Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64, supra; cf., Johnson v. Rockefeller, 365 F.Supp. 377, affd. sub nom. Butler v. Wilson, 415 U.S. 953, 94 S.Ct. 1479, 39 L.Ed.2d 569; and Matter of Fitzpatrick v. Smith, 90 A.D.2d 974, 456 N.Y.S.2d 902, affd. 59 N.Y.2d 916, 466 N.Y.S.2d 318, 453 N.E.2d 547 [both holding Civil Rights Law § 79-a constitutional] ).

Nevertheless, an inmate is constitutionally deprived of his liberty upon conviction and sentence of imprisonment, and his rights are necessarily limited by the realities of confinement and by the legitimate goals and policies of the correctional system (O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2404, 96 L.Ed.2d 282; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1877, 60 L.Ed.2d 447). As a general proposition, an inmate retains only those rights which "are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system" (Pell v. Procunier, supra, 417 U.S., at 822, 94 S.Ct., at 2804; see also, Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S., at ----, 107 S.Ct., at 2261, supra; Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3199, 82 L.Ed.2d 393; Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 2538, 53 L.Ed.2d 629; Matter of Rivera v. Smith, supra, 63 N.Y.2d at 510, 483 N.Y.S.2d 187, 472 N.E.2d 1015). Traditionally, intimate marital relations have been deemed inconsistent with incarceration because the very purpose of confinement is to remove the prisoner from society for punishment and to serve valid governmental interests of security, deterrence and rehabilitation. Inasmuch as these interests can be furthered by denying intimate contact during the period of incarceration courts have uniformly concluded that neither a prisoner nor his spouse has a right to intimate marital relations during a prisoner's confinement and that the State is under no obligation to establish conjugal visitation programs (see, Matter of Mary of Oakknoll v. Coughlin, 101 A.D.2d 931, 475 N.Y.S.2d 644; In re Cummings, 30 Cal.3d 870, 180 Cal.Rptr. 826, 640 P.2d 1101; McGinnis v. Stevens, 543 P.2d 1221, 1237-1238 [Alaska]; see also, Polakoff...