Doe v. Doe (In re Doe)
| Docket Number | 50679 |
| Decision Date | 31 August 2023 |
| Parties | In the Matter of: Jane Doe II, A Child Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age. v. JANE DOE (2023-14), Respondent-Appellant. JANE DOE I and JOHN DOE I, Petitioners-Respondents, |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, Canyon County. Hon Courtnie R. Tucker, Magistrate.
Judgment terminating Doe's parental rights, affirmed.
Aaron Bazzoli, Canyon County Public Defender; Alex W. Brockman Deputy Public Defender, Caldwell, for appellant.
Thomas Humphrey; Boise, for respondents.
Jane Doe appeals from the magistrate court's judgment terminating her parental rights. Doe alleges the magistrate court erred in finding a statutory basis for terminating her parental rights and that termination is in the best interests of the child. Because substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate court's findings, the judgment terminating Doe's parental rights is affirmed.
Doe is the biological mother of Jane Doe II (Jane). In May 2016 Jane and her half-sister[1]were removed from Doe's care based on allegations of physical abuse. Jane was placed with Jane Doe I and John Doe I (Guardians).
Jane was returned to Doe's custody in November 2016. Approximately six months later, Jane was returned to the care of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (Department) and Doe called Guardians to see if they would again be foster parents for Jane; Guardians agreed. From October 2017 until January 2018, Jane was moved to a temporary foster home but returned to Guardians' care in January 2018 where she has remained. Guardians encouraged and allowed Doe to visit Jane, but Jane's behavior would become dysregulated after the visits.
In May 2019, a permanency hearing was held. The Department recommended termination of Doe's parental rights and adoption. Instead, the magistrate court ordered a permanent guardianship with Guardians. Guardians wanted to continue to facilitate visitation between Doe and Jane, so with the help of Jane's counselor, Guardians drafted a visitation agreement (agreement) for Doe that created tiers of communication between Doe and Jane. The tiered structure was designed to protect Jane from Doe's erratic and often inappropriate communication. The agreement included Guardians' mailing address and contact information for Jane's counselor. Once each tier was completed, Doe would move to the next tier of communication. The tiers began with letters, then phone calls, then video phone calls, and then in-person visitation. Each tier required weekly contact and lasted one month. For example, if Doe provided weekly letters to Jane for one month, then the next month, Doe could have telephone contact with Jane. The agreement contained provisions limiting the kind of topics that Doe could discuss with Jane and provided parameters for Doe's behavior. Although Doe initially refused to sign the agreement, she eventually signed it and returned it to Guardians in August of 2019.
When Doe mailed the signed agreement to Guardians, Doe also included a birthday card for Jane. That was the first and last communication Doe had with Jane for the duration of the case. Although Doe asked Guardians if she could send electronic messages to Jane, Guardians declined to permit that contact, reasoning that it would be better for Jane to have a physical document like a letter or card. Although Doe sent approximately two text messages to Guardians regarding Jane, Guardians declined to share those text messages with Jane because Doe had not complied with the signed visitation agreement. Because Doe never completed the first tier of the communication agreement, contact between Doe and Jane essentially ceased in 2019.
As a result of the lack of contact, Guardians filed a petition to terminate Doe's parental rights and adopt Jane. After a hearing, the magistrate court found two different statutory bases to terminate Doe's parental rights. First, the magistrate court found Doe abandoned Jane. Second, the magistrate court found Doe neglected Jane by failing to provide proper parental care and control. The magistrate court then concluded that terminating Doe's parental rights is in Jane's best interests and terminated Doe's parental rights to Jane. Doe appeals.
On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243, 245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court's judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also said that the substantial evidence test requires a greater quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court's finding must be supported by clear and convincing evidence than in cases where a mere preponderance is required. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. Roe v. Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Further, the magistrate court's decision must be supported by objectively supportable grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600.
Doe alleges the magistrate court erred in terminating her parental rights to the child. Specifically, Doe argues the magistrate court's findings that she abandoned Jane, that she neglected Jane, and that termination of her parental rights is in the best interests of the child are not supported by substantial and competent evidence. In response, Guardians contend the magistrate court did not err.
A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with her child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341, 343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible, family life should be strengthened and preserved. I.C. § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of due process must be met when terminating the parent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383, 386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminating a parent-child relationship be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because a fundamental liberty interest is at stake, the United States Supreme Court has determined that a court may terminate a parent-child relationship only if that decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); see also I.C. § 16-2009; Doe v. Dep't of Health &Welfare, 146 Idaho 759, 761-62, 203 P.3d 689, 691-92 (2009); Doe, 143 Idaho at 386, 146 P.3d at 652.
Idaho Code § 16-2005 permits a party to petition the court for termination of the parentchild relationship when it is in the child's best interests and any one of the following five factors exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between the child and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities for a prolonged period that will be injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or (e) the parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time. Each statutory ground is an independent basis for termination. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 1117.
The magistrate court found two statutory bases for termination of Doe's parental rights to the child. First, the magistrate court found that Doe abandoned Jane because Doe willfully failed to maintain a normal parent-child relationship with Jane. Second, the magistrate court concluded Doe neglected Jane by failing to provide her with proper parental care and control necessary for her well-being. These findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence.
One of the five bases for termination is abandonment. I.C. § 16-2005(1)(a). Section 162002(5) defines the term "abandoned" as the willful failure to maintain a normal parental relationship, including, but not limited to, reasonable support or regular personal contact. "No hard-and-fast rule controls the question of whether a parent has abandoned his or her child; instead, '[e]ach case must be decided on its own particular facts.'" In re Adoption of Doe, 143 Idaho at 191, 141 P.3d at 1060 (quoting Crum v. Dep't of Health &Welfare, 111 Idaho 407, 409, 725 P.2d 112, 114 (1986)). A petitioner bears the burden of persuasion to show by clear and convincing evidence that the parent abandoned the child, which "includes a showing that the defendant parent is without just cause for not maintaining a normal relationship." Id. at 192, 141 P.3d at 1061. "The key issue regarding willfulness is whether the parent is capable of maintaining a normal relationship with the child." Doe v. Doe, 155 Idaho 505, 508, 314 P.3d 187, 190 (2018).
If the petitioner meets his burden, the parent must present evidence that there is just cause for the failure to maintain the parental relationship. Id. at 510, 314 P.3d at 192. "If the trier of fact finds that there are no valid defenses or 'just causes,' then the...
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