State v. Doe

• Decision Date: 29 September 2006
• Docket Number: No. 32240.,32240.
• Citation: 146 P.3d 649,143 Idaho 383
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John DOE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

146 P.3d 649

143 Idaho 383

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John DOE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 32240.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Moscow, August 2006 Term.

September 29, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Tevis W. Hull, Sandpoint, argued for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Jason B. Siems, Deputy Attorney General, argued.

BURDICK, Justice.

John Doe appeals from a district court order affirming the magistrate's order terminating the parent-child relationship between him and his daughters. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1990, Doe met and married S.R. At that time Doe had two sons from a previous relationship, and S.R. had a daughter, A.R., from her previous marriage. After Doe and S.R. married, A.R.'s biological father, T.O., voluntarily terminated his parental rights to A.R., and Doe adopted the young girl. T.O., however, maintained contact with A.R. Doe and S.R. also had a daughter together, C.R., born shortly before Doe adopted A.R.

Doe, S.R., A.R., and C.R. lived together as a family until S.R. died under suspicious circumstances on February 10 or 11, 2002. Doe was charged with homicide for S.R.'s death, although the charges were later dismissed. While investigating S.R.'s death, law enforcement officials uncovered evidence that Doe had sexually molested his adopted daughter, A.R. It was also alleged that Doe had groped his wife's then eleven year-old sister shortly after he and S.R. married and while the sister was staying with them. Subsequently, Doe was charged with two counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor under sixteen for his conduct with A.R. and S.R.'s sister. However, at a preliminary hearing Doe pleaded guilty to lewd and lascivious conduct with A.R. in exchange for the state dismissing the second charge. At that hearing the magistrate advised Doe of his rights, the exact nature of the charges against him and the maximum penalty he could face. Doe then entered a guilty plea and signed an acknowledgement and waiver of rights. Nevertheless, Doe moved to change his guilty plea, but the district court denied this motion and later sentenced Doe to ten years to life in prison.

During this time, A.R. and C.R. were in the state's custody. Eventually, A.R. was placed with T.O. and his family in Oregon, and C.R. went to live with her maternal great-aunt, C.L., and her family in Utah. After Doe's incarceration the state filed a petition for termination. Following a two-day trial in which the magistrate heard the testimony of several witnesses and took judicial notice of many documents and the criminal proceedings regarding Doe's sexual abuse of A.R., the magistrate issued an order terminating Doe's parental rights to both A.R. and C.R. Doe appealed this order to district court, which affirmed the magistrate's termination order. It is from this decision that Doe timely appeals the order terminating his parental rights as to C.R. only.

II. ANALYSIS

Doe raises two separate issues in his appeal. First, he argues that the magistrate's decision to terminate his parental rights to C.R. was based on an incorrect view of the evidence. Second, he asks that this Court disregard certain statements in the record. We turn first to Doe's evidentiary arguments because the decision whether to exclude evidence affects our analysis of the magistrate's termination order.

A. Evidentiary Issues

As a preliminary matter, Doe requests that this Court disregard any hearsay statements made by A.R., CeCe, Ann Smith and C.W. (A.R.'s friend who also alleges that Doe sexually abused her). However, Doe fails to explain which specific statements should be excluded from the Court's consideration and also fails to explain the basis on which these statements should be excluded. It is well settled that this Court will not consider any issue when a party fails to support it with argument or authority. Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 187, 75 P.3d 743, 748 (2003). Moreover, at oral argument counsel for Doe waived these arguments. Therefore, this Court will not consider Doe's request to exclude any statements made by A.R., CeCe, Ann Smith or C.W.

B. Did the magistrate err in terminating the parent-child relationship between Doe and C.R.?

The underlying action comes to this Court pursuant to a petition filed under Title 16, chapter 20 of the Idaho Code, which provides for the termination of parent-child relationships on either a voluntary or an involuntary basis. "Implicit in [the Termination of Parent and Child Relationship] act is the philosophy that wherever possible family life should be strengthened and preserved...." I.C. § 16-2001. Additionally, the explicit purpose of this act is to promote the welfare of both parents and children. Id.

In Idaho the state may petition the court for termination of the parent-child relationship when it is in the parent's and child's best interest. I.C. § 16-2005(e) (2002).¹ However, "[a] parent's right to custody, care and control of his or her child is a fundamental liberty right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment[,]" In re Bush, 113 Idaho 873, 875, 749 P.2d 492, 494 (1988), which includes the right to maintain a familial relationship with the child, In re Baby Doe, 130 Idaho 47, 50, 936 P.2d 690, 693 (Ct.App.1997). Therefore, when the State intervenes to terminate the parent-child relationship the requisites of due process must be met. Baby Doe, 130 Idaho at 50, 936 P.2d at 693. This necessitates the State proving the grounds for terminating a parent-child relationship by clear and convincing evidence, Bush, 113 Idaho at 876, 749 P.2d at 495, and also requires this Court on appeal to determine if the magistrate's decision was supported by substantial and competent evidence, Doe I v. Doe, 138 Idaho 893, 900, 71 P.3d 1040, 1047 (2003). Substantial, competent evidence is "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Folks v. Moscow School Dist. No. 281, 129 Idaho 833, 836, 933 P.2d 642, 645 (1997).

"Where ... the issues before the appellate court are the same as those considered by the district court sitting in an appellate capacity, the appellate court will review the trial record with due regard for, but independently from the district court's decision." Doe v. Roe, 133 Idaho 805, 807-08, 992 P.2d 1205, 1207-08 (1999) (quoting Doe v. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare, 122 Idaho 644, 645, 837 P.2d 319, 320 (Ct.App.1992)). We conduct an independent review of the record that was before the magistrate court, Roe Family Servs. v. Doe, 139 Idaho 930, 934, 88 P.3d 749, 753 (2004), in order to determine whether the magistrate's decision was supported by "objectively supportable grounds." Doe v. Roe, 142 Idaho 594, 599, 130 P.3d 1132, 1137 (2006).

Here, the state argued that Doe's parental rights to C.R. should be terminated based on I.C. § 16-2005(a), (b), (e), and (h)(3) (2002). CASA argued that I.C. § 16-2005(d) was also applicable. However, the magistrate determined that only I.C. § 16-2005(e) provided the basis for termination of Doe's parental rights to C.R. Subsection (e) governs the assortment of indeterminate parent-child issues and is distinct from the explicit categories that precede it. Hofmeister v. Bauer, 110 Idaho 960, 962, 719 P.2d 1220, 1222 (Ct. App.1986). "[Idaho Code 16-2005(e)] stands alone in mandating that the parent's best interests be served by termination. The other categories, predicated upon particular conduct or status of the parent, do not impose this requirement. The categories are independent." Id. Therefore, we will examine whether termination was in the best interest of the child, C.R., before turning to whether it was in the best interest of the father, Doe.

1. C.R.'s Best Interest

After determining that other subsections of I.C. § 16-2005 could not provide the basis for termination, the magistrate determined termination would be in C.R.'s best interest under I.C. § 16-2005(e). He wrote:

[T]he benefits of termination to [C.R.] are many. Among those benefits are public financial benefits (money) that [C.R.] would be entitled to receive upon her anticipated adoption by [C.L. and her husband]. Mike Starnes [C.R.'s case worker] testified that there are public funding benefits through Health and Welfare that are only available to children who've been legally adopted. Since [Doe] will be in prison for at least the next nine and one half years, he will be unable to provide any significant financial support for [C.R.] if his parental rights are left intact. The Court also finds that [C.R.] would benefit from a sense of finality and comparative normalcy and permanency following termination and adoption by [C.L. and her husband]. [C.R.] would then have her "parents" with her in her home rather than having to think of her father as being in prison in another state. While the chances of it occurring seem very remote, [Doe's] pending appeal leaves open the possibility that he could be released and have standing to request contact with [C.R.] if his parental status were still intact. As discussed, [Doe] is a child molester dwelling in denial and refusing treatment for his personal issues. As such, he represents an unacceptable risk to children, including [C.R.]. The fact that he hasn't yet molested [C.R.] is almost certainly the result of her comparative age to [A.R.], and not any indication of [Doe's] ability to control his deviant sexual impulses. The Court having considered the benefits and detriments inherent in terminating [Doe's] parental rights, it is the Court's finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in [C.R.'s] best interest.

Doe contends the magistrate erred in the decision that termination was in C.R.'s best interest because the trial court: (1) failed to "acknowledge that there had been no issue of abuse, poor parenting or abandonment" of C.R.; (2) failed to recognize that the State perpetrated abuse on C.R....