Doe v. Eagle-Union Community School Corp.

• Decision Date: 30 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. IP 98-1294-C-B/S,IP 98-1294-C-B/S
• Citation: 101 F.Supp.2d 707
• Parties: DOE, John a Minor in his own right, Doe, Robert, Doe, Mary John Doe's Parents each in their own right, Doe, John a minor By and Through Robert Doe and Mary Doe John Doe's Parents, Plaintiffs, v. EAGLE-UNION COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORPORATION, dismissed per entry of 12/18/98, Wingerter, Robert in his Official Capacities as Eagle-Union Community School Corporation Board Member and Board President, Cravens, Jon in his Official Capacities as Eagle-Union Community School Corporation Board Member and Board Secretary, Curtis, Charles in his Official Capacity as Eagle-Union Community School Corporation Board Member, Krupowicz, James in his Official Capacity as Eagle-Union Community School Corporation Board Member, Roeder, Paula in her Official Capacity as Eagle-Union Community School Corporation Board Member, Hull, Howard in his Official Capacity as Eagle-Union Community School Corporation Superintendent, Armstrong, Teran in her Professional and Individual Capacities, Tillett, Nancy in her Professional and Individual Capacities, The State of Indiana, Reed, Sue Ellen in her Official Capacity as Superintendent of The Indiana Department of Education, Special Education Appeal Board, Dewes, Cynthia in her Official Capacity as Chairman and Member of The Indiana Board of Special Education Appeals, Terrien, Richard L. in his Official Capacity as Indiana Board of Special Education Appeals Member, Quisten, Raymond in his Official Capacity as Indiana Board of Special Education Appeals Member, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

Page 707

101 F.Supp.2d 707

DOE, John a Minor in his own right, Doe, Robert, Doe, Mary John Doe's Parents each in their own right, Doe, John a minor By and Through Robert Doe and Mary Doe John Doe's Parents, Plaintiffs, v. EAGLE-UNION COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORPORATION, dismissed per entry of 12/18/98, Wingerter, Robert in his Official Capacities as Eagle-Union Community School Corporation Board Member and Board President, Cravens, Jon in his Official Capacities as Eagle-Union Community School Corporation Board Member and Board Secretary, Curtis, Charles in his Official Capacity as Eagle-Union Community School Corporation Board Member, Krupowicz, James in his Official Capacity as Eagle-Union Community School Corporation Board Member, Roeder, Paula in her Official Capacity as Eagle-Union Community School Corporation Board Member, Hull, Howard in his Official Capacity as Eagle-Union Community School Corporation Superintendent, Armstrong, Teran in her Professional and Individual Capacities, Tillett, Nancy in her Professional and Individual Capacities, The State of Indiana, Reed, Sue Ellen in her Official Capacity as Superintendent of The Indiana Department of Education, Special Education Appeal Board, Dewes, Cynthia in her Official Capacity as Chairman and Member of The Indiana Board of Special Education Appeals, Terrien, Richard L. in his Official Capacity as Indiana Board of Special Education Appeals Member, Quisten, Raymond in his Official Capacity as Indiana Board of Special Education Appeals Member, Defendants.

No. IP 98-1294-C-B/S

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

March 30, 2000.

Jack G. Hittle, Church Church Hittle & Antrim, Noblesville, IN, Thomas E. Wheeler II, Bose McKinney & Evans, Indianapolis, IN, for Eagle-Union Community Schools, Jon Cravens, Charles Curtis, James Krupowics, Paula Roeder, Howard Hull, Teran Armstrong, Nancy Tillett.

Kathyryn Symmes Kirk, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for the State of Indiana, Sue Ellen Reed, Special Education Board, Cynthia Dewes, Richard L. Terrien, Raymond Quisten.

ENTRY DISCUSSING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BARKER, Chief Judge.

I. Introduction

A. Parties and Procedural Posture

Plaintiffs allege that rights secured to them by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491, by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., as well as by constitutional due process, were violated by the defendants.

The plaintiffs in this action may be usefully designated as Student and Parents, and on occasion to describe the salient events "Student's Mother" is also a term used. In relation to the docket and the pleadings, the Student is Robert Doe, and his parents are Mary Doe, Mother, and John Doe, Father.

There are two groups of defendants in this action, the "School Defendants" and the "State Defendants." The State Defendants are the State of Indiana, Suellen Reed, the Indiana Board of Special Education Appeals ("BSEA"), Cynthia Dewes, Richard L. Therrien, and Raymond Quist. The School Defendants are Eagle-Union Community School Corporation ("Eagle-Union"), Nancy Tillet, Teran Armstrong, Howard Hull, Paula Roeder, James Krupowicz, Charles Curtis, and Robert Wingerter.

The defendant individuals among the School Defendants are members of the Eagle-Union's School Board, except for Howard Hull, who is Superintendent of Eagle-Union, Teran Armstrong, who is the Principal at the high school attended by the Student, and Nancy Tillett, who is a counselor at the high school attended by the Student. The Student has engaged Eagle-Union in litigation in the past in P.J., a Minor by His Next Friend v. Eagle-Union Community School Corporation, 1999 WL 1054599 (7th Cir. November 17, 1999) (unpublished) (affirming district court disposition of IDEA and related challenges), and in A Minor, M.S., by Minor's Next Friend, P.S. v. Eagle-Union Community School Corporation, 717 N.E.2d 1255 (Ind.App.1999).

The School Defendants and the State Defendants seek resolution of the claims against them through the entry of summary judgment.¹ The plaintiffs oppose such disposition, and likewise seek the entry of summary judgment as to their claims against the School Defendants.

B. Summary Judgment Standard

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a motion for summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." A "material fact" is one that "might affect the outcome of the suit." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute is genuine only if a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party. Id. Because the plaintiffs are proceeding without counsel, the notice required by Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100 (7th Cir.1982), was issued. Through this notice, the plaintiffs were notified of the nature of the motions for summary judgment, of the proper manner in which to respond, and of the consequences of failing to respond. The plaintiffs have responded with evidence and a discussion of their claims.

A party moving for summary judgment initially has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact in evidence of record. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Schroeder v. Barth, Inc., 969 F.2d 421, 423 (7th Cir.1992). If the moving party carries this burden, the opposing party then must "go beyond the pleadings" and present specific facts which show that a genuine issue exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Scherer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 975 F.2d 356, 360 (7th Cir.1992).

The methodology outlined above applies to the plaintiffs' due process claims, which constitute the entirety of the claims against the State Defendants and a portion of the claims against the School Defendants. A different standard of review, however, is applicable to the residual claims against the School Defendants. A district court reviewing an administrative decision "shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). In this setting, when no new evidence is presented,

"the motion for summary judgment is simply the procedural vehicle for asking the judge to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record." Heather S. by Kathy S. v. State of Wisc., 125 F.3d 1045, 1052 (7th Cir.1997) (citation omitted). Accordingly, despite being termed summary judgment, the district court's decision is based on the preponderance of the evidence. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1996); Hunger v. Leininger, 15 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir.1994). Indeed, a district court must independently determine whether the requirements of the Act have been satisfied. In developing this standard, Congress specifically rejected language which would have made state administrative findings conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. However, because courts do not have special expertise in the area of educational policy, they must give "due weight" to the results of the administrative decisions and should not substitute "their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review." Board of Educ. of Murphysboro v. Illinois Bd. of Educ., 41 F.3d 1162, 1166 (7th Cir.1994) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see Morton Community Unit Sch. Dist. v. J.M., 152 F.3d 583, 587-88 (7th Cir.1998) ("[C]ourts (the district court and then this court, using the same standard) should give due deference to the hearing officers' judgments."); Heather S., 125 F.3d at 1052-53.

Patricia P. v. Board of Educ. of Oak Park, 203 F.3d 462, 467 (7th Cir.2000); see also Board of Educ. of Murphysboro v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 41 F.3d 1162, 1166 (7th Cir.1994) (in cases challenging administrative decisions under the IDEA, a district court must independently determine whether the IDEA's requirements have been satisfied).

II. Discussion

A. Statutory Overviews

The core of the claims and issues in this action is the implementation of the IDEA. Under IDEA, a parent or guardian is entitled to procedural safeguards to ensure that his or her disabled child's educational needs are being met by the student's school district. The following excerpt, though lengthy, sets the stage for an understanding of what occurred in relation to the Student's entitlements and the various defendants' obligations under the IDEA.

IDEA, known originally as the Education of the Handicapped Act, was enacted to ensure that all children with disabilities have access to a "free appropriate public education" to meet their unique needs. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c). A "free appropriate public education" is defined as "special education and related services" that (1) have been provided at public expense and under public supervision and direction; (2) meet the standards of the state educational agency; (3) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the state involved; and (4) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under § 1414(a)(5). Id. § 1401(a)(18).

To effectuate this goal, Congress established a three-tiered funding, administration, and implementation scheme, under which the state must submit a plan of compliance to the Secretary of Education which provides federal IDEA funds to the state. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412-1414. The state is then responsible for administering the funds on the state level, including the...