Doe v. Evans

• Decision Date: 09 September 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-0879,97-0879
• Citation: 718 So.2d 286
• Parties: 137 Lab.Cas. P 58,516, 14 IER Cases 577, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D2077 Jane DOE, Appellant, v. William Dunbar EVANS, III; Church of the Holy Redeemer, Inc.; The Diocese Of Southeast Florida, Inc.; and Calvin O. Schofield, Jr., Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 286

718 So.2d 286

137 Lab.Cas. P 58,516, 14 IER Cases 577,

23 Fla. L. Weekly D2077

Jane DOE, Appellant, v. William Dunbar EVANS, III; Church of the Holy Redeemer, Inc.; The Diocese Of Southeast Florida, Inc.; and Calvin O. Schofield, Jr., Appellees.

No. 97-0879.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Fourth District.

Sept. 9, 1998.

Certification Denied Oct. 29, 1998.

Edward Campbell of Roberts & Sojka, P.A., and Randy D. Ellison, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Thomas E. Ice of Barwick, Dillian, Lambert & Ice, P.A., Miami, and Christopher Renzulli of Renzulli & Rutherford, New York City, for appellees Church of the Holy Redeemer, Inc., The Diocese of Southeast Florida, Inc., and Calvin O. Schofield, Jr.

POLEN, Judge.

Jane Doe, a former parishioner at the Church of the Holy Redeemer (Holy Redeemer), appeals the dismissal of her second amended complaint as against Holy Redeemer, the Diocese of Southeast Florida, Inc., (the Diocese), and Bishop Calvin O. Schofield, Jr. (Schofield) (collectively "church defendants"). Another defendant, Reverend William Dunbar Evans, III, did not join in the church defendants' motion to dismiss, and Doe's claims against Evans remain pending in the lower court. We have before us only the dismissal of Does' claims against the church defendants. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of those claims.

FACTS

In Doe's second amended complaint against the several defendants, Doe alleged she was a former parishioner at Holy Redeemer where Evans was employed as a pastor responsible for providing counseling and spiritual advice to parishioners having marital difficulties. Doe alleged Evans approached her and asked to assist her with counseling, spawning a pastoral counselor-counselee relationship that endured from December 27, 1991, to February of 1992.

Doe alleged the Diocese, Schofield, and Holy Redeemer were aware of prior incidents involving sexual misconduct during counseling by Evans at another church, within the Diocese, and at Holy Redeemer. Despite this knowledge, nothing was done to rectify the situation. Doe alleged Schofield and the Diocese had control over hiring, firing, compensation, and discipline of priests including Evans.

Doe alleged a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against all defendants, asserting Evans breached the duty owed to Doe by becoming romantically involved with her in a manner that made it impossible for Evans to adequately keep Doe's interests paramount. Doe alleged Holy Redeemer, Schofield, and the Diocese were made aware early in the counseling process that Evans was abusing his position of trust. She asserted Evan's alleged conduct was not motivated by any sincerely held religious belief, further alleging the church defendants owed her a fiduciary duty, (apparently premised on Doe having informed the church defendants of Evan's conduct), which the church defendants breached, causing Doe embarrassment, guilt, and ridicule.

Additionally, Doe alleged a cause of action against Holy Redeemer, the Diocese, and Schofield for negligent hiring and/or supervision and/or retention, as well as a cause of action against all defendants for "outrage."

The church defendants moved to dismiss Doe's second amended complaint on the basis the causes of action brought against these church defendants involved practices and procedures beyond the purview of secular courts. They argued the adjudication of these claims would result in the court's excessive entanglement with religious beliefs contrary to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The church defendants argued the claim of breach of fiduciary duty was essentially a claim of clergy malpractice, which they alleged had been uniformly rejected by states considering the claim. This claim, they argued, was barred by both the Establishment Clause and the The church defendants also argued the first amendment barred the claim of negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, because those claims required a determination of what makes one competent to serve as a priest, which in turn requires interpretation of church canons and internal policies and practices--determinations beyond the court's scope of review.

Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

As to Doe's claim for outrageous conduct, the defendants argued this cause of action was not recognized by Florida courts. Alternatively, the church defendants argued if Doe's claim was read as a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, her allegations did not rise to the level of "outrageousness" required by Florida courts. Finally, the church defendants argued the adjudication of this claim was beyond the secular court's scope of review.

The trial court granted the church defendants' motion to dismiss with prejudice stating Doe's claims were barred by the First Amendment.

OVERVIEW OF FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall made no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...." This phrase is broken down into two clauses: the first is referred to as the Establishment Clause, and the second as the Free Exercise Clause. "The entanglement doctrine, which prohibits excessive governmental entanglement with religion, springs from the Establishment Clause." L.L.N. v. Clauder, 209 Wis.2d 674, 563 N.W.2d 434, 440 (1997).

An explanation of the excessive entanglement doctrine applicable to the instant First Amendment issue is contained in the court's opinion in Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450 (Ind.Ct.App.1996):

The First Amendment ... contains two freedoms with respect to religion: the freedom to believe and the freedom to act. The freedom to believe is absolute, while the freedom to act is subject to regulation for the protection of society. However, any regulation must meet a three-part test:

First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion."

* * * * * *

Excessive entanglement occurs when the courts begin to review and interpret a church's constitution, laws, and regulations. The First Amendment prohibits courts from resolving doctrinal disputes or determining whether a religious organization acted in accordance with its cannons and bylaws.

Konkle, 672 N.E.2d at 454 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971)) (additional citations omitted).

As to excessive governmental entanglement with religion, the court in L.L.N. noted:

It is well-settled that excessive governmental entanglement with religion will occur if a court is required to interpret church law, policies, or practices; therefore, the First Amendment prohibits such an inquiry. However, it is equally well-settled that a court may hear an action if it will involve the consideration of neutral principles of law.

L.L.N., 563 N.W.2d at 440 (citations omitted).

Applying these basic principles to Doe's claims against the church defendants, we must examine whether the determination of her claims necessarily implicates an excessive governmental entanglement with religion. If the court is required to interpret church law, policies, or practices, the First Amendment prohibits such an inquiry. Examination of case law from other jurisdictions reveals a split of authority on this question as to each of Doe's claims.

NEGLIGENT HIRING, RETENTION, AND SUPERVISION

To prevail on claims of negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, the plaintiff must establish the employer owes a duty to the plaintiff, the breach of which is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. See Watson v. City of Hialeah, 552 So.2d 1146 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).

Negligent hiring occurs when, prior to the time the employee is actually hired, the employer knew or should have known of the employee's unfitness, and the issue of liability primarily focuses upon the adequacy of the employer's pre-employment investigation into the employee's background. Negligent retention, on the other hand, occurs when, during the course of employment, the employer becomes aware or should have become aware of the problems with an employee that indicated his unfitness, and the employer fails to take further action such as investigating, discharge, or reassignment.

Garcia v. Duffy, 492 So.2d 435, 438-439 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (citations omitted).

Doe contends Doe v. Dorsey, 683 So.2d 614 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), rev. denied, 695 So.2d 699 (Fla.1997) controls and holds civil damages may be assessed against a church for proven claims of negligent hiring, supervision, and retention. We disagree, and believe Dorsey actually supports affirmance.

In Dorsey, a former altar boy alleged a priest exerted undue influence, dominion, and control over the plaintiff to participate in an ongoing sexual relationship beginning when the boy was thirteen and continuing long after the young man reached majority. Id. at 615. The court concluded allegations of abuse occurring while the plaintiff was a minor were time-barred. Id. at 617. In addressing a potential First Amendment bar, the court stated it would limit the circumstances under which it would allow civil liability for negligent retention to criminal conduct:

Although the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers makes a convincing case that the First Amendment does not protect the church when the acts of the clergy involve children and are criminal in nature, because we hold that the action against the church and the bishop in this case for the negligent retention of the priest, insofar as the abuse of plaintiff which occurred while he was a minor is concerned, is time-barred, the issue of whether the First Amendment protects the church when its clergy commits criminal acts is not before us. In any event, we are persuaded that just as the...