Doe v. FP, CX-03-333.
| Decision Date | 19 August 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. CX-03-333.,CX-03-333. |
| Citation | 667 N.W.2d 493 |
| Parties | Mary DOE, et al., Appellants, v. F.P., Respondent, Diocese of Winona, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
J. Poage Anderson, Diane M. Odeen, Nichols, Kaster & Anderson, PLLP, Minneapolis, for appellants.
Robert L. McCollum, Teri E. Bentson, McCollum, Crowley, Vehanen, Moschet & Miller, Ltd., Bloomington, for respondent F.P.
George F. Restovich, Bruce K. Piotrowski, George Restovich & Associates, Rochester, for respondent Diocese of Winona.
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, John S. Garry, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, for amicus curiae State of MN.
Considered and decided by HARTEN, Presiding Judge, WILLIS, Judge, and WRIGHT, Judge.
Based on the sexual relationship between appellant Mary Doe and respondent F.P., a Catholic priest of respondent Diocese of Winona (the diocese), Mary Doe and her husband, appellant John Doe, brought claims against respondents for sexual abuse/sexual exploitation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium. They also asserted claims against the diocese for negligent hiring and retention, negligent supervision, and strict liability, and a claim against F.P. for breach of fiduciary duty.
Appellants moved for leave to add a claim for punitive damages. Respondents moved for summary judgment. The district court denied appellants' motion and granted summary judgment to respondents on all claims. Appellants challenge the denial of their motion; the summary judgment granted on the claim under Minn.Stat. § 148A.03 (2002); the dismissal of claims under Minn.Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(l) (2002), and Minn.Stat. § 609.345, subd. 1(l) (2002), based on the conclusion that those statutes facially violate the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution, and the dismissal of the derivative claims.1
Appellants John and Mary Doe and their three young children were members of the Catholic parish in Currie, Minnesota. Mary Doe worked part-time as a musician for the parish.
In summer 1987, F.P., a priest, was assigned to the Currie parish. He got to know Mary Doe in her capacity as a musician and became a friend of the Doe family. F.P. and Mary Doe met weekly to plan the music for services. They developed what both regarded as a close friendship; in F.P.'s words, they "fell in love" and mutually disclosed intimate details of their lives: in F.P.'s case, these included his sexual relationships with other women; in Mary Doe's case, they included her disappointing involvement with the charismatic movement, her fears of alcoholism, and her dissatisfaction with her marriage. F.P. advised Mary Doe to see a counselor for her family problems and a substance abuse expert for her alcoholism; he also recommended a spiritual advisor for her. Mary Doe saw all three of these professionals on an ongoing basis. The sexual component of the relationship between Mary Doe and F.P. began with hugs and had progressed to sexual touching by 1992.
In July 1993, F.P. was transferred from Currie to Mankato, about 90 miles away. F.P. visited the Doe family in Currie about once a month; Mary Doe, sometimes with a member or members of her family, also visited him in Mankato. Many of these visits involved sexual contact between F.P. and Mary Doe. The relationship ended in 1998, after Mary Doe discovered that F.P. was sexually involved with another woman. She and her husband eventually brought this action against F.P. and the diocese. The district court dismissed the action, and this appeal followed.
1. Did F.P. provide psychotherapy to Mary Doe within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 148A.01, subd. 6 (2002)?
2. Do Minn.Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(l) (2002), and Minn.Stat. § 609.345, subd. 1(l) (2002), violate the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution?2
On appeal from summary judgment, this court asks whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its application of the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn.1990)
. The district court granted respondents summary judgment on appellants' claim under Minn.Stat. § 148A.02 (2002), alleging that F.P. was practicing psychotherapy in his relationship with Mary Doe.
It is not a defense to the action that sexual contact with a patient occurred outside a therapy or treatment session or that it occurred off the premises regularly used by the psychotherapist for therapy or treatment sessions.
Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court recently addressed a claim brought against a member of the clergy as a result of a sexual relationship under a similar law, Chapter 148B, governing unlicensed mental health practitioners. "`Unlicensed mental health practitioner' * * * includes * * * (3) clergy who are providing mental health services that are equivalent to those defined in subdivision 4." Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d 426, 437 (Minn.2002) (quoting Minn.Stat. § 148B.60, subd. 3 (1998)).
Subd. 4. "Mental health services" means psychotherapy and the professional assessment, treatment, or counseling of another person for a cognitive, behavioral, emotional, social, or mental condition, symptom, or dysfunction, including intrapersonal or interpersonal dysfunctions.
Id. (quoting Minn.Stat. § 148B.60, subd. 4 (1998)). The supreme court based its determination that a clergy member "provided services equivalent to psychotherapy" within the meaning of Minn.Stat. § 148B.60 on several factors: (1) the cleric referred to his sessions with a couple as "marital counseling"; (2) the meetings with the couple varied from weekly to monthly over two years; (3) the cleric brought third parties to the counseling sessions to assist the couple with their marriage problems; (4) he discussed his psychological coursework and used psychological terminology; (5) he conducted psychological and personality examinations of the couple and assessed their personalities; (6) he attempted to modify one party's behavior; and (7) he challenged the opinions of professional counselors, saying that they did not understand the situation as well as he did and that his advice and approach were superior to theirs. Id. at 438-39.
None of these factors is present here. F.P. referred to himself and Mary Doe as "friends"; she spoke of him as her friend and of their relationship as between equals. During the period that F.P. and Mary Doe had regular weekly meetings, the meetings were for the purposes of liturgy planning or choir practice. F.P. repeatedly advised Mary Doe to seek counseling from professionals—not from himself—regarding her depression and her alcohol use, and she often discussed with him what her professional counselors had told her. F.P. had no training in counseling or psychology. When asked if he counseled parishioners going through a death in the family, he said he would "visit with them and be with them in their pain"; when asked if he counseled parishioners about substance abuse, he said, "If they came to me, I would talk with them and refer them." F.P. also testified about his own counseling, using the term to mean scheduled, compensated appointments with a professional psychologist or psychiatrist. He conducted no psychological or personality testing of Mary Doe or of anyone else. He did not provide "professional treatment, assessment, or counseling of a mental or emotional illness, symptom, or condition" within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 148A.01, subd. 6, and Minn.Stat. § 148A.02. Their communications did not come within the statutory meaning of psychotherapy.
Mary Doe claimed that F.P. counseled her, but she defined counseling as, "[Y]ou just simply go talk to someone about your personal problems." In her deposition, she referred to F.P. as a friend of her and her family and to their relationship as mutual and between equals. She testified that, when their friendship began, F.P. shared with her information about his sexual activities with other women in parishes to which he had previously been assigned. She also testified that when, near the end of their relationship, she discovered that F.P. was sexually involved with another woman, she was hurt; F.P. testified that she was jealous.
We conclude that the district court did not err in granting respondents summary judgment on appellants' chapter 148A claim that F.P. was practicing psychotherapy in his relationship with appellant and, accordingly, affirm the district court as to that issue.
Minnesota statutes are presumed constitutional, and this court's power to declare a statute unconstitutional should be exercised with extreme caution. In re Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn. 1989). Determining a statute's constitutionality is a question of law. Hamilton v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 600 N.W.2d 720, 722 (Minn.1999).
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