Lickteig v. Kolar
| Decision Date | 27 May 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. A09-1728.,A09-1728. |
| Citation | 782 N.W.2d 810 |
| Parties | Mary LICKTEIG, Plaintiff/Appellant,v.Robert KOLAR, Jr., Defendant/Appellee. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. A cause of action based on sexual abuse does not exist under Minnesota law apart from common-law tort, although such common-law tort claims may arise from “sexual abuse” as defined by Minn.Stat. § 541.073 (2008).
2. The doctrine of intrafamilial immunity does not apply to suits between siblings, and therefore, does not bar appellant's claim.
3. The delayed discovery statute of limitations that applies to claims based on sexual abuse, Minn.Stat. § 541.073 (2008), is retroactive.
Richard D. Casey, Ryland L. Deinert, Dana Van Beek Palmer, Lynn, Jackson, Shultz & Lebrun, P.C., Sioux Falls, SD, for appellant.
John E. Mack, Mack & Daby, P.A., New London, MN, for appellee.
Appellant Mary Lickteig sued her brother, appellee Robert Kolar, Jr., in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota for sexual abuse and battery allegedly committed during their childhood, between approximately 1974 and 1977. The district court dismissed the case sua sponte, concluding that Lickteig did not state a cause of action, and Lickteig appealed. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals certified three questions to this court: (1) whether Minnesota law recognizes a cause of action by one sibling against another sibling for “sexual abuse” that allegedly occurred when they were both minor children; and, if so, what are the elements of that cause of action; (2) whether intrafamilial immunity applies between siblings for a sexual abuse tort or battery tort committed when both were unemancipated minors living in the same household, where the lawsuit is not brought until both are emancipated adults living in separate households; and (3) whether the statute of limitations, Minn.Stat. § 541.073 (2008), applies retroactively to Lickteig's action, where she was allegedly sexually abused as a minor between 1974 and 1977, but, because of repressed memories, she alleged that she did not remember the abuse until 2005. We accepted the questions as certified, and we now answer the first two questions in the negative and the third question in the affirmative.
Lickteig and Kolar are biological siblings who grew up in Walnut Grove, Minnesota. Lickteig alleged that Kolar sexually abused her for several years, starting in 1974 and ending in 1977. Lickteig also alleged that Kolar sexually abused, raped, and assaulted her older sisters while she was in the same room. Kolar admitted that he sexually abused two of his sisters, but denied Lickteig's allegations against him. Lickteig alleged that because of mental and emotional distress, she had repressed her memory of these events. She asserted that she began to see a therapist in August 2005 because of nightmares, as memories of Kolar's sexual abuse began to resurface.
Lickteig sued Kolar in 2007 in federal district court. The court had subject matter jurisdiction in the case based on the diversity of citizenship statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). Lickteig is a South Dakota resident and Kolar is an Iowa resident. Lickteig alleged one count of sexual abuse and one count of battery. Kolar denied Lickteig's allegations and asserted counterclaims for abuse of process and defamation. Lickteig filed a motion to amend her complaint to add a claim for punitive damages, which Kolar opposed on the ground that the statute of limitations barred Lickteig's claims against him. The district court granted the motion to amend, concluding that Lickteig's action was not time-barred under Minn.Stat. § 541.073. Upon Lickteig's motion for summary judgment on Kolar's counterclaims, the district court granted the motion to dismiss Kolar's abuse-of-process claim, but denied the motion as to Kolar's defamation claim.
After reviewing briefs by the parties on the issue of whether Lickteig asserted a cognizable action, the district court dismissed the case sua sponte. The court concluded that Lickteig did not state a cause of action after determining that: (1) Minnesota does not recognize a cause of action for sexual abuse between unemancipated siblings, and (2) the doctrine of intrafamilial immunity barred the action.
The district court denied Lickteig's requests to file a motion to reconsider and to certify the issues to this court. Lickteig appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and the Eighth Circuit certified to this court the three questions 1 before us. We accepted the certified questions without modification.
We review certified questions de novo. In re UnitedHealth Group Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 754 N.W.2d 544, 550 (Minn.2008). We may answer a question of law certified by a federal court “if the answer may be determinative of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court and there is no controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision, or statute of this state.” Minn.Stat. § 480.065, subd. 3 (2008).
The certified questions before us involve consideration of Minn.Stat. § 541.073, the statute of limitations for claims based on sexual abuse. Subdivision 1 of the statute defines “sexual abuse” as “conduct described in sections 609.342 to 609.345.” Minn.Stat. § 541.073, subd. 1. Minnesota Statutes sections 609.342 to 609.345 (2008) are the criminal sexual conduct provisions of the criminal code that define criminal sexual conduct in the first to fourth degrees.2
Minnesota Statutes § 541.073, subdivision 2, details the limitations period, and provides:
Subdivision 3 provides, “[t]his section applies to an action for damages commenced against a person who caused the plaintiff's personal injury either by (1) committing sexual abuse against the plaintiff, or (2) negligently permitting sexual abuse against the plaintiff to occur.”
This statute, known as the “delayed discovery statute,” D.M.S. v. Barber, 645 N.W.2d 383, 387 (Minn.2002), was enacted in 1989. As originally enacted, it provided in part:
An action for damages based on personal injury caused by sexual abuse must be commenced, in the case of an intentional tort, within two years, or, in the case of an action for negligence, within six years of the time the plaintiff knew or had reason to know that the injury was caused by the sexual abuse. The plaintiff need not establish which act in a continuous series of sexual abuse acts by the defendant caused the injury. The knowledge of a parent or guardian may not be imputed to a minor. This section does not affect the suspension of the statute of limitations during a period of disability under section 541.15.
Act of May 19, 1989, ch. 190, § 2, 1989 Minn. Laws 485, 486 (). The statute was effective on May 20, 1989, the day following final enactment, and it applied to actions “pending on or commenced on or after that date.” Id. § 6, 1989 Minn. Laws at 488. The Legislature also enacted an extension of time provision:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a plaintiff whose claim is otherwise time-barred has until August 1, 1990, to commence a cause of action for damages based on personal injury caused by sexual abuse if the plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff consulted an attorney to investigate a cause of action for damages based on personal injury caused by sexual abuse within two years of the time the plaintiff knew or had reason to know that the injury was caused by the sexual abuse.
Id. § 7, 1989 Minn. Laws at 488. This provision was not codified in Minnesota Statutes.
In 1991, the Legislature deleted the 2-year statute of limitations for intentional tort claims based on sexual abuse and enacted a 6-year statute of limitations for all claims based on sexual abuse. The statutory language was amended to its current version and provides, “[a]n action for damages based on personal injury caused by sexual abuse must be commenced within six years of the time the plaintiff knew or had reason to know that the injury was caused by the sexual abuse.” Act of May 28, 1991, ch. 232, § 1, 1991 Minn. Laws 629, 629 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 541.073). This change became effective on May 29, 1991, and applied to actions “pending on or commenced on or after that date.” Id. § 4, 1991 Minn. Laws at 631.
The Legislature again enacted an extension-of-time provision in 1991 id. § 5, 1991 Minn. Laws at 631, and then amended that provision in 1992 to read:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a plaintiff whose claim would otherwise be time-barred under Minnesota Statutes 1990 has until August 1, 1992, to commence a cause of action for damages based on personal injury caused by sexual abuse if the action is based on an intentional tort committed against the plaintiff.
Act of Apr. 29, 1992, ch. 571, art. 12, § 2, 1992 Minn. Laws 1983, 2088. Like the prior extension provision, this section of the session laws was not codified in Minnesota Statutes. The 1992 amendment to the extension provision was effective retroactive to August 1, 1991, and applied to actions “pending on or commenced on or after that date.” Id. § 3, 1992 Minn. Laws at 2088. The statute has not been amended since 1992.
The first question presented is whether Minnesota law recognizes a separate cause of action for sexual abuse, as opposed to a common-law tort claim based on sexual abuse. No prior decision...
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