Doe v. Frisz
| Decision Date | 26 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | SC 99310 |
| Citation | 643 S.W.3d 358 |
| Parties | John DOE, Appellant, v. Kurt FRISZ, Chief Law Enforcement Officer, St. Charles County, Missouri, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Doe was represented by Daniel J. Brutrager, Mary L. Bruntrager and Jonathan N. Bruntrager of Bruntrager & Billings PC in Clayton, (314) 646-0066.
Frisz was represented by Robert E. Hoeynck and Rory P. O'Sullivan of the St. Charles County counselor's office in St. Charles, (636) 949-7540.
In December 2019, Petitioner John Doe pleaded guilty to four counts of endangering the welfare of a child for striking his daughters and exposing one daughter to the cold. Several months after pleading guilty, Doe's probation officer notified him that he needed to register as a sex offender based on allegations in charges the state abandoned and to which Doe did not plead guilty. Doe petitioned for writ of prohibition, requesting the circuit court prohibit Respondent Sheriff Kurt Frisz from determining he must register as a sex offender. The circuit court issued a preliminary writ but, ultimately, denied a permanent writ of prohibition. Doe appealed. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 10 of the Missouri Constitution. This Court holds the circuit court erred in using the state's abandoned charges to find Doe pleaded guilty to sex offenses, but, because a writ of prohibition is not the proper remedy, this Court affirms the circuit court's judgment denying a permanent writ of prohibition.
On February 16, 2018, a grand jury indicted Doe on 17 counts alleging multiple instances of sodomy and child molestation involving his daughters, H.C. and R.C., and one count of statutory rape involving H.C. The state later filed a substitute information in lieu of indictment alleging the same 17 counts. Eventually, the state reached a plea agreement with Doe in which he agreed to plead guilty to four counts of endangering the welfare of a child in the first degree, and the state agreed to dismiss all other counts. In the four counts of endangering the welfare of a child, the state alleged Doe struck H.C. on two instances, struck R.C. on one instance, and exposed R.C. to the cold with inadequate clothing for an extended period of time.
On December 3, 2019, the circuit court held a plea hearing. During the hearing, H.C. offered a victim impact statement in which she told the court Doe raped, manipulated, and beat several members of their family. The circuit court expressed its reluctance to accept the plea, but, based on the state's representations regarding the victims’ mental states and the state's assessment of the likelihood of success on the original charges, the circuit court accepted the plea agreement. The circuit court then suspended imposition of Doe's sentence and placed him on probation for five years. The circuit court added several special conditions, including a psychological and psychosexual evaluation and sex offender counseling.
On July 21, 2020, Doe's probation officer, Sonya Engelking, notified him that he must register under Missouri's Sex Offender Registration Act ("SORA") and under the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA"). Before notifying Doe, Engelking consulted with Sheriff Frisz, who then consulted with the County Counselor's office. Two days after Engelking notified Doe that he needed to register as a sex offender, Doe filed a petition for writ of prohibition in the St. Charles County Circuit Court. In his petition, Doe requested the circuit court "prohibit the Chief Law Enforcement Officer from determining that Relator is required to register under either SORA or SORNA[.]" The circuit court issued a preliminary writ of prohibition. After holding a hearing, the circuit court concluded Doe was required to register as a sex offender and denied Doe's request for a permanent writ.
"If the court issues a preliminary order and a permanent writ later is denied, the proper remedy is an appeal." State ex rel. Ashby Road Partners, LLC v. State Tax Comm'n , 297 S.W.3d 80, 83 (Mo. banc 2009). Appellate courts review the denial of a petition for writ for an abuse of discretion. U.S. Dep't. of Veterans Affairs v. Boresi , 396 S.W.3d 356, 359 (Mo. banc 2013) (expressing the rule in the context of a writ of mandamus). A circuit court abuses its discretion when it "misapplies the applicable statutes." Id. "Matters of statutory interpretation are questions of law reviewed de novo. " Holmes v. Steelman , 624 S.W.3d 144, 149 (Mo. banc 2021). Ultimately, this Court is "primarily concerned with the correctness of the circuit court's result, not the route taken by the circuit court to reach that result, and the circuit court's judgment must be affirmed if cognizable under any theory, regardless of whether the circuit court's reasoning is wrong or insufficient." State ex rel. Greitens v. Am. Tobacco Co. , 509 S.W.3d 726, 737 (Mo. banc 2017) (quotation marks omitted).
Under section 589.400.1(7) of SORA,1 a person must register as a sex offender if that person is required to register under SORNA. SORNA requires a "sex offender" to register. 34 U.S.C. § 20913(a) (2018). SORNA broadly defines "sex offender" as "an individual who was convicted of a sex offense." 34 U.S.C. § 20911(1) (2018). A "sex offense" includes "a criminal offense that is a specified offense against a minor." 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(ii) (2018). Finally, the definition of "specified offense against a minor" contains a catchall provision that includes "[a]ny conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor." 34 U.S.C. § 20911(7)(I) (2018) (emphasis added).
Missouri courts have applied a non-categorical approach when determining whether an offense included conduct that by its nature was a sex offense against a minor. Doe v. Isom , 429 S.W.3d 436, 443 (Mo. App. 2014). The non-categorical approach allows courts to look "beyond the guilty plea to the underlying facts of the offense to determine whether the petitioner's offense qualifie[s] as a sex offense." Doe v. Belmar , 564 S.W.3d 415, 418 (Mo. App. 2018) (quotation marks omitted). A categorical approach, on the other hand, would permit courts to "look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense." Isom , 429 S.W.3d at 442 n.7 (quotation marks omitted).
For example, in Isom , the offender pleaded guilty to endangering the welfare of a child in the first degree. Id. at 441. The offender argued endangering the welfare of a child was not in and of itself a sex offense. Id. Although the court of appeals agreed, it noted "the offense of endangering the welfare of a child in the first degree can relate to sexual offenses." Id. (emphasis in original). Applying a non-categorical approach, the court of appeals looked beyond the conviction to the charging document, which alleged the offender endangered the welfare of a child by "disseminating nude pictures of A.R. touching her genitals to her friends, students at her school, and to other adults." Id. (emphasis in original). Based on the allegations to which the offender pleaded guilty, the court of appeals found he pleaded guilty to a sex offense. Id. at 443.
Here, Doe argues the four offenses of endangering the welfare of a child to which he pleaded guilty were not sexual in nature. Doe points out the charges to which he pleaded guilty alleged he struck his daughters on three occasions and exposed R.C. to the cold with inadequate clothing for an extended period of time on one occasion, but they do not mention anything sexual in nature. Doe further contends the circuit court improperly considered the allegations in the first indictment and information, which alleged 17 counts that were all different from the counts to which he pleaded guilty, in determining his offenses were sexual in nature. Sheriff Frisz responds the non-categorical approach allows courts to consider all "reliable evidence," including abandoned pleadings. Sheriff Frisz's argument, however, would grossly expand the non-categorical approach.
In prior cases applying the non-categorical approach, Missouri courts have considered allegations to which the defendant pleaded guilty. Isom , 429 S.W.3d at 443 ; Belmar , 564 S.W.3d at 416 (). The state relies on United States v. Hill , 820 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir. 2016), but, even in Hill , the evidence on which the court relied to determine whether the defendant committed a sex offense against a minor resulted in the underlying conviction. In Hill , the defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of "willfully, maliciously, and indecently expos[ing] his person in a public place on property of others, or to the view of any person on a street highway." Id. at 1004 (alteration in original). Hill argued nothing about that charge indicated he committed the offense "against a minor." Id. The court rejected his argument because, "[a]ccording to the relevant arrest affidavit, Hill masturbated in front of an eleven-year-old child." Id. at 1006. The court looked beyond the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the offense but did not look beyond the circumstances of the crime to which Hill pleaded guilty.
This case differs from Hill because Doe did not plead guilty to the sex offenses alleged against him. Although the state alleged Doe committed 17 unmistakably sex offenses, the state did not pursue those charges. Rather, the state dismissed those charges and brought four different charges that were not sexual in nature. Indeed, Sheriff Frisz agrees Doe was not required to register as a sex offender under section 589.400.1(2) of SORA, which requires a person...
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