Doe v. Lorain-Elyria Motel, Inc.
| Decision Date | 16 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:19-CV-1194 |
| Parties | JANE DOE S.W., Plaintiff, v. LORAIN-ELYRIA MOTEL, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
OPINION & ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Best Western International, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 29) and Defendant Lorain-Elyria Motel, Inc.'s Motions to Dismiss or, alternatively, Motion to Transfer (ECF No. 40). For the following reasons, Defendants' Motions are hereby DENIED.
Plaintiff, Jane Doe S.W. ("Doe"), alleges she was trafficked for sex beginning in 2017 at the Best Western and Motel 9 properties in Elyria, Ohio and the Economy Inn property in Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 4). Plaintiff now seeks to hold these hotels liable under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act ("TVPRA"), 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). Plaintiff also brings state law claims for negligence, premises liability, and unjust enrichment.
Plaintiff alleges that these hotel Defendants knew that sex trafficking occurred frequently on their properties and failed to prevent it, and also that they knew or should have known of Doe's trafficking. Plaintiff points to behavior that she alleges hotel staff should have recognized as signs of her trafficking: physical signs of human trafficking including "bruises and physical deterioration," indicators of commercial sex activity such as "bottles of lubricants, boxes of condoms, excessive requests for towels and linens, cash payments," and the presence of three to five Johns entering and leaving the hotel guest room per day. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 55, 56). Doe alleges that these hotels and their parent companies did not take adequate measures to prevent human trafficking and "demonstrated willful blindness to the rampant culture of sex trafficking." (Id. at ¶ 79).
Defendants both bring motions to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Defendant Best Western International, Inc. ("Best Western") also moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). Defendant Lorain-Elyria Motel, Inc. ("LEM") moves to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for improper venue under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) or, in the alternative, moves the Court to exercise its discretion to transfer the case to the Northern District of Ohio.
Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that personal jurisdiction exists over a defendant. Opportunity Fund, LLC v. Epitome Sys., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 2d 531, 537-38 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (citing Air Prods. & Controls, Inc. v. Safetech Int'l, Inc., 503 F.3d 544, 549 (6th Cir.2007)). Where, as here, "the district court relies solely on written submissions and affidavits to resolve a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, rather than resolving the motion after either an evidentiary hearing or limited discovery, the burden on the plaintiff is 'relatively slight,' and 'the plaintiff must make only a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists in order to defeat dismissal.'" Air Prods. & Controls, 503 F.3d at 549 (quoting Am. Greetings Corp. v. Cohn, 839 F.2d 1164, 1169 (6th Cir.1988). Plaintiff can make this showing by "establishing with reasonable particularity sufficient contacts between [the Defendants] and the forum state to supportjurisdiction." Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 887 (6th Cir.2002) (quoting Provident Nat'l Bank v. California Federal Savings Loan Ass'n, 819 F.2d 434, 437 (3d Cir. 1987)). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the Court "construe[s] the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party," and "does not weigh the controverting assertions of the party seeking dismissal." CompuServe Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir.1996) (emphasis in original).
A complaint will be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ P. 12(b)(3) if venue is improper. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) in: (1) any district in which the defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the state; (2) a district "in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated;" or (3) if there is no other district where the action may be brought so long as the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Even if venue is proper under § 1391(b), a court may exercise its discretion to grant a motion to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) "if the transfer would further the convenience of the parties and the witnesses and be in the interest of justice." MJR Int'l, Inc. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, No. 2:06-CV-0937, 2007 WL 2781669, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 24, 2007). On a motion to transfer, "the plaintiff's choice of a forum is entitled to considerable weight, and, consequently, the party moving for a change of venue must demonstrate that the interests served by 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) clearly favor a change of venue." Id. at *3 (citing Sun Oil Co. v. Lederle, 199 F.2d 423 (6th Cir.1952)).
The Court may dismiss a cause of action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Such a motion "is a test of theplaintiff's cause of action as stated in the complaint, not a challenge to the plaintiff's factual allegations." Golden v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d 950, 958-59 (6th Cir. 2005). The Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008). If more than one inference may be drawn from an allegation, the Court must resolve the conflict in favor of the plaintiff. Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993). The Court cannot dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id. The Court is not required, however, to accept as true mere legal conclusions unsupported by factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). Although liberal, Rule 12(b)(6) requires more than bare assertions of legal conclusions. Allard v. Weitzman, 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). Generally, a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint's factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). It must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. A claim is plausible when it contains "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Defendant Best Western first moves to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. (ECF No. 29 at 4-8).
Personal jurisdiction exists over a defendant "if the defendant is amenable to service of process under the [forum] state's long-arm statute and if the exercise of personal jurisdiction would not deny the defendant[ ] due process." Bird v. Parson, 289 F. 3d 865, 871 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). Personal jurisdiction over a defendant may be general or specific, depending on the nature of the defendant's contacts with the forum state. Bird v. Parson, 289 F. 3d 865, 873 (6th Cir. 2002). General jurisdiction exists when a defendant's contacts are sufficiently "continuous and systematic" to justify jurisdiction over claims unrelated to those contacts. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). The "paradigm all-purpose forums" for corporate defendants are its place of incorporation or its principal place of business. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2015). Specific personal jurisdiction exists over an out-of-state defendant who has "certain minimum contacts with [the State] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 564 U.S. at 293 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Compensation and Placement et al., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). The plaintiff must show the defendant "purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum" and "the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This Court finds specific personal jurisdiction exists over defendant Best Western. Construing the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there are sufficient allegations to indicate Best Western has minimum contacts with the forum state. Doe alleges defendant operates forty-four Best Western branded hotels throughout the state of Ohio. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 13); (ECF No. 34 at 29). Plaintiff alleges that as a hotel parent company, defendant was willfullyblind to the prevalence of sex trafficking at hotel locations in the forum and failed to train and to monitor adequately its properties. (ECF No. 1 at 65, 79). She alleges defendant receives profits from these hotel locations and that her specific trafficking occurred at a Best Western location in the state of Ohio. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 11); (ECF No. 34 at 29). These actions constitute purposeful availment, and cannot be characterized as "random, fortuitous, or attenuated." Opportunity Fund, LLC, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 539. Plaintiff has alleged a causal connection between Best Western's...
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