Doe v. Phillips
| Decision Date | 01 April 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. WD 68066.,WD 68066. |
| Citation | 259 S.W.3d 34 |
| Parties | Jane DOE I, et al., Respondents, v. Thomas PHILLIPS, et al., Defendant, James Keathley, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Arthur Benson, Jamie K. Lansford, co-counsel, Kansas City, MO, for respondents.
Before HARDWICK, P.J., SMART, J. and WELSH, SP. J.
The Circuit Court of Jackson County issued a judgment enjoining the Superintendent of the Missouri State Highway Patrol from publishing photographs and identifying information of registered sex offenders whose convictions predate the July 1, 1995, enactment of Missouri's Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), Section 589.400 et seq., RSMo. The Superintendent appeals from the permanent injunction. For reasons explained herein, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the cause to the circuit court with instructions to limit the scope of the injunction.
Eleven plaintiffs, who had been convicted of crimes that required them to register as sex offenders, filed suit against the Superintendent of the Missouri Highway Patrol and other defendants1 seeking a declaration that SORA was unconstitutional under the Missouri Constitution. In January 2005, the circuit court upheld SORA in all respects. The plaintiffs appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court.
In ruling on the case in 2006, the Supreme Court generally upheld SORA but found that application of the registration requirements to persons who were convicted prior to the January 1, 1995, enactment of the law was a violation of the Missouri Constitution's prohibition on retrospective laws. Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833, 852 (Mo. banc 2006); Mo. Const. art. I, § 13. The case was remanded to the circuit court.
On remand, the plaintiffs who qualified as pre-1995 offenders moved for an order prohibiting the defendants from using the photographs provided with their SORA registrations. The circuit court granted relief, in January 2007, by entering a permanent injunction against James Keathley, as Superintendent of the Missouri Highway Patrol, and his successors. The judgment prohibited the Superintendent from "publishing the photographs of plaintiffs on websites on the Internet[,] or otherwise disseminating such photographs ... and identifying information of persons registered under SORA whose convictions predated January 1, 1995."
The circuit court denied the Superintendent's motions to amend the judgment. On appeal, the Superintendent raises four points challenging the permanent injunction.
Our review of this judgment in equity is the same as in other court-tried cases: We must affirm the trial court's decision unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Systematic Bus. Servs., Inc. v. Bratten, 162 S.W.3d 41, 46 (Mo. App.2005).
"Whether an injunction should be granted is a matter of the trial court's discretion in balancing the equities." S. Star Cent. Gas Pipeline, Inc. v. Murray, 190 S.W.3d 423, 432 (Mo.App.2006). The court has broad discretion to grant relief that fits the particular facts, circumstances, and equities of the case. Id. We review a trial court's decision to grant an injunction under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 429.
In his first point on appeal, the Superintendent contends the circuit court erred in enjoining the publishing of photographs and other identifying information about the plaintiffs because such dissemination does not violate the Missouri Constitution's ban on retrospective laws. In Doe, the Supreme Court defined a retrospective law as one which 194 S.W.3d at 850 (quoting Squaw Creek Drainage Dist. v. Turney, 235 Mo. 80, 138 S.W. 12, 16 (1911)). Based on this definition, the Superintendent argues that publication of the plaintiffs' photos in no way imposes an obligation or duty on sex offenders who are now exempt from SORA's registrations requirement and, therefore, does not fall within the conduct proscribed by the Doe decision.
The Superintendent's argument misses the point of the injunctive relief granted. The circuit court did not enjoin the dissemination of the plaintiffs' photos because such conduct directly violated the constitution; rather, the court concluded that the dissemination was improper because the photos were obtained as a result of an unconstitutional statutory provision. The circuit court stated:
The continued use of said photographs by Defendant James F. Keathley constitutes the continuation of an aspect of the plaintiffs' registration that was held unconstitutional. Defendant would not have the photographs of plaintiffs but for their compelled compliance with a provision of SORA that has now been determined to be unconstitutional.
By restricting use of the photos, the circuit court reasonably exercised its discretion in attempting to fully address the wrongs suffered by the pre-1995 offenders, who were unlawfully required to register under SORA.
The basis of equity "is the doing of complete, essential, and perfect justice between all the parties without regard to form, and its object is the prevention of injustice." Landmark Bank v. Ciaravino, 752 S.W.2d 923, 927 (Mo.App.1988) (quoting State Savings Trust Co. v. Spencer, 201 S.W. 967, 969 (Mo.App.1918)). In granting equitable relief, the court should do "complete justice by enjoining the whole of the unlawful proceeding." Joe Dan Mkt., Inc. v. Wentz, 223 Mo.App. 772, 20 S.W.2d 567, 569 (1929). Here, the circuit court recognized that eliminating the registration requirement only partially resolved an injustice for pre-1995 offenders. To ensure complete justice, equity required eliminating access to information obtained during the unconstitutional registration process. The injunction was proper to the extent that it prohibited the Superintendent from using photographs and identifying information that were unlawfully acquired. Point I is denied.
Point II offers a related argument. The Superintendent contends the injunctive relief was too broad in that it also prohibited the dissemination of plaintiffs' photographs and identifying information obtained from sources other than the SORA registrations. In Doe, the Supreme Court expressly "reject[ed] the claim that publication of true information" about the pre-1995 offenders would necessarily violate the constitutional ban on retrospective laws. 194 S.W.3d at 852. The Supreme Court, in effect, recognized that defendants should not be precluded from using all information in their possession concerning the plaintiffs, particularly when such material was otherwise available in the public sector.
We agree that the circuit court...
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